# RADIO LIBERTY

## REPORT ON THE USSR

### ALL-UNION TOPICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valerii Konovalov</td>
<td>Legacy of the Afghan War: Some Statistics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron Trehub</td>
<td>Growing Alarm about AIDS in the Soviet Union</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Marples</td>
<td>The Strange Case of Valerii Legasov</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron Trehub</td>
<td>Accuracy of 1989 Census Called into Question</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annette Bohr</td>
<td>Resolving the Question of Equality for Soviet Women—Again</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IN THE REPUBLICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Fuller</td>
<td>Crisis in Georgian Shota Rustaveli Society</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Solchanyk</td>
<td>Mykhailo Hrushev's'kyi: On the Road to Full Rehabilitation</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Marples</td>
<td>Further Debate on Energy in Southern Ukraine</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Marples</td>
<td>New Revelations Underline Seriousness of Problems in Ukrainian Coal Mines</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir Socor</td>
<td>Moldavian Writers Publish Unauthorized Periodical in Latin Script</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Fuller</td>
<td>New Abkhaz Campaign for Secession from Georgian SSR</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vera Tolz</td>
<td>The USSR This Week</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Legacy of the Afghan War: Some Statistics
Valerii Konovalov

Statistical data on the number of Soviet troops who saw service in Afghanistan and the casualties they suffered were shrouded in secrecy throughout the long years of the war. It was only at the start of the Soviet troop withdrawal that Army General Lizichev produced figures that showed that the losses of the Fortieth Army in Afghanistan up to May, 1988, comprised 13,310 dead, 35,478 wounded, and 311 missing.1 By the time the withdrawal of Soviet troops was complete, these losses had risen to 15,000 dead, 37,000 wounded, and 313 missing. According to the Soviet journalist Aleksandr Bovin, over the entire period of almost ten years, more than half a million Soviet soldiers served in Afghanistan.2

These are the official statistics. In January of this year, however, the newspaper of the Central Committee of the Estonian Komsomol, Noorte Haal, published a report in which its correspondent in Kabul, Toomas Sildam, totally refuted the official Soviet data on losses during the war in Afghanistan. The Estonian newspaper claimed that overall Soviet losses amounted to 50,000 killed and 150,000 injured and that, altogether, more than a million Soviet soldiers passed through the Afghan experience. The economic cost of the Afghan war for the Soviet Union was around 60 billion rubles. By way of comparison, the Estonian newspaper stated that the cost of cleaning up after the earthquake in Armenia would be 5 billion rubles.3

It is not possible to produce even an approximate picture of the national composition of the troops who served or died in Afghanistan from the official data provided by the USSR Ministry of Defense. A fragmentary picture may, however, be pieced together from the scraps of information that have appeared occasionally in the pages of the

1 Argumenty i fakty, No. 22, 1988.
3 Noorte Haal, January 24, 1989; Komsomol'skaya pravda (Lithuania), March 14, 1989.
Soviet press. Belorussia was the first republic to breach the wall of silence surrounding the Afghan war: a book containing the names of Belorussians killed in Afghanistan is being compiled by the publishers of the Belorussian Soviet Encyclopedia. Preliminary calculations place the list of dead from the republic at around 760. It is expected that the book will ultimately contain the names of about 800 who died in Afghanistan. Data on individual towns and cities have also appeared in the Belorussian press. Thus, 2,264 Afghan veterans live in Minsk, of whom seventy-five are invalids; ninety-three former residents of the republican capital did not return from Afghanistan alive. There are over 2,000 Afghan veterans in Vitebsk Oblast, of whom forty-six are invalids, while 136 died in Afghanistan. Further data on Belorussian veterans of the Afghan war came to light in an interview with V. Pechennikov, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party. There are more than 16,000 Afghan veterans in Belorussia, according to Pechennikov, 433 of whom are invalids (436 according to other sources), about 200 of them first- and second-category invalids.

Statistics on other regions of the USSR are subject to even greater secrecy and are even more fragmentary than those on Belorussia. In the Kiev area of Ukraine, for example, not far from Bab'ii Yar, there is a new military cemetery that is almost exclusively for Afghan veterans—officers and other ranks. The cemetery contains hundreds of graves. There are 129 Afghan veterans living in the Nizhne-ukrainsky Raion of the Crimean Oblast, and eleven failed to return from the war. In Pavlograd in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, there are more than 400 invalids from the Afghan war, and eleven families suffered bereavement. Sixty-two Afghan veterans live in the Svalyava Raion of Zakarpatskaya Oblast.

As regards the RSFSR, the greatest number of veterans are from Moscow—27,000. There are some interesting data relating to the Lyublinsky Raion of Moscow: 400 living Afghan veterans, seven dead. There are 103 Afghan invalids in Leningrad, and more than 6,000 veterans of the war live in Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast. More than 2,300 veterans of the Afghan war live in Tula, fifty-six of whom are invalids; eighty did not return alive. In the city of Dzerzhinsk in Gorky Oblast, which has a population of 300,000, there are 260 Afghan veterans, nine of whom are wounded, three now being invalids, and twelve families were bereaved. There are about 150 Afghan veterans in Zagorsk, Moscow Oblast, with deaths in sixteen families. In Kosimov, also in Moscow Oblast, there are 160 Afghan veterans. In the Kominternovskiy Raion of Voronezh, there are ninety-three Afghan veterans. In Novosibirsk, 440 Afghan veterans are sorely in need of better housing. Novosibirsk lost 127 men dead in Afghanistan. Two are still missing.

Some of the published statistics relate to the Baltic states. More than 300 Afghan veterans live in Tallinn. According to official reports, twenty-six Estonians died in Afghanistan. This figure seems suspiciously low. Other sources indicate, for example, that the village of Kokhila, not far from Tallinn, has seven Afghan veterans and lost three dead. An incomplete list of Latvians and Russians from Latvia contains the names of fifty-six dead and one missing. More than 3,000 men from Lithuania served in Afghanistan. Eighty-seven were killed and eighty-eight are now invalids.

More than 1,220 Afghan veterans live in Baku, and more than 600 in Tbilisi. As far as Central Asia and Kazakhstan are concerned, several sources attest that duty in Afghanistan affected mainly men from rural districts. Slightly more than 350 veterans of the Afghan war live in the Kirgiz capital of Frunze, but in the rural raions, irrespective of distance from the capital, the numbers are much greater. The number of dead from Kirgizia was 191. In the Andizhan Raion of the Uzbek SSR, 141 to 180, with most figures in the hundreds.20 Afghan veterans were killed in battle.

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6 Sovetskaya Belorusiya, March 1, 1989. Pechennikov’s figure of 16,000 Afghan veterans for a republic with a population of 10 million is hard to square with the figure of 27,000 Afghan veterans for Moscow with its population of 9 million (Zvezda, February 24, 1989; TASS, March 3, 1989). There is a similar discrepancy in his statistics on invalids among Afghan veterans. The figures for Minsk and Vitebsk Oblast alone constitute a quarter of the 433 men he refers to.  
there are more than thirty Afghan veterans. There are eighty Afghan veterans in the Tajik city of Dusti, and several hundred in the Leninsky Raion of the republican capital, Dushanbe. More than 300 Afghan veterans live in the Akhunbabaevsky Raion of Fergana Oblast. Thirty-three veterans of the Afghan war work on the "Sotsializm" kolkhoz in Ashkhabad Raion, and there are more than 2,000 Afghan veterans in Alma-Ata.16

There are also some interesting statistics on officers who served in Afghanistan and those veterans who went on to serve in the MVD or to study at prestigious higher educational institutions. According to the commander of the Baltic Military District, Lieutenant General Kuz'min, about 10 percent of the officers under his command served in Afghanistan. A good half of the officers of airborne assault troops served on Afghan soil.17 Some 700 Afghan veterans are serving in the Main Administration of Internal Affairs of the Moscow City Executive Committee. Last year, twenty-nine Afghan veterans enrolled at the Moscow Higher Police Academy,18 and twenty of the 210 first-year students at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations were Afghan veterans.19

The fragmentary nature of the information in the Soviet press makes it difficult to obtain any idea of the social composition of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. One thing is, however, certain: the sons of high-ranking Party officials did not go to Afghanistan. Anxious parents made sure they were enrolled in higher educational institutions with military departments or, by using their connections, arranged for them to serve in Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, or some other quiet spot.20 It was the sons of ordinary Soviet families who served and died in Afghanistan, not the children of the Party elite.

To return to the grim statistics of losses during the Afghan war, just how many soldiers were killed in the war: 15,000 or 50,000? The answer to this question was hinted at in the title of an article published in a Central Asian newspaper: "One in Three Is Alive—These Are the Terrible Statistics of This Difficult War."21

Looking at the casualty lists that the Soviet press has slowly started to publish, it is difficult to understand why the number of veterans from one particular city is sometimes almost as great as, if not greater than, the figure for the whole neighboring republic. The impression is created that it is in someone’s interests to echo the assertion of “Pamyat'” leader Dmitril Vasilev that significantly more “fellow-Slavs” died in the war than representatives of other nationalities.22 A clear indication of this is provided by the small number of Afghan war casualties for the Baltic republics in the official statistics. The figure of 800 for Belorussia is more realistic, lending weight to the argument that the real number of Soviet dead in the Afghan war may have been not 15,000 but closer to the terrible 50,000 cited in the Estonian Komsomol newspaper.

19 Argumenty i faisky, No. 44, 1988.
21 Komsomolets Tadzhikistana, December 2, 1989.

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Growing Alarm about AIDS in the Soviet Union
Aaron Trehub

A n international conference on AIDS in Europe took place in Moscow in March. Convened under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the USSR Ministry of Health, the conference was attended by over 150 specialists from Eastern and Western Europe. Although its main purpose was to examine ways of monitoring and halting the spread of the disease among drug users, the conference also shed some light on the current AIDS situation in the Soviet Union. Dr. Aleksandr Kondrusiev, deputy minister of health and chief medical officer of the USSR,
told reporters that 176 Soviet citizens have now been identified as carriers of HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. This figure represents an increase of more than 100 percent since last fall, when the number of Soviet HIV carriers was officially put at eighty-three. It is almost certainly too low however. Dr. Vadim Pokrovsky, head of the Central Scientific Research Laboratory for AIDS Epidemiology and Prophylaxis in Moscow, told Soviet television viewers last month that the number of Soviet HIV carriers is probably in the 1,000-10,000 range.

The WHO conference took place at a time of growing alarm about AIDS in the Soviet Union, especially within the medical establishment. Dire projections abound. Last month, Pravda reported that mathematicians have calculated that, if current rates of infection hold, the Soviet Union will have 600,000 HIV carriers and 6,000 active AIDS cases by 1995; by the year 2000, said the experts, there will be 15 million carriers and 200,000 active cases in the USSR. An article that appeared the same day in the trade-union newspaper Trud was more encouraging. It quoted Kondrusev as saying that, “according to preliminary estimates,” there will be 55,000 HIV carriers and approximately 1,300 active cases of the disease in the USSR by the end of the century. The numbers given by Kondrusev may turn out to be too high or too low, said the newspaper; the important thing is that the number of HIV carriers and AIDS victims in the Soviet Union is likely to rise into the thousands in the coming decade.

The most alarming statements have come from the minister of health, Dr. Evgenii Chazov. He recently told the RSFSR daily Sovetskaya Rossiya that “the danger is such that in about ten years the problem of AIDS in our country may reach the level of the Chernobyl’ tragedy.” “The threat facing us is no less dangerous than that of an ecological ‘bomb’ or nuclear weapons,” Chazov told Izvestia a few days later.

Incompetent Doctors and Negligent Personnel
Chazov’s overheated rhetoric aside, there is plenty of cause for alarm. The USSR registered its first AIDS death last September, when a twenty-nine-year-old prostitute succumbed to the disease in a Leningrad hospital. The circumstances of her death, as recounted in the Soviet press, provided an unusually graphic illustration of the shortcomings of Soviet medicine. To start with, the doctors treating her misdiagnosed her symptoms. Then they botched the first set of blood tests, mixing her serum sample with those of several other patients because there was not enough reagent to test each sample separately. When they finally got it right, it was too late. The test results showing that the woman was HIV positive came back from the laboratory three days after her death. The case in Leningrad showed that, despite a period of grace of several years, during which the Soviet medical establishment watched the spread of the disease in the West, the Soviet Union has been caught unprepared by “the plague of the twentieth century.”

An even more shocking case of medical negligence occurred in a children’s hospital in the city of Elista, the capital of the Kalmyk ASSR, where at least forty-one children and eight mothers were infected with the AIDS virus late last year. Investigators are still looking into the incident, but it seems fairly certain that the virus was spread by the repeated use of unsterilized hypodermic syringes.

Chronic Shortages of Syringes and Condoms
The case in Elista has shown that perhaps the most serious problem in the fight against AIDS in the Soviet Union is the shortage of disposable hypodermic syringes and needles. Although the exact size of the shortfall is difficult to determine, it certainly reaches many millions, perhaps billions, of syringes each year. The problem is complicated by buck-passing and finger-pointing among various government ministries. On paper at least, the Ministry of the Medical and Microbiological Industry (Minmedbioprom) is responsible for the production of disposable syringes and needles in the Soviet Union. Mikhail Grigor’ev, head of the main production department of Minmedbioprom, told the popular weekly magazine Ogonek last summer that the Soviet Union needs at least six billion disposable syringes a year. “Our present production capacity,” he said, “is seven million a

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1 Steve Goldstein, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, March 18, 1989.
2 Central Television, February 8, 1989.
8 TASS, February 24, 1989. At the conference in Moscow earlier this month, however, Dr. Valentín Pokrovsky, president of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and father of leading AIDS specialist Vadim Pokrovsky, said that the infection was spread by the use of unsterilized catheters (Steve Goldstein, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, March 18, 1989).
year." By buying new equipment abroad and by soliciting help from other Socialist countries, Grigor'ev said, the Soviet Union could raise this figure to 350 million in 1988, "but that's the limit!" Predictably, he tried to shift the blame for the shortfall to another ministry, the Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry (Minstankoprom), which, he said, has fallen down on the job of designing Soviet-made equipment for producing disposable syringes.

In the event, Grigor'ev's estimate that the Soviet Union could produce 350 million disposable syringes in 1988 proved to be far too optimistic. Pravda recently reported that last year the USSR produced or assembled from imported parts a grand total of 49 million syringes, 28.5 million of which lacked needles. Dr. Kondrusev told reporters at the conference in Moscow earlier this month that the Soviet Union's present production capacity is 30 million disposable syringes a year. This is 10 million less than the yearly output of the "Inserpol" syringe factory outside Lisbon, which was recently visited by a Soviet medical delegation on the lookout for foreign sources of supply. Set up six years ago by a Portuguese engineer-entrepreneur, the factory, which also manufactures blood-transfusion equipment, employs all of twenty-seven people.

Then there is the condom shortage. Last year, the usually staid doctors' newspaper Meditsinskaya gazeta printed a couple of feuilletons on the subject. It appears that experts have reckoned that the Soviet Union needs at least a billion condoms a year. The USSR's sole condom factory is located in Armavir, a city in the southwestern RSFSR. In a good year, it produces up to 220 million of what Soviet medical bureaucrats demurely call "Article Number 2." In 1987, however, the factory's production line hit a snag, and Article Number 2 disappeared from drugstore shelves in all but the largest cities. It has yet to reappear. Last month, a reporter for the youth newspaper Komsomol'skaya pravda could not find a single packet of condoms in any of the more than 240 drugstores in the Crimea.

Like the shortage of disposable syringes, the shortage of condoms has been made worse by a lack of cooperation between a number of government ministries. In this case, the players are the USSR Ministry of Health (Minzdrav), the Ministry of the Oil Refining and Petrochemical Industry (Minneftekhimprom), and the Ministry of Chemical and Petroleum Machine Building (Minkhimprom). In 1987, according to Pravda, Minzdrav ordered 300 million condoms from Minneftekhimprom; it received 200 million. Taken to task for the shortfall by Meditsinskaya gazeta, Minneftekhimprom accused Minkhimprom of having failed to come up with designs for Soviet-made equipment (the production line at the Armavir plant was imported from Italy some years ago). As Pravda remarked, "the uninitiated person would be amazed to learn that such intimate questions as family planning, the choice of contraceptives, and his or her sex life are ultimately in the hands of Minzdrav, Minneftekhimprom—anybody's but his or her own." The newspaper also ridiculed the way in which the number of condoms to be produced is set by ministerial fiat:

It may be hard for people to understand why the manufacturers, having settled on producing 220 million of "the articles in question," which works out to exactly three condoms per year for every member of the male sex, have now . . . decided to make twice as many—i.e., six. Perhaps five would do, or maybe seven?

**Popular Attitudes: Indifference and Panic**

Dr. Valentin Pokrovsky has said that the popular attitude towards AIDS in the Soviet Union is still predominantly one of indifference. "The perception that this disease will pass us by now rules in this country," he told reporters at the conference in Moscow. He did remark, however, that "some part of the population" has reacted with panic. Elista is a case in point. The Kalmyk poet and candidate for the Congress of People's Deputies David Kugul'tinov, recently described how cars bearing Kalmyk license plates have been pelted with stones in neighboring territories, "as if automobiles are spreaders of the AIDS virus." He also claimed that there have been demands in other republics that Kalmyk students be

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18 "Byt' lyud'mi!" Izvestia, February 23, 1989.
evicted from university dormitories. Kugul’tinov noted that the United States recently adopted a law that raised penalties for discrimination against AIDS victims,19 and he recommended that the

19 Last November, Californian voters defeated Proposition 102, a state ballot initiative that would have required doctors to report the names of HIV carriers to public health authorities (RFE/RL Special, November 10, 1988). There have also been a number of recent court decisions extending the protection afforded by the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which “bars discrimination against the handicapped by institutions receiving federal funds,” to HIV carriers (“Fighting AIDS Discrimination,” Time, September 5, 1988, p. 50).

NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY

The Strange Case of Valerii Legasov
David Marples

The monthly journal Soviet News and Views, which is published by the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, has once again focused attention on the case of the late Academician Valerii Legasov, who committed suicide on April 27, 1988, after two years of intensive work into the causes and consequences of the Chernobyl' disaster.1 Following his suicide, there was much speculation in the West over whether Legasov had in fact been suffering from radiation sickness. According to the author of the article in Soviet News and Views, Soviet playwright and science editor of Pravda Vladimir Gubarev, Legasov was subjected to high levels of radioactivity at Chernobyl'; however, it seems to have been not so much radiation that led to Legasov’s death as the adverse effect that the aftermath of the disaster had on his psyche.

Gubarev begins with a brief biography of Legasov. He notes that the scientist was a graduate of the prestigious Mendeleev Institute’s Faculty of Physicochemical Engineering. Following postgraduate studies in nuclear fuels, he obtained his doctorate at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, which is affiliated with the USSR Academy of Sciences. As deputy director of the All-Union Institute of Chemical Physics, Radiochemistry,
and Nuclear and Plasma Technologies, Legasov was involved in examining the potential dangers in nuclear power engineering. Gubarev declares that Chernobyl represented a turning point in Legasov's life.

Thereafter, Gubarev says, Legasov sought a dramatic change that would overcome a perceived stagnation in Soviet science. In particular, he wanted to establish principles for industrial safety for the remainder of the century. However, Gubarev states, his ideas were rebuffed and rejected at every turn by fellow academicians. On April 26, 1988, the day before his suicide, a session of the USSR Academy of Sciences formally rejected his proposals by a vote of 129-100. One chemist is quoted as saying: "We don't want a rookie leading us by the nose." Legasov, who was fifty-three when he died, received the report of the session that same evening.

Views on Legasov among the academicians were, however, evidently mixed. While a space scientist felt that his death was "an irreparable loss for science," a senior researcher at the Kurchatov Institute (Gubarev does not name him) believed that

Legasov was a typical representative of the scientific mafia whose politicking brought about the Chernobyl tragedy, thereby inuring the country more than the mafiosi who dealt in corruption.

Gubarev, who was responsible for Legasov's memoirs being published posthumously in Pravda, clearly does not adhere to this view. He maintains that Legasov was a successful researcher, who, though disillusioned with some aspects of Soviet science, believed that nuclear energy had a sound future. His death was a result, he implies, of a psychological breakdown.

Looking at the post-Chernobyl career of Legasov, a change can be discerned in his outlook and attitude to the Soviet nuclear energy industry, but it is not clear when this change took place. Shortly after the disaster, he remained convinced of the future of nuclear power:

I am profoundly convinced that nuclear power stations are the pinnacle of achievement in power generation. . . . The future of civilization is unthinkable without the peaceful utilization of nuclear power.2

Moreover, Legasov remained a firm spokesman for the view that nuclear power was a much safer and more preferable energy source than hydroelectric and thermal electric stations. In one instance, he even went so far as to suggest that nuclear power could become a stabilizing influence in world politics as a future struggle for the diminishing supply of raw materials might lead to conflicts between nations. At the same time, he pointed out that supplies of organic fuel could not last longer than the year 2100 and that their exploitation was thus short term.3

As head of the Soviet delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) session in Vienna in August, 1986, Legasov came across as a staunch defender of the continued use of nuclear power in the Soviet Union and of the design of the graphite (RBMK) reactors of the type used at Chernobyl. The Soviet report on the Chernobyl accident, which he coauthored, was basically an optimistic document. Praised for its openness and scientific accuracy—although it can hardly be regarded as a definitive account—the report appeared to skim over or ignore altogether many of the more controversial issues, such as the delayed evacuation process, the dangerous nature of the cleanup work, and even the radioactive fallout that took place after May 6.

At some point thereafter, however, Legasov began to question the morality of technological expansion in the Soviet Union: "The problem today is the proliferation of all sorts of projects and the concentration of vast power," he stated in an interview published in the summer of 1987, ostensibly referring in the latter instance to the Ministry of Power and Electrification and the Ministry of Atomic Power. Initially, he believed, the decisions made in the nuclear power industry were good ones, but problems arose when these ideas were applied indiscriminately on a large scale. As he informed Ukrainian writer Yurii Shcherbak:

The need for electric power is great. It was necessary quickly to introduce and master power [production] on a new scale. . . .

The number of people involved in the preparation of installations and their running increased sharply. But the teaching and training methods could not keep up with the pace of development.4

At this time, in late 1986, he had begun to elaborate a new philosophy of safety. The key to the problem, in his view, lay in the relationship between "man and machine." The latter had to be

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2 Pravda, June 2, 1986.
made reliable enough to withstand the inevitable mistakes of the former. This apparently straightforward logic actually represented a fundamental change in Soviet thinking, which, as far as industrial development was concerned, had overrated the infallibility of the machine. "We have become too carried away by technology," asserted Legasov. Although technology had been created at the outset "in the spirit of the greatest humanitarian ideas," it had been taken over by technocrats who operate without moral principles: "The low technical level and the low level of responsibility of these people is not a cause but an effect. The effect of their low moral level."

Legasov and some of his colleagues tried in vain to draw attention to this problem, notes Gubarev, but were ignored by the scientific community. They had sought, he stated, better computing power, simulators for the training of staff at nuclear power plants, but to no avail. According to the Belorussian writer Ales' Adamovich, Legasov did not rule out the possibility of another Chernobyl-type accident at one of the fourteen graphite reactors (RBMKs) still operating in the country.

You can put it on record. I am convinced, unfortunately. The most important contributing factors to the Chernobyl accident have not been and cannot be removed. They include faults resulting from poor construction and the lack of reliable emergency systems for similar plants, and the impossibility of constructing any concrete "cones" to seal them at this stage.5

At the time of his death, therefore, it seems clear that Legasov was an unhappy and disillusioned man who felt that the concerns to which he had devoted his career after Chernobyl were being ignored by his peers. ... In the final analysis, whatever the scientist's motives and state of mind, he certainly succeeded in undermining the credibility of those involved in the Soviet nuclear industry after Chernobyl. There have been new revelations about a past accident at the Beloyarsk plant and a near disaster on a Soviet nuclear submarine.

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At the time of his death, therefore, it seems clear that Legasov was an unhappy and disillusioned man who felt that the concerns to which he had devoted his career after Chernobyl were being ignored by his peers. He had begun to praise the cleanup workers at the site, particularly those carrying out very hazardous duties in the first days after the disaster.6 Yet his colleagues seemed to be ignoring the lessons of Chernobyl and continuing to make plans for expanding the industry as though nothing had changed. Since a strong movement against nuclear power development was emerging in the Soviet Union, his associates, in their turn, may have felt that his statements amounted to a betrayal. A year later, however, much of the mystery surrounding Legasov remains. Indeed, Gubarev's article only gives rise to further questions. When did Legasov's change of opinion about Chernobyl take place? For example, the interview with Adamovich, is not dated. Was he regarded within the Kurchatov Institute and the Academy of Science generally as "an old-style bureaucrat" or as a man determined to put into operation the principles of perestroika in the sphere of nuclear energy? Why has his searing criticism of the attitude of the so-called technocrats and the lack of safety at RBMK reactors never been refuted or discussed publicly by scientists? And were there other reasons for his death? Gubarev makes it plain that he at least is far from satisfied with the investigator's report into Legasov's death, which stated that

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Gubarev and Shcherbak evidently adhere to the theory that the suicide was in part an attempt to draw attention to the unfortunate state of affairs in the nuclear industry. Gubarev stated in the aforementioned article that Legasov's suicide was an act of courage, rather than weakness. In the final analysis, whatever the scientist's motives and state of mind, he certainly succeeded in undermining the credibility of those involved in the Soviet nuclear industry after Chernobyl. There have been new revelations about a past accident at the Beloyarsk plant and a near disaster on a Soviet nuclear submarine.7 Legasov's death remains one more unhappy event in this sad chronicle.

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5 Moscow News, No. 29, 1988, p. 10.
7 The Observer, January 8, 1989; and AP, March 5, 1989.

Report on the USSR
Accuracy of 1989 Census Called into Question
Aaron Trehub

The fourth all-Union census of the postwar period in the Soviet Union was carried out between January 12 and 19 of this year. Preliminary results are due to be published in April. Already, however, the Soviet press has printed several items that raise serious questions about the accuracy of the census results.

Was There Deliberate Falsification?
The most serious attacks have come from census-takers themselves and have to do with the complications caused by the Soviet residence permit (propiska) system. In the Soviet Union, as in most other countries, census results are used to decide how resources should be allocated. Clearly, local officials stand to gain from overstating the population of their districts: the greater the number of inhabitants, the more resources they stand to get. The catch is that many Soviet citizens do not live where their residence permits say they should. This means that local officials have to reckon with the possibility that the number of people actually living in their district may, upon examination, turn out to be smaller than the number of people registered as living there. Should this discrepancy come to light, the district would find itself in a weaker position to compete for resources from the center.

A letter to Ogonek from three census-takers from a neighborhood in Moscow describes how some officials came up with a foolproof way to prevent this.1 They instructed the census-takers to count everybody with a propiska for their district as permanent residents, regardless of whether they were actually living there. Conversely, they told the census-takers to count everybody who happened to be living in their district as permanent residents, regardless of whether they had a propiska. The census-takers refused to follow these instructions on the grounds that they violated the census regulations and "encroached on the civil rights of Soviet citizens." They were thereupon relieved of their duties by the chairman of the neighborhood Party executive committee.

A letter to Argumenty i fakty from a tabulator in Sverdlovsk Oblast suggests that similar instructions were issued there.2 According to the letter, officials went so far as to "populate" unoccupied apartments. Given the severe housing shortage in the Soviet Union, it seems strange that there should be any unoccupied apartments. A survey conducted in a number of Soviet cities in 1986, however, discovered at least one million apartments that were either not occupied at all or occupied illegally.3

Since it is not clear how widespread these practices were, it is not yet possible to determine how seriously they may have affected the accuracy of the census results. What is interesting is that Goskomstat, the Soviet statistical agency, does not seem all that inclined to look into the question. Responding to the letter from the tabulator in Sverdlovsk, representatives of Goskomstat confined themselves to explaining how discrepancies between the number of actual and officially registered inhabitants in a given area might arise; they dodged the main point of the letter—i.e., that deliberate falsification had occurred.

What About the Homeless?
Late last year, a reader of Izvestia raised the delicate question of counting the Soviet homeless.4 The official fiction that there are no homeless people in the Soviet Union was only recently abandoned, and so far no official estimates of their numbers have been made public. There are unofficial estimates, though, and they suggest that this is a rather large group of people. For example, the free-lance journalist Aleksei Lebedev, who has made the homeless his special concern, claims that there are at least 1.2 million homeless people in the Soviet Union.5 If Lebedev is right, the officials in charge of the next all-Union census might consider following the example of their counterparts in the United

1 "Mozhno li doveryat?" Ogonek, No. 9, 1989, p. 23.
2 "Vse li uznala statistika," Argumenty i fakty, No. 8, 1989.
Other Complaints

Finally, there have been complaints that the census regulations were written in such a way as to conceal the size of the Soviet armed forces and the Soviet prison population. It seems that, in contrast with the all-Union census of 1959, this year's census did not identify military personnel as such, but rather assigned them their nearest civilian job equivalent. Thus an army doctor was listed as a doctor, a member of a construction brigade was listed as a builder, and so forth. Inmates of Soviet penal institutions were apparently listed as ordinary workers in the most appropriate branch of the economy (wood processing or construction, for example). "If we had come up with this kind of 'solution' before, we wouldn't have had to spend all those years maintaining the army and worrying about the prisons," remarked one census-taker from Irkutsk.7 "Why should I, a major in the Soviet Army, have to hide behind the mask of an office worker?" demanded one military man in the pages of Izvestia.8 Goskomstat spokesmen excused the practice by saying that this year's census regulations were drawn up before the advent of Gorbachev, glasnost', and "the new political thinking."

Conclusion

The 1989 all-Union census is the first Soviet census that has been conducted under conditions of glasnost'. For this very reason, its flaws and omissions are being discussed in the open. The next move is up to Goskomstat. Whether that much-maligned agency will act on the charges of falsification and concealment remains to be seen.

WOMEN

Resolving the Question of Equality for Soviet Women—Again

Annette Bohr

Now we can say with pride that outside of Soviet Russia there is not a single country in the world where women enjoy full rights.

V.I. Lenin, 1919

Officially resolved decades ago, the "women's question" in the Soviet Union has reasserted itself with a vengeance. Exhausted by decades of "emancipation," many Soviet women are expressing nostalgia for traditional female roles centered around the home and family. Others—although in smaller numbers—are taking advantage of increased opportunities for political and social activism, and a few are even espousing Western-style feminism.

The "Women's Question" in Marxist-Leninist Theory

In accordance with Marxist-Leninist precepts, the fledgling Soviet government set out to resolve the question of sexual equality for women in several ways. First, early Soviet legislation sought to secure full economic and social equality for women by abolishing restrictions on women's freedom of movement, revising inheritance laws that were unfavorable to women, and making extensive changes in the realm of family legislation. Marriage became a free association of equal and independent partners, and divorce was readily obtainable at the request of either spouse. De facto relationships were given legal recognition, legitimate and illegitimate children were accorded the same rights, and, in 1920, abortion was legalized.1

Second, and of greatest significance, the Marxist-Leninist perspective emphasized the employment of women in the public sector as a condition of complete equality. The emergence of women from the confines of the hearth and home would, it

was argued, lead to their assumption of a full range of political, economic, and social roles and hence their complete emancipation. Engaging women in the public sector was Lenin's answer even to the problem of prostitution. "Take them back to productive work, bring them into the social economy," he said to German revolutionary Klara Zetkin in 1920.2

Third, since the employment of women in the public sector was not intended to create "a double burden," the responsibility for housework and child care was to shift from the individual household to the social collective. Communal living arrangements, including shared kitchens and laundries, and a network of child care institutions would theoretically free women to fully integrate themselves into the productive economy. In actual fact, owing to the disruptions of war, large-scale unemployment, and rampant inflation, few resources were devoted to these social programs. Thus, the envisaged "socialization of housework" never took place.

The Emergence of a "Third Sex"
During the 1930s, the previous stress on the liberation of women and freedom to divorce was altered to favor family stability. Once again, the family was regarded as the primary societal unit charged with the care and upbringing of children, while the state's role was reduced to that of providing assistance.3 This change effectively meant that women continued to bear the main responsibility for child care and household duties as before, in addition to assuming new roles as, for example, factory workers or cotton pickers.

During these years, the number of women employed in industry and agriculture increased dramatically as centralized planning, rapid industrialization, collectivization, and World War II created unprecedented demands for workers. Women joined road gangs and construction brigades, housewives retrained to become welders and tractor drivers. Between 1928 and 1945, the percentage of women among all workers and employees in the USSR jumped from 24 percent to 56 percent—an all time high (see Table). It was during these years of upheaval that Soviet women "got tough." In the words of one contemporary Soviet feminist, "a third sex" was spawned—i.e., a new breed of woman who performs both traditional male and female roles.4

Aid to Working Mothers
Owing to labor shortages in the 1960s, a final intensive effort was launched to recruit the country's sole remaining major untapped source of labor—namely, the relatively large numbers of housewives. Between 1960 and 1975, the number of women employed in the public sector increased by 79 percent—from 29 million to 52 million, virtually exhausting this source of labor.5 By the mid-1970s, concern over a steadily declining rate of natural increase prompted a lively debate among Soviet scholars over ways to reverse current demographic trends. Although no consensus was reached, one influential thesis advanced by a number of prominent demographers submitted that the high rate of women participating in the labor force had adversely affected the birth rate.6

Consequently, to help ease the problems of combining work with motherhood, a decree was issued in 1981 granting working mothers one year of partially paid maternity leave and an option to take an additional six months unpaid leave.7 Under the old system, in effect since 1973, working women were entitled to fully paid maternity leave for 112 days—fifty-six days before and fifty-six days after the birth of their child—and an option to take a further year of unpaid maternity leave. The new regulations retained the provision of fifty-six days of fully paid maternity leave before birth.

Over the past few years, the birth rate has risen noticeably, and several specialists have attributed this positive demographic trend—whether correctly or incorrectly—directly to the expansion of maternity benefits for working women. As two Soviet economists have remarked: "The years that have passed have shown that aid in such form has actually influenced the demographic behavior of young families."8 In response to this apparent success, maternity benefits were expanded again in 1987, extending the period of fully paid leave before birth from fifty-six to seventy days and the period of partially paid leave from one year to eighteen months with the option of an additional six months of unpaid leave. Like the 1981 reform, the 1987

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4 "Tretii pol?" Novoe vremya, No. 37, 1988, p. 46.
5 Calculated from Trud v SSSR, Moscow, 1988, p. 107.
7 "Zhenshchiny i deti v SSSR," Vestnik statistiki, No. 1, 1988, p. 66.
8 Planovoe khozaistvo, No. 1, 1988, pp. 82-85. It should be noted that the amount of the monthly stipend—35 rubles in most regions—calls into question the extent to which such aid can influence "the demographic behavior of young families."
This view has frequently been echoed in the Soviet press; an article published in Pravda, for instance, stated that hundreds of women had written to the newspaper affirming that they would willingly stop work if they could afford to do so.12

From the legal standpoint, many categories of women are not liable to prosecution under Soviet antiparasite legislation if they should choose not to avail themselves of their constitutionally guaranteed “right to work.” Excluded from prosecution under Article 209 of the RSFSR Criminal Code are invalids, pensioners, pregnant women, women with children under the age of twelve, and persons engaged in household labor. (The use of the word “persons” [litsa] here is presumably an enlightened gesture signifying that this category may also apply to “househusbands.”)13 In spite of these exemptions, however, most Soviet women of working age do work. In 1987, women comprised 51 percent of the labor force although they represented only 48.3 percent of the population of working age.14

What then is preventing the hundreds of women who wrote to Pravda and countless others from "staying at home"? As Zaslavskaya indicated, most Soviet women have no choice but to work, either because their husbands’ salaries are insufficient to make ends meet or because they themselves are heads of households. Furthermore, women who do not accrue the requisite twenty years of service in the public sector are ineligible for old-age pensions, although a widow will generally still qualify for a survivor pension.15 While most pensions are meager, the absence of even this material security can be a serious problem in old age. Pension policy is an issue of particular importance to women since they form the bulk of the population of pensioners.16 (This stands to reason since, on average, the life expectancy of Soviet women is 8.8 years longer than that of Soviet men and there is a five-year difference in retirement age.)17

**Juvenile Delinquency**

Doubtless one reason Gorbachev has approved policies that encourage full-time homemaking is the link he has perceived between an increase

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**TABLE**

<p>| Female Workers and Employ in the National Economy by Union Republic (Percentage of Total) |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1987</th>
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<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Trud v SSSR, Moscow, 1988, p. 107.

reform is being implemented gradually, the areas of the country with the lowest birth rate receiving the highest priority.9

**Return to the "Purely Womanly Mission"?**

In his book Perestroika, Gorbachev wrote:

We are now holding heated debates in the press, in public organizations, at work, and at home about the question of what we should do to make it possible for women to return to their purely womanly mission.10

The concept of "a return to a purely womanly mission" strikes a deep chord among many Soviet women, according to Academician Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, the president of the Soviet Sociological Association. In an interview with TASS last year, she stated that 40 percent of all Soviet working mothers would leave their jobs if their husbands' earnings were high enough to ensure an adequate standard of living for their families.11 This view has frequently been echoed in the Soviet press; an article published in Pravda, for instance, stated that hundreds of women had

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13 Ugolovnyi kodeks RSFSR, Moscow, 1987, p. 418.
14 *Trud v SSSR*, op. cit., pp. 107 and 105, respectively.
16 Naselenie SSSR 1987, Moscow, 1988, p. 49.
17 Argumenty i fakty, No. 9, 1989, p. 3.
Juvenile delinquency can largely be explained by the inadequate attention shown to children by their parents. As he wrote in *Perestroika*:

Engaged in scientific research or working on construction sites, women no longer have time to perform their everyday duties at home—housework, the upbringing of children, and the creation of a good family atmosphere. We have discovered that many of our problems—in children's and young people's behavior, in our morals, culture, and in production—are partially caused by the weakening of family ties and a slack attitude to family responsibilities.

Zaslavskaya has concurred with Gorbachev on this issue, stating that "such negative phenomena as juvenile delinquency can largely be explained by the inadequate attention shown to children by their parents." Citing the findings of polls conducted by the Soviet Sociological Association, she declared that the time working mothers spend "in spiritual communication" with their children does not exceed thirty minutes a week, and the corresponding figure for men is only six minutes. Another frequently quoted Soviet study claims that from an average of two hours and twenty-four minutes free time each working day, working mothers devote only seventeen minutes directly to their children's upbringing and one hour and nine minutes to watching television and listening to the radio. Zoya Pukhova, chairman of the Committee of Soviet Women, has refuted the whole theory as tendentious, arguing that the real cause of juvenile delinquency can be traced to economic backwardness and the nonobservance of laws aimed at helping women.

*Perestroika and the Beauty Pageant*

The new and benevolent attitude taken by Soviet officials, scholars, and the media towards full-time homemaking appears to be part of an overall "restructured" approach towards traditional feminine values. Another aspect of this new outlook is the introduction of Western-style beauty pageants—long considered by Western feminists as an instrument of male oppression—which have generated great enthusiasm. The first Soviet beauty queen was selected in March, 1987, in Irkutsk, from a field of over 10,000 contestants. This innovation quickly caught on, and since then there have been pageants in many major Soviet cities. The most publicized contest was "Moscow Beauty 88," won by Maria Kalinina, a sixteen-year-old student. When asked what made the Soviet beauty pageant different from those held in the West, Kalinina replied that "ours is different because we have *perestroika*," but she did not elaborate on this theme.

Not all beauty pageants, however, have been as successful as those staged in Moscow and Irkutsk. In Uzbekistan, there were only 129 entries for the crown of Miss Tashkent, and only half of these actually appeared on the day of the event. As the English-language magazine *Soviet Uzbekistan* explained:

The sixteen- and seventeen-year-old girls were invited to bring their parents, and some of the latter were very reluctant to see their offspring wearing bikinis on stage. This, perhaps, explains why the crown went to Natasha Kogan, a blonde, which is untypical for the Eastern set of beauty values.

In Vilnius, at a Sajudis meeting on March 12, several women expressed disapproval of the idea of electing a "Miss Lithuania," suggesting instead that "the most haggard, worn-out, and downtrodden woman in the country be found and crowned 'Miss Soviet Union.'" In contrast, Moscow Central

Women Activists

Not only has *glasnost* given voice to the opinions of women who hold traditional views, it has also paved the way for an upsurge of female activism. Several women have become prominent members of informal associations and popular fronts, such as—to name but a few—Marju Lauristin, one of the principal leaders of the Estonian Popular Front; Sirje Ruutsoo-Kilin, a leading activist for Estonian national causes; Tamara Cheidze of the Ilia Chavchavadze Society in Georgia; and Leila Yunusova, a core member of Azerbaijan's nascent popular front.

It is also not uncommon for women to form groups and demonstrate for a common cause. On International Women's Day (March 8), Jewish women refusedniks in nine Soviet cities began a hunger strike; a group of Lithuanian mothers, whose sons died while serving in the Red Army, demonstrated in Vilnius at an election campaign meeting organized by the Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring; and, in Erevan, a group of 500 women initiated a mass demonstration to demand the release of the imprisoned members of the Karabakh Committee. In contrast, Moscow Central

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18 *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 1, 1988, p. 76.
Television offered its viewers lighter fare, the holiday highlight being a synchronized swimming competition sponsored by the women's magazine Sovetskaya zhenshchina.

Western feminist ideas have also made some headway in the Soviet Union, although it would be incorrect at present to speak of the existence of a feminist movement. In the words of one Soviet feminist,

for some reason we do not have a serious feminist movement, with a platform, a concept, right and left wings, and, if you will, with extremists, bawlers, and ringleaders. I'm not advocating extremism, but at present women's voices are heard only in their own kitchens.23

Perhaps the most outspoken Soviet feminist is Ol'ga Lipovskaya, a Leningrad resident, who has been issuing the samizdat feminist journal Zhenskoe chtenie since the beginning of 1988. Her journal analyzes such topics as rape, abortion, contraception, and wife-battering, and includes philosophical and literary pieces on Soviet women's issues.24 Lipovskaya and her collective are carrying on a Soviet feminist tradition begun in the late 1970s by another group of Leningrad women, many of whom now live in the West.25

According to Lipovskaya, many women want to give up their jobs because they are "completely worn out" by the hardships of everyday life in the Soviet Union and see full-time domestic labor as a possible way out of their misery. But she emphasized that more women than men have undergone secondary-specialized or higher education in the Soviet Union and most of these "middle-class" women are performing work they enjoy and would "hardly wish to leave it." (In 1987, 61 percent of all specialists in the Soviet economy with secondary-specialized or higher education were women.)26 Lipovskaya does not see a return to full-time housework as the way to improve the lot of Soviet women. Nor, as the popular argument goes, does she believe that the ultimate solution to the "women's question" lies in the improvement of consumer goods and services (dishwashers, frozen foods, etc.) but rather in the redefinition of male and female social roles to enable full equality to be attained in every sphere.

23 Novoe vremya, No. 37, 1988, p. 47.
26 Vestnik statistiki, No. 1, 1989, p. 47.

War Mothers and War "Madonnas"

Two groups of women who have begun to air their anxieties and grievances are mothers whose sons have died while serving in the Red Army, and female veterans of the Afghan war. Members of the first group have thus far asserted themselves with the greatest force in Lithuania. In Vilnius, on March 8, a group of "war mothers" and their sympathizers demonstrated at an election campaign meeting promoting several members of the Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring (Sajudis). The women carried signs bearing the names of sons who had committed suicide while stationed at home or abroad as a result of dedovshchina (hazing). They requested the election candidates to do everything in their power to enable new Lithuanian recruits to fulfill their military service in Lithuania or at least in the Baltic republics. On March 22, groups of women formed picket lines in front of military draft offices and government and Party offices in Vilnius and other Lithuanian cities to press home this demand. The women also collected thousands of signatures of support for their cause, which has the backing of Sajudis.27

The "Afghan Madonnas" is how a Pravda report of the same title published in 1987, referred to Soviet women who fulfill their "internationalist duty" in Afghanistan.28 According to this article, a variety of reasons bring women to war-torn regions to serve as nurses, entertainers, translators, etc:

Some come to test their mettle, some come to improve their material conditions, and still others to find their mission in life. But one thing unites them all—they all come here to work.

One Tajik woman working in an officers' club in Kabul said she decided to come to Afghanistan after she had been asked in Moscow "Where are your Tajiks? Each one of you could do more for the war effort in Afghanistan than an entire artillery battalion."

Little official recognition has been given to the "Afghan Madonnas," and, as volunteers, they are ineligible for the benefits accorded to Soviet veterans. "It turns out that medical assistants who have fulfilled their internationalist duty in Afghanistan receive no benefits—not in questions of housing, entrance to medical institutes, or medical treatment," complained one female medical assistant from Moscow. Another nurse wrote in a letter published in Komsomolskaya pravda: "Everywhere I go [for assistance] I hear the refrain

no one sent you to Afghanistan." Of equal concern to many female volunteers is the lack of appreciation shown to them for the hardships they endured. As a nurse who served in Kabul put it:

What an affront it is that nothing is said about these women, although they have worked on the same terrain and in the same conditions—and often in even worse conditions—than many officers.

Women in Power
Soviet women have never been well represented in the upper echelons of the Party and government. Only two women in history have become members of the Politburo—Ekaterina Furtseva, who served on it until 1961, and Aleksandra Biryukova, who became a candidate member in September, 1988. Women fare little better at lower Party levels. Soviet Women's Committee Chairman Zoya Pukhova has complained that only 7 percent of all oblast and raion committee secretaries are women, while women make up 29 percent of overall Party membership.

With the exception of Biryukova there are no women in the USSR Council of Ministers. Although women comprised 32.8 percent of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies (1984 elections), only 16.4 percent of candidates who ran for election to the new Congress of People's Deputies were women. In addition, women comprised only 198 of the 880 candidates registered for the 750 seats given to public organizations, and one tenth of these were reserved for the Soviet Women's Committee.

Elvira Novikova, a women's rights activist of long standing and a candidate for the Congress of People's Deputies, has attributed what she calls muzhekratiya, or government by men, to patriarchal traditions. She said:

For many years our society has been ruled almost exclusively by elderly and middle-aged men. . . . Under muzhekratiya there is and can be no democracy, since it does not take into account the opinion of most women and young people who form the majority of the population.

In contrast with Novikova, Politburo candidate member Biryukova has contended that the reason few women have advanced to the upper echelons of Soviet power is not a bias in favor of men but a natural inclination of women to orient themselves towards children and family life. In an article in Trud entitled "Why Can't I Become a Minister?" a worker stated that she, like most other Soviet women, was simply too overburdened by everyday cares to even think of entertaining such lofty ambitions.

Soviet women have no more power in the workplace than they do in government. Whereas 48 percent of men with a higher education are employed as managers at various levels, this is the case for only 7 percent of women who have similar qualifications. Even in industries where women predominate (which, as a rule, use low-paid labor with minimal skills), few of them are directors. In the textile industry, for example, only 21 percent of the top managerial positions are held by women; and in the food industry, only 14 percent.

Dangerous Working Conditions
Both feminists and women who have a more traditional viewpoint agree on at least two matters—Soviet women work in difficult conditions, and their health suffers as a result. Official estimates put the number of women who work in hazardous conditions at 3.4 million, although the actual number appears to be substantially higher. Since the inception of glasnost', a veritable barrage of articles has appeared in the Soviet press depicting the abysmal working conditions of women from Kishinev to Siberia. Millions of women are reported to have an increased incidence of disease as a result of their work. These include cotton workers in Central Asia poisoned by agricultural chemicals, textile workers with abnormally high levels of heart and respiratory disease, construction workers in the Far East, and even the nation's milkmaids.

Despite protective legislation that bars women from performing certain jobs, such laws are systematically ignored. Most of the more than 275,000 Soviet women engaged in hard physical labor do not want to change jobs because heavy work is relatively well-paid and offers the possibility of early retirement. Another major problem that receives a great deal of attention in the Soviet press concerns the 3.8 million women who currently work the night shift in Soviet factories, although

29 "Zhenshchiny na voine?" Komsomol'skaya pravda, June 14, 1988.
30 Ibid.
32 "Politika ne dlya zhenshchiny?" Moskovskie novosti, No. 10, 1989.
33 Ibid.
38 "Kak real'no pomoch' zhenshchine?" Argumenty i fakty, No. 9, 1989, p. 1.
the Fundamental Labor Law of the USSR and the Union Republics (1970) permits such use of female labor only as an extraordinary and temporary measure.\textsuperscript{39}

Throughout the 1980s, Soviet officials have been considering various options aimed at making it easier for women to combine a career with domestic responsibilities, but the most tangible result to date has been the issuance of a string of largely ineffective decrees. The decree issued in 1981 expanding aid to working mothers also advised government ministries and departments to design and implement measures that would allow women to work either part-time, with a flexible schedule, or at home. Another decree of September, 1987, granted pregnant mothers and mothers with young children the right to work part-time without administrative consent, but with a cut in pay—an option that few seem able to afford.\textsuperscript{40} Furthermore, the introduction of part-time work, as with the implementation of flexible schedules, has been strongly resisted by enterprise managements. Efforts over the past decade to engage more women in "home craft industries" (nadomnichestvo) have met with only minimal success, even among the large numbers of Central Asian women with many children. In Uzbekistan, for example, the number of women currently working at home or part-time is less than 20,000.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{39} "Tysyacha l'odna noch'," \textit{Rabotnitsa}, No. 4, 1988.
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Pravda Vostoka}, March 8, 1989.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Soviet society seems as far away from effecting a solution to the "women's question" now as it was over seventy years ago when the Bolshevik revolution "liberated" the women of the tsarist empire. Despite rising levels of educational attainment, full employment for women does not automatically entail equality in the labor market. Furthermore, although the idea that the woman's place is in the home is gaining in popularity, most Soviet women still need to work full-time in order to make ends meet.

As far as the prospects for a full-fledged women's rights movement are concerned, the majority of Soviet women remain uninterested or else consider the task of "raising male consciousness"—to use the terminology of Western feminism—too daunting. Perhaps most important of all, the vast majority of Soviet women do not believe that \textit{perestroika} has made their daily lives any easier either by alleviating food and housing shortages or by improving the supply of consumer goods and services.\textsuperscript{42} To date, the only perceptible benefit the new reforms have brought Soviet women is, in the words of Ol'ga Lipovskaya, the freedom "to let off steam."

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Perestroika} has brought at least one new consumer good to Soviet women. In June of last year, Tambrands Inc., based in New York, established a joint venture with the Ukrainian Ministry of Health for the manufacture of Tampax brand tampons. \textit{New York Newspaper}, June 19, 1988.

\textit{Report on the USSR}
In a further manifestation of growing national­ist sentiment, Georgians demonstrated in Tbilisi on March 18 to demand changes in the composition of the board of the official Shota Rustaveli Society—the body apparently created by the republican authorities to limit the influence and appeal of informal groups in the Georgian SSR. According to a telephone statement made to the Georgian Service of Radio Liberty by veteran human-rights activist Merab Kostava, some 500 people assembled outside the Tbilisi Opera House, where a congress of the Shota Rustaveli Society was in progress, and demanded that the popular literary critic Akaki Bakradze be elected chairman of the board of the society. Bakradze was subsequently elected unanimously to that position. The demonstrators further protested against alleged interference by the Georgian authorities, including the KGB, in the activities of the society; that interference, according to the demonstrators, had resulted in the suppression of the society’s Demographic Fund, and they demanded the expulsion of members of its leadership said to have cooperated with the authorities to that end.

The formation of a republican society named after the medieval national bard, Shota Rustaveli, was first proposed in December, 1987, in what appears to have been an official attempt to minimize the impact of the recently created informal Ilia Chavchavadze Society.¹ The primary concerns of the proposed Shota Rustaveli Society were to be largely identical with those of its informal counterpart—namely, the Georgian language and Georgian culture in general, historical and cultural monuments, and the environment. After a lively press discussion of the draft statutes of the proposed society and the conditions of membership, the founding meeting of the Shota Rustaveli Society was held in March of last year. The archconservative establishment poet and academician Irakli Abashidze was elected chairman of the board of the society, and the poet Revaz Amashukeli, Tbilisi State University professor Sargis Tsaishvili, and Akaki Bakradze were elected deputy chairmen.²

By October of last year, the number of members of the Shota Rustaveli Society had grown to 30,000.³ The society had also launched a somewhat controversial initiative—a Demographic Fund, the aim of which was to stimulate the flagging birth rate among the Georgian population of the republic.⁴ The demographic situation has emerged as one of the gravest sources of disquiet among Georgian intellectuals, who have expressed fears that, given the exceptionally high rates of natural increase among the Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Kurdish communities in Georgia, the Georgians themselves could eventually be reduced to the status of a minority within their own republic.⁵

In September and October, 1988, unofficial groups, including the Ilia Chavchavadze Society and its offshoot, the more radical National-Democratic Party, organized a series of demonstrations in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and other Georgian cities.


⁵ See, for example, Literaturuli Sakartvelo, September 30, 1988, and Akhalgazrda komunisti, November 1, 1988.
to protest against the destruction of Georgian historical monuments, human-rights violations, and Russification. Official concern over this upsurge of popular sentiment is reflected in two quite toughly worded editorials printed on November 10 in the Russian- and Georgian-language Party and government daily newspapers spelling out the limits of and constraints imposed by glasnost and attacking the National-Democratic Party and "so-called initiative groups" for transgressing those limits with the primary aim of "inciting the population . . . to disorder and criminal acts"; for "putting forward alternative (oppozitsionsnye) political programs" under the guise of defending national interests; for turning legitimate concerns into political issues; and for "usurping the right to speak in the name of the Georgian people."

Perhaps in an effort to strengthen the authority and appeal of the Shota Rustaveli Society in the face of the increasing political awareness and activism of the population, a meeting of the presidium of the board in early November released Irakli Abashidze from the post of chairman "at his own request" and elected him, together with four other archconservative members of the presidium, to a "council of advisers" to the presidium. It was decided to postpone the election of a new board until the first congress of the society, which was scheduled for January, 1989; until that time, the activities of the presidium were entrusted to the three original vice chairmen—Akaki Bakradze, Sargis Tsalishvili, and Revaz Amashukeli—together with two others.6

It was further noted that, since the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party and the Georgian Council of Ministers were currently in the process of drawing up joint "national-state" (natsional'no-gosudarstvennye) programs on issues that figured in the society's list of concerns,7 the presidium of the society should participate in the compilation, implementation, and monitoring of these programs.

Between November 22 and 29, 1988, when tens of thousands of people demonstrated in Tbilisi to protest against the wording of the new draft amendments to the Soviet Constitution, the Shota Rustaveli Society was the body responsible for drawing up and collecting signatures to a petition demanding the rejection of the planned amendments that would negate the republics' theoretical right to secede from the USSR and circumscribe the powers of the republican leaderships in the event of the imposition of martial law.8

It may well be that the Georgian authorities were shocked by such a display of independent political activity on the part of what was supposed to be a nonpolitical body. For whatever reasons, notwithstanding the decision taken in November to hold the first congress of the Shota Rustaveli Society in January, 1989, a cryptic announcement in the Georgian press in mid-January disclosed that a session of the presidium of the society had scheduled the congress for March 18-19. No explanation was given for the failure to hold the congress in January as originally scheduled.9

The election of Akaki Bakradze as chairman of the board of the Shota Rustaveli Society represents a personal vindication for a man who in the past has incurred the displeasure of the republican authorities more than once and whose personal integrity is acknowledged to be absolute. In 1981, Bakradze was fired from his teaching post at Tbilisi State University and was reinstated only after a student demonstration in his behalf.10 On the occasion of his sixtieth birthday, in April, 1988, he was feited in the literary press as "a true hero in the most complete and intense sense of the word," and it was noted that many demands currently being voiced by both young and old in Georgian society were first put forward by Bakradze in a period when "it was considered heresy to speak of such things."11

Akaki Bakradze is perhaps the only individual to be regarded as the ideal spokesman for Georgian national interests both by the republican authorities and by society at large. As such, he has the advantage over the Georgian dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who, for a period of three decades beginning in 1956, assumed the role of the voice and conscience of the Georgian nation.12 Bakradze is, moreover, one of two prospective Georgian

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7 Drafts of three state programs were subsequently published for discussion. For the one on the status of the Georgian language, see Komunisti, November 3, 1988, and Elizabeth Fuller, RL 559/88, "Draft 'State Program' on Georgian Language Published," December 12, 1988; for that on the preservation of historical monuments, see Komunisti, February 19, 1989; and for that on the study of Georgian history, see Sakhal'kho ganatleba, February 15, 1989.

12 Gamsakhurdia and Bakradze are known to have been friends: together with the writer Nodar Tsuleiskiri, Bakradze escorted Gamsakhurdia's wife Manana to his trial in May, 1978. The two men are reported to have had a violent disagreement last November over the Shota Rustaveli Society's campaign to change the wording of the draft amendments to the Soviet Constitution (Komunisti, January 29, 1989).
candidates for the elections on March 26 to the Congress of People's Deputies who are reported to favor greater independence for the republic.\textsuperscript{13} It remains to be seen how successfully he is able to combine the roles of unofficial popular spokesman and chairman of what remains an official body.

\textsuperscript{13} Financial Times, March 21, 1989.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Mykhailo Hrushevsky: On the Road to Full Rehabilitation

Roman Solchanyk

It is little more than a year since Izvestia (rather than Radyans'ka Ukraina or Pravda Ukrainy) first announced that the rehabilitation of Mykhailo Hrushevsky had been set in motion,\textsuperscript{1} and historians in Kiev have begun to discuss plans to reissue Hrushevsky's works. Hrushevsky is widely recognized as the father of modern Ukrainian historiography.

A recent issue of Literaturna Ukraina reports that a commission formed last December to study Hrushevsky's work held its first session at the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The meeting was opened by Pavlo S. Sokhan', a deputy director of the Institute of History and head of the newly reestablished Archeographical Commission of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Sokhan' argued that the time had finally come to free Hrushevsky from "a whole series of vulgar and one-sided distortions and labels from the time of Stalinism and stagnation," including the "ridiculous accusation" that he was a spy.\textsuperscript{2}

The participants at the meeting, including a representative of the informal Ukrainian Studies Club "Spadshchyna" (Heritage), discussed plans for the republication of Hrushevsky's monumental Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusi (History of Ukraine-Rus'), described as "the first synthetic work in native historiography on a European level." Until recently, Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusi has been kept under lock and key in the Soviet Union. The participants also considered publishing thematic volumes of Hrushevsky's writings that originally appeared in numerous journals and serial publications from the end of the nineteenth-century to the 1920s; his correspondence and other archival materials deposited in the Central State Historical Archive of the Ukrainian SSR; and a monograph on his life and historical views.

According to the report in Literaturna Ukraina, the commission resolved to begin work simultaneously in three areas: publication of a photo reprint edition of the Istoriya Ukrainy-Rusi by the Naukova Dumka publishers, the initial volumes of which should be ready in 1991; preparation of a collective monograph devoted to Hrushevsky's life and historical ideas; and compilation of a full bibliography of his works based, in part, on earlier bibliographies issued in 1906 and 1929.

These decisions represent not only a major step forward in the current campaign to rid the Ukrainian historical record of the numerous so-called blank spots but also a significant political victory for the reform-minded and patriotic forces in Ukrainian society over the conservative Party and academic establishments. It must be remembered that Hrushevsky, in addition to being Ukraine's foremost historian, was also the head of the Ukrainian Central Rada in 1917 and the first president of the pre-Bolshevik Ukrainian People's Republic. For more than fifty years, Soviet publications have consistently denounced Hrushevsky both for his interpretation of Ukrainian history as well as his political activities, despite the fact that in 1924 Hrushevsky returned to Ukraine after several years spent living abroad, was elected to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and was chosen as a member of the all-Union Academy of Sciences in 1929. As late as 1987, the one-volume encyclopedia Velykyi Zhovten' i hromadyanska viina na Ukraini (The Great October and the Civil War in Ukraine), touted as a concrete example of "the new thinking" in historiography, included Hrushevsky's works among those which had been "forbidden by the state because of their political implications." As Ukraine's leading historian, Hrushevsky's rehabilitation is a significant symbol of the new thinking in Ukrainian historiography.

1 See Roman Solchanyk, RL 70/88, "Hrushevsky to Be Rehabilitated?" February 18, 1988.

in historical research, described Hrushevs'kyi as "one of the main ideologists and leaders of the bourgeois nationalist counterrevolution."³

Recently, three Ukrainian literary journals—Kyiv, Votchyzna, and Zhovten"—have each begun reissuing one of Hrushevs'kyi's works, and articles devoted to Hrushevs'kyi have also been published in the Kiev press. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian Party leadership and conservative historians have made no secret of their opposition to attempts at rehabilitating the historian. Thus, shortly after Izvestia (February 12, 1988) announced that Hrushevs'kyi's works had been made available to readers at the Central Scientific Library of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Ukrainian historian Rem H. Symonenko, head of the Department of the History of the Friendship of Peoples of the USSR at the Institute of History in Kiev, attacked the Moscow newspaper for publishing "an unqualified panegyric to M. S. Hrushevs'kyi."⁴

Several months later, Literaturna Ukraina published a full-page article by the literary scholar Serhii Bilokin' that presented Hrushevs'kyi in a positive light.⁵ On this occasion, the response came from Vitalii H. Sarbei, head of the Department of the History of Capitalism at the Institute of History, who criticized Bilokin' on the pages of the Party and government daily Radyans'ka Ukraina for his "incompetent and thoroughly naïve attempt to whitewash" Hrushevs'kyi.⁶ Sarbei, it might be noted, is the author of the introduction to a scandalous piece of propaganda entitled Pid chuzhymy praporamy (Under Alien Banners), which is devoted to "exposing" so-called Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.⁷ Even though the book was published in 1956, Sarbei did not shrink from characterizing Hrushevs'kyi, in typical Stalinist fashion, as "a sworn enemy of the Ukrainian people." The attack on Bilokin' appears to have served its purpose. Literaturna Ukraina had originally announced that an unabridged version of Bilokin' s article would be published in the literary monthly Kyiv in September, 1988. Thus far, this article has failed to appear. Instead, Kyiv informed its readers that "soon the journal will publish a fundamental study of the political profile and scientific activity of Academician M. S. Hrushevs'kyi."⁸

During the same month, Symonenko returned to the attack, criticizing Izvestia once again, this time in Komunist Ukrainy, the Ukrainian Party's main theoretical organ.⁹ In this article, Symonenko argued that Hrushevs'kyi's political convictions and his approach to history are two sides of the same coin:

At the root of his [scholarly propositions] is an overt nationalist concept, an attempt to separate and counterpose the history of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, to show that, supposedly, from time immemorial these followed "different paths"; that, supposedly, relations between them are steeped in irrevocable and insur­mountable enmity; that, supposedly, Ukraine always oriented itself towards the West.

Symonenko said that history has always played a significant role in the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism and quoted the West Ukrainian Communist polemicist Yaroslav Halan with evident approval: "It's a long road from Hrushevs'kyi to the Bandereite butchers, but it's the same one." Any uncertainty that may have remained regarding the establishment's position on Hrushevs'kyi was dispelled at the October, 1988, plenum of the Ukrainian Central Committee by Party leader Shcherbitsky, who publicly chastised Literaturna Ukraina for the article by Bilokin' and praised Radyans'ka Ukraina for the piece by Sarbei. The former, maintained Shcherbitsky, published a long article on the well-known Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, in which his scientific and political activity is presented in a one-sided way, and an attempt is made, to some degree, even to justify his well-known nationalist positions. . . . It was therefore proper for the editorial board of Radyans'ka Ukraina to publish a competent review of this article.¹⁰

Presumably, the decision to go ahead with the reissue of Hrushevs'kyi's historical works was made possible by the "superinternationalists" in Kiev retreating from their positions. Yet, it is

⁸ Kyiv, No. 9, 1988, p. 149.
¹ Radyans'ka Ukraina, October 11, 1988.
instructive to note that this kind of controversy was entirely absent from the process leading up to the republication of the works of the prerevolutionary Russian historians Klyuchevsky, Solov'ev, and Karamzin. In fact, the only discussion that did emerge in this connection focused on the need to reissue their works in massive editions, and this was accomplished without any apparent difficulty. Indeed, Karamzin's *History of the Russian State*, a work that was originally commissioned by the tsarist court, is currently being reissued by the Soviet publishing houses "Moskovskiy rabochii," "Nauka," and "Kniga" in editions of 100,000, 300,000, and 100,000 copies, respectively.11 This is in addition to an earlier 766-page volume of excerpts from *History of the Russian State* published by the "Pravda" publishing house in an edition of half a million copies.12

It remains to be seen whether there will be enough copies of Hrushevs'kyi's *History of Ukraine-Rus'* to supply at least every public and university library in the Ukrainian SSR.


12 N. M. Karamzin, *Predaniya vekov. Skazaniya, legendy, rasskazy iz "Istorii gosudarstva Rossiskogo."

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**ENERGY**

Further Debate on Energy in Southern Ukraine

David Marples

Following a protracted discussion about the pros and cons of building a huge energy complex in Nikolaev Oblast in southern Ukraine, the Kiev newspaper *Robitnycha hazeta* has angrily attacked planners of the scheme for advancing "inept and obsolete" arguments in favor of the project. In a lengthy article, the newspaper cast aside any pretensions to impartiality and came down firmly on the side of the project's opponents. Moreover, these now have powerful support from, among others, the leadership of both the Party and executive committees of Nikolaev Oblast.

The debate was sparked off by an article written by V. Bilodid, an engineer at the South Ukraine nuclear power plant, that was published in *Robitnycha hazeta* in mid-October.1 Bilodid was particularly worried that completion of the second stage of the nuclear plant (i.e., reactors three and four, each with a 1,000 megawatt capacity) would cause irreparable damage to the South Bug River and its animal life. He also referred to the dangers of overheating the Konstantinovka and Tashlyts'ke reservoirs that would be used for cooling purposes at the plants.

On November 11, 1988, an official reply signed by L. Sharaev, the first secretary of the Nikolaev Oblast Party Committee, was published in the same newspaper. This article stated that there was widespread concern about the building of reactors three and four and outright opposition to the third stage—the construction of a fifth and a sixth reactor at the station.

Bilodid's article was criticized in a letter to the newspaper from the planners, who included V. Osadchuk, the director of the Ukrainian branch of the All-Union Institute for the Design of Hydroelectric Power Stations (Gidroproekt), which is subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification, and the chief engineer of the project, L. Levits'kyi. Although Osadchuk and his colleagues had apparently sent the newspaper a twenty-two-page response "insisting" on its publication, the editors of *Robitnycha hazeta* printed the letter in a very abbreviated form.2

The planners pointed out that Nikolaev Oblast suffers from acute water shortages and fuel-energy imbalances and that the power stations had been planned as early as the 1960s. They stated that various sites had been considered for the South Ukraine complex, including four for the nuclear

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2 *Robitnycha hazeta*, December 18, 1988. The newspaper offered the justifiable plea of shortage of space for abbreviating it but then proceeded to devote considerably more space to its response than it allotted to the letter.
power plant and ten for the hydro-accumulation station. By 1970, a proposition had been put forward to amalgamate the power stations into one unit. Refuting Bilodid's remarks to the contrary, the planners maintained that the runoff waters from the nuclear plant were being localized in a special circulation system that is not connected to the reservoirs or the South Bug.

Bilodid had maintained that there were technical illegalities in the organization of the South Ukraine plant's cooling system. According to Osadchuk and his colleagues, however, the cooling system at the plant did not contravene the new rules on the siting of nuclear plants approved by the USSR Council of Ministers in October, 1987. Since, they stated, the rules permit a direct-flow system of cooling (as opposed to water that is recirculated). They added that the original plans had been approved by a commission from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1975 and that the second stage of the nuclear plant had been sanctioned in 1984-85, again after careful investigation.

Having noted the economic benefits of a complex that is to include three hydrotations in addition to the nuclear power plant (of undetermined size), the planners then denied that the ambitious scheme would adversely affect plant and animal life, disputing the contention that the rivers flowing into the reservoirs contain rare plant life that would need transplanting. Finally, they attacked Bilodid's assertion that the plans for the complex had not been devised with sufficient caution, pointing out that they had been elaborated over the course of a decade (1975-85).

The editors of Robitnycha hazeta shot down the planners' points one by one. This surprisingly aggressive approach suggests that those supporting the completion of the energy complex as originally planned are now in the minority. The newspaper revealed that the oblast officials have long been trying to alert all-Union and Ukrainian government officials to the situation. The Nikolaev Oblast Executive Committee was quoted as expressing its "uneasiness over the numerous deviations from the plan in the construction of the first and second stages of the South Ukraine nuclear power plant." It was said to have appealed repeatedly to the USSR and Ukrainian SSR Councils of Ministers, the USSR and Ukrainian SSR State Planning Committees and State Committees for the Protection of Nature, and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

The Nikolaev Oblast Party and Executive Committees were also reported to have sent another letter to the USSR Council of Ministers in November, 1988, in which they demanded that an expert commission reexamine the project; that a decision be taken regarding the possibility of drawing up a new plan to look into alternative energy sources in southern Ukraine; and that all hydrotechnical construction on the South Bug River cease in the interim. Apparently the Oblast Prosecutor's Office also stepped in, pointing out that plans for the third stage of the nuclear power plant did not take into consideration the need to protect local supplies of fish.

According to Robitnycha hazeta, the conclusion of many specialists is that extending the nuclear plant to a second, third, and even fourth stage (i.e., eight reactors, each with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts) would cause serious damage to fish supplies and reduce the flow water of the South Bug to little more than a third of its present level. This would lead, it is said, to a reduction of "natural spawning" by 80 percent and would bring the salinization of the water to a critical level. The newspaper cited the recent decision to abandon construction of the Danube-Dnepr Canal and suggested that the planners of the South Ukraine energy complex were simply presenting the same arguments that had been used by supporters of the now obsolete canal.

Finally, numerous examples were provided of what the newspaper perceived as legitimate opposition to the energy complex, including "a concerned protocol" from a Party meeting at Reactor Section No. 1 at the nuclear plant itself. Surely, the newspaper argued, planners should concern themselves less with the scarcity of water and electricity than with the need to economize on water use and conserve energy. Robitnycha hazeta then stated that it was prepared to continue the debate if the planners had any new arguments to offer.

Significantly, this vehement assault on those who still seek to expand nuclear power in the Ukrainian SSR comes at a time when a renewed emphasis on nuclear power has emerged in the republic. An article that recently appeared in a Ukrainian journal by M. Barabash citing "the ecological advantages of nuclear energy" is one example of this trend. The author commented that the percentage of nuclear power plant capacity in the Soviet Union is much less than in some developed Capitalist countries and then went on to systematically refute the possibility of relying, in the long term, on any other major energy sources such as coal, oil, natural gas, the sun, or wind. Indicating that traditional fuel resources will soon be depleted, Barabash contended that solar energy—which has recently been debated at length in the republic—is not viable, primarily because

3 Pidproporom leninizmu, No. 23, 1988, pp. 80-82. This journal appears twice a month.
the aluminum that would be required to make an adequate amount of solar energy "collectors" is inordinately expensive. Barabash believes that, despite concerns over the burial of nuclear waste, nuclear power represents the best energy alternative for the future.

In an interview with a Ukrainian newspaper that was also published recently, Yurii Filimontsev, an official of the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power, referred to additional safety measures being introduced at Soviet nuclear power plants. Filimontsev stated that the ministry, which was heavily and repeatedly attacked in Ukraine throughout 1988, has now set up a special group of twenty-nine people to deal specifically with public anxieties and letters about the nuclear power program. Noting also that new safety requirements have enforced an extension of the minimum distance of nuclear plants from major population points from between thirty and forty kilometers to sixty kilometers, Filimontsev declared his confidence that "the tragedy of Chernobyl' will not be repeated."4

The South Ukraine energy complex—like the Crimean nuclear plant with which it is often linked in discussions—is indeed a controversial issue. Given that opponents of the plan anticipate that the huge complex will ultimately encompass an 8,000 megawatt nuclear plant and three hydrostations, it is hardly surprising that the discussion has become heated.5 Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the supplies of electricity generated could compensate for the massive ecological damage that would accrue from such a complex.

4 Kul'tura i zhylt'ya, No. 51, 1988, p. 8.
5 Academician A. M. Grodzinsky, among the more moderate voices in the Ukrainian nuclear debate, recently died (Radyans'ka Ukraina, December 20, 1988).

COAL MINING

New Revelations Underline Seriousness of Problems in Ukrainian Coal Mines

David Marples

During his visit to Donetsk on February 22, 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev met with Ukrainian coal miners, whom he is said to have told to "shove aside' bureaucrats and opponents to radical reform."1 The general secretary's visit took place shortly after disturbing details about the incidence of occupational injuries in underground mines under the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry were revealed in an interview in the weekly Ekonomicheeskaya gazeta by V. S. Shatalov, a deputy chairman of the State Mining Safety Inspectorate.2 Although Shatalov's remarks related to underground mines all over the Soviet Union, the examples he cited show that very many of the problems apply particularly to the Donetsk Basin (Donbass), 85 percent of which is located on Ukrainian territory.


The Ukrainian coal industry has long experienced problems with deteriorating geological and mining conditions in the Donbass. In 1987, when the State Committee for Statistics of the Ukrainian SSR first began to publish figures on Ukrainian (as distinct from all-Union) coal output, it became evident that the apparent substantial improvement in overall output of coal in the USSR had not been matched in Ukraine. Whereas all-Union output had risen from 712 million tons in 1985 to 772 million tons in 1988, the Ukrainian totals for these same years were 189 million tons and 192 million tons, respectively. In other words, Ukraine's contribution to the overall total declined from 26.5 percent to 24.9 percent. Moreover, Ukrainian coal output in 1970 had been 207.1 million tons, a figure that has not been approached in recent years.3

These figures for gross output hardly tell the whole story. The quality of Ukrainian coal has declined constantly because of a growing rock and ash content. The powerful ecological lobby in the republic has complained about the problems caused by the coal industry in the western Donbass, where coal workings have caused the land to subside, imperiling agricultural production. Coal enterprises have been obliged to set aside funds for nature protection measures. The Voroshilovgrad Oblast Party Committee revealed recently, for example, that coal enterprises in the oblast have thus far expended more than 17 million rubles for this purpose, of which 6.4 million went on water protection schemes, 4.7 million on cleaning water polluted by coal mining, and 1.3 million on restoration of spoiled land.4

Shatalov’s remarks came in the wake of a special collegium of the USSR Prosecutor’s Office, held in December of last year, that had noted the high incidence of occupational injuries in the coal industry. Shatalov stated that the problem arose in the late 1950s and early 1960s when the development of the coal industry was slowed down and priority was given to the oil and gas industries. Several mines had been closed, he said, and the coal industry lacked the resources to carry out the reconstruction of enterprises. Half of the coal mines under the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry today had been brought into operation before 1960, he continued, and in 129 of them coal is being extracted at depths of more than 700 meters.5

Adequate technology to operate deep mines with thin, sloping seams has clearly not yet been developed. Shatalov referred to “gross engineering miscalculations,” failure to resolve the problem of gas seepage in Donbass mines, and poor ventilation in the mines of the Kuznetsk Basin in Siberia. He revealed that more than 600 miners die each year in accidents caused mainly by rock falls during the extraction of coal, the retimbering of mines, and the transportation of coal and miners underground.

5 This is possibly an underestimate. A Ukrainian coal official revealed last year that about a third of Ukrainian coal mines are being worked at depths of more than 800 meters (see David Marples, RL 437/88, “Working Conditions in Ukrainian Coal Mines Criticized,” September 20, 1988). In March, 1986, the then chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, O. Lyashko, declared that new seams being exploited at Ukrainian coal mines were at depths of 1,200-1,600 meters (Izvestia, March 4, 1986). There are approximately 250 coal mines operating in the Donbass. Hence, if Shatalov’s figures are correct, about eighty of the 129 deep mines in the Soviet Union are located there.

Curiously, he omitted to mention the methane gas explosions that have been particularly endemic in the Donbass.6

A key problem, according to Shatalov, has been the failure of research institutes to provide the necessary technology to deal with the worsening mining conditions. Some 45 percent of underground technology is said to be unreliable, as is 29 percent of ventilating and 70 percent of face-clearing machinery. Great claims have been made by science, but inventions displayed with pomp at exhibitions have proved useless in service. Even plans to equip mines with loudspeaker systems—especially important when accidents occur—have not been carried out.

In the final part of the interview, Shatalov concentrated on breaches of safety regulations. In his opinion, the majority of accidents, fatal or otherwise, would not have occurred had basic rules been followed. He pointed out that since the early 1970s there has been no such thing as a “day off” in the Soviet coal industry. Coal miners in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary have both a day off during the week and Sundays free. On these rest days, basic repair and maintenance work can be carried out. In Soviet coal mines, such work is neglected in the interests of raising output and, as a result, more accidents have occurred. Shatalov revealed that mining equipment is generally inspected only after an accident has occurred.

When irregularities take place, those responsible—chief engineers or heads of mine sections—can be penalized or fined, but such punishments have become so routine that they have ceased to have any deterrent effect. Shatalov cited the cases of two officials of the Donetsk Coal Production Association, one of whom had received six admonishments in the course of a year, and the other twelve. In his view, work safety has not been a main priority of enterprises, partly because the costs to the state of such tragic accidents do not affect the financial position of the enterprises. He maintained that occupational injuries must be reflected in the enterprises’ balance sheets if they are to make any impression on the leaders of those enterprises.

It has often been pointed out in Ukrainian periodicals and newspapers that January, 1989, marked the start of the transition to full

6 Two serious accidents occurred in the Donbass, on December 24, 1986, and May 16, 1987, involving loss of life as a result of explosions of methane gas. The first was at the Yasinovskaya- Glubokaya mine in Makeevka; the second at the Chaikino mine near Donetsk. It has been stated that the latter incident could have been avoided had the mine been properly ventilated (see Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, December 27, 1986: Pravda, May 20, 1987; Trud, May 24, 1987).
khizraschet and self-financing in the coal industry. It is difficult, however, to imagine how a branch of the Soviet coal industry that has been operating at a loss for some time can hope to go over to self-financing. To make matters worse, the industry still suffers from the Stakhanov tradition, under which output and competition take precedence over work safety, technical improvements, and the quality of the coal produced. This is reflected vividly in a recent issue of the Ukrainian coal journal that attempts to deal with the problem of how perestroika will affect Socialist competition among enterprises of the industry.7

One reason for the relative decline of the Donbass has been the reduction or lack of capital investment. It has seemed at times as if the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry had abandoned its Ukrainian branch, regarding the future as belonging to the mines of Siberia and the Far East. (In 1986, the Ukrainian Ministry of the Coal Industry, often the lone proponent of greater investment in the Donbass mines, was abolished and its place taken by state production associations under the direct control of the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry in Moscow.) The high incidence of occupational injuries is partly a reflection of this neglect. Operating the Donbass mines involves a very high proportion of manual labor, temperatures as high as 45 degrees Celsius, and seven-day work weeks. Shatalov's disclosures about the high mortality and injury rates follow revelations last year about the frequency of heart disease and mental problems among underground miners.

It would appear logical that, as a result of the failure of plans to boost nuclear power output in the Soviet Union (one Western authority doubts whether the plan for 1986-90 will be even 40-percent fulfilled8), there could be a major new role for coal to play as a source of fuel for thermal power stations. Thus far, the gap has been filled by natural gas, not least because of the inability of the underground coal mines in Ukraine to take up the slack.

7 Ugol' Ukrainy, No. 12, 1988, pp. 2-3.

LANGUAGE

Moldavian Writers Publish Unauthorized Periodical in Latin Script*
Vladimir Socor

For the first time since the USSR annexed from Romania most of what is now the Moldavian SSR, a Moldavian periodical printed in the Latin script has gone into circulation there. The inaugural issue of the cultural magazine Glasul (The Voice), which is to be a monthly, went on sale at the headquarters of the Moldavian Writers' Union in Kishinev (Chișinău) on March 13 without official authorization. As local intellectuals have reported in telephone interviews with Radio Free Europe, the Moldavian authorities witheld authorization to publish. The issue was nevertheless prepared by Moldavian writers, who managed to have it printed in the Latvian SSR and to have its print run of 60,000 copies transported from Riga to Kishinev.

The Moldavian writers have been in the forefront of the public campaign demanding that Moldavian be made the state language of the republic, that it be recognized as identical to Romanian, and that the Latin script, which was replaced under Stalin with the Cyrillic, be restored.1 Faced with public pressure in the form of petitions, rallies, and mass demonstrations in

support of those demands, the authorities in Kishinev at first stonewalled and then fell back on ambiguously worded assurances and delaying tactics that can only have strengthened the public's mistrust. Since last December, the authorities had made repeated if vague promises to license Glasul as a first step towards reintroducing the Latin script; the failure to deliver on their promise showed that they had been prevaricating. The word glasul became one of the slogans chanted at the unauthorized mass rallies and demonstrations in Kishinev in recent weeks.

The inaugural issue of the magazine was paid for partly out of funds of the Moldavian Writers' Union and partly through donations solicited by the writers from the public. The editors were able to find printing facilities in the Latvian SSR with the help of sympathizers in the People's Front of Latvia and in the small Moldavian community in Riga. The editorial board of Glasul is composed of five writers who are associated with the Moldavian Democratic Movement in Support of Restructuring and the Alexe Mateevici Cultural Club, the two independent organizations that combine demands for Moldavian national emancipation and for democratization of the Soviet state and society. The editorial board is chaired by the poet Leonida Lari, and the novelist Ion Drufa, whose works are considered modern classics, is listed as the founder of the magazine. Although the Moldavian authorities refused to permit newsstand sales of Glasul and allowed it to be distributed only from the premises of the Writers' Union, the 60,000 copies of the inaugural issue were reported to have been almost sold out within three days of arriving in Moldavia.

The issue has the format of a newspaper and is twelve closely printed pages long. Some of the material reflects an intense interest in the preservation of traditional spiritual values and falls back on the organicist view of history and cultural development as a defense against forced assimilation. These articles emphasize the historical continuity of the Moldavian national entity, portraying it as indivisibly linked with a past in which Slavic influences played no role whatever. Several articles and poems celebrate Romania's national poet, the nineteenth-century classic Mihai Eminescu, a Moldavian who is seen as symbolizing the unity of Moldavian and Romanian culture on both banks of the Prut River. Other essays, short stories, and poems evoke the traditional Moldavian village as it existed until the postwar Stalin terror and forced collectivization. Two articles are by Orthodox clergymen: an archpriest who welcomes the reappearance of the Latin script in the name of the faithful and a priest who, using a pseudonym, writes about the role of religion in buttressing national consciousness and the capacity for "national survival." An appeal to all citizens of the Moldavian SSR solicits assistance in the current search for evidence to "reconstitute the true facts" about the man-made famine, collectivization, and deportations of the Stalin period.

Other articles reflect modern, forward-looking preoccupations with economic, ecological, and political issues. One essay entitled (after Goya's apocalyptic vision) "The Slumber of Reason" describes the ecological damage wreaked on the republic through indiscriminate industrialization. An article on "Regional Self-Management" considers the republic's future place within a reformed, decentralized Soviet economic system. In an article on "Rehabilitating the Concept of Civic Virtue," Iurie Roșca, one of the spokesmen for the Moldavian Democratic Movement, outlines the movement's agenda for reforms. Another article takes to task Moldavian Television for obstructing glasnost. Discrimination against the Moldavian language is examined in an exposé of the republican school system, and an item by a philologist explains some spelling rules in the Latin script. Finally, the writer Maria Briedis from Riga contributes notes on the small Moldavian community in Latvia and its friendly ties with nationally minded Latvian intellectuals.

Contributors to this issue include some of the most prominent Moldavian cultural figures, such as Drufa, Lari, the poets Ion Hădărca and Nicolae Dabija, the literary historian Mihai Cimpoi, and the historian Ion Turcanu, all of whom are also known to be supporters of the Moldavian Democratic Movement and the Mateevici Club. Their presence in the pages and on the editorial board of Glasul alongside activists of these organizations is symptomatic of the alliance that has taken shape in the republic in recent months between the unofficial groups and the Moldavian cultural establishment in pursuit of a common agenda of reformist and national goals. Their and their colleagues' decision simply to ignore the authorities' objections and go ahead with the publication of an unauthorized, large-circulation magazine that was eagerly awaited by the public reflects the growing assertiveness and self-confidence of reformist and nationally minded intellectuals in the Moldavian SSR. It also illustrates their ability to reach out to the public at large as well as to link up with like-minded groups in other Soviet republics.

As writers and members of unofficial groups in Kishinev have reported in telephone interviews with Radio Free Europe, the Moldavian leadership has been prompt to take countermeasures. Addressing an authorized rally of unofficial groups in Kishinev on March 19, Moldavian Communist Party First Secretary Semen Grossu, in the course of wide-ranging remarks on the language problem and other topical issues, branded the magazine “unlawful” for violating Soviet press laws and warned that the judicial authorities would deal with those responsible for its publication. In addition, the Party authorities have told Moldavian writers that Glasu’s main offense is not so much its contents as the “illegality” of the use of the Latin alphabet. The republican Prosecutor’s Office has initiated an investigation into the activities of several citizens in Kishinev thought to have been involved in the printing and transportation of the periodical. Police patrols with dogs have searched suspected premises in Kishinev for the galley proofs of the second issue, which, amid these vicissitudes, is being prepared for publication. As some of Glasu’s backers observe with tongue in cheek, it was, after all, in Kishinev that the underground Bolshevik newspaper Iskra managed best to survive and elude the tsarist police.

(RLI66/89, March 30, 1989)

TRANSCAUCASUS

New Abkhaz Campaign for Secession from Georgian SSR

Elizabeth Fuller

Georgian émigré sources have reported that a meeting was held on March 18 in the Abkhaz ASSR to back demands by the indigenous Abkhaz, who constitute barely 17 percent of the population of the area, for the separation of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR and its attachment to the RSFSR. A similar separatist campaign, arising from the feeling on the part of the Abkhaz that their economic, social, and cultural needs were being neglected by the majority Georgian population, was launched early in 1978 and reached its apogee in May of that year.1

At that time, CPSU Central Committee Secretary Ivan Kapitonov traveled to Abkhazia in the wake of mass demonstrations by the Abkhaz and made it clear to the protesters that there could be no question of altering Abkhazia’s territorial subordination. At the same time, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a joint resolution on the region’s socioeconomic development that one Western journalist estimated would cost $750 million to implement.2 A similar joint resolution of the Georgian Party Central Committee and the Georgian Council of Ministers detailed measures to promote Abkhaz history, culture, and literature.3 Periodic assessments of the situation in the Georgian press indicate, however, that, while considerable progress has been made towards revitalizing the Abkhaz economy and meeting Abkhaz cultural needs, suspicion and hostility still pervade Abkhaz-Georgian relations in the Abkhaz ASSR.4

The new Abkhaz separatist campaign was launched with a letter signed by fifty-eight Abkhaz Communists and addressed to the Nineteenth All-Union Party Conference, which was held in June, 1988; the letter demanded the secession of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR. Georgian Party First Secretary Dzhumber Patiashvili may have been alluding to this letter, among others, in his speech to a plenum of the Abkhaz Oblast Committee last September. On that occasion, Patiashvili referred to a series of letters that were addressed to the authorities both in Tbilisi and in Moscow. The letters were said to contain critical assessments of certain aspects of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical development of

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1 See Ann Sheehy, RL 141/78, “Recent Events in Abkhazia Mirror the Complexities of National Relations in the USSR,” June 26, 1978.
3 See RL 141/78.

April 7, 1989
the autonomous republic that, Patiashvili implied, were motivated less by an objective evaluation of the situation than by interethnic hostility. Patiashvili did not specify the concrete charges made in these letters; he merely rejected the complaints as the product of "failings in ideological-upbringing, propagandistic, and explanatory work."5

The letter from the fifty-eight Abkhaz Communists subsequently formed the basis for a petition that was drawn up by the Abkhaz government at a mass meeting on March 18 in the village of Lykhny (the center of the demonstrations in 1978). The petition, which was addressed to the government of the USSR, demanded the separation of the Abkhaz ASSR from Georgia and its upgrading from the status of an autonomous republic to that of a Union republic.

5 Zarya Vostoka, October 1, 1988.

News of this new Abkhaz campaign for secession from the Georgian SSR provoked counterdemonstrations in Tbilisi on March 24 and 25 by the Georgian intelligentsia, who for years have complained that the Georgian population of Abkhazia is subjected to discrimination by the Abkhaz minority6 and who have now expressed fear that Moscow may yield to the demands of the Abkhaz in order to weaken the nascent Georgian national movement. To judge from remarks made by Arkadii Vol’sky, chairman of the Special Administration Committee imposed on the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, to the effect that in a Socialist state all "frontiers" between republics are "relative, a mere line on the map,"7 this fear would seem to be without foundation.

6 See AS 4415, 5233, 5263, and 6170.
The USSR This Week

Vera Tolz

_Saturday, March 25_

On the Eve of Elections

Just before the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, many rallies were held in various cities of the Soviet Union. On March 24, _Izvestia_ attacked "nationalists" in Estonia, accusing them of trying to disrupt the election campaign. The newspaper claimed a leaflet had been found in Tallinn urging people to boycott the election. In Riga, one of the candidates for election, Juris Dobelis, a member of the Latvian National Independence Movement, said he was standing for election on the principle of independence for Latvia from the USSR (_Reuters_, March 25). In Moscow, thousands of people rallied once more in support of Boris El'tsin (_UPI_, March 25).

Stalin’s Victims Commemorated in Latvia and Estonia

TASS said that some 300,000 persons in Riga participated in an observance commemorating Latvian victims of repression under Stalin’s rule. The agency said that a meeting and procession of mourning commemorated more than 40,000 Latvians who were deported forty years ago during the campaign to collectivize Latvian agriculture. March 25 is the fortieth anniversary of the start of the second wave of mass deportations of Latvians to remote parts of the USSR; the first wave started in 1941. Estonians gathered on the same day to commemorate the deportation of their countrymen in similar circumstances (_TASS_, March 25).

Interior Minister Says Growing Crime “Reason for Alarm”

USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Vadim Bakatin said that the problem of rising crime in the USSR was "cause for alarm and food for thought." TASS said Bakatin’s comments came in an interview in the latest issue of the weekly _Nedelya_. He was quoted as expressing particular concern over the increase in crime committed by young people. Bakatin said that juvenile delinquency grew last year by 11 percent and that 55 percent of all criminals convicted last year were under the age of thirty.

George Bush on US-Soviet Summit

US President George Bush said that he did not agree with the idea of "an instant summit" with the Soviet Union, saying that there were other channels currently open between the two countries. The Soviet Union has been pushing for a summit: Soviet Ambassador to the United States Yurii Dubinin said on March 23 that he hoped a date could be set when US Secretary of State James Baker visits Moscow this spring.
President Bush, however, told The Washington Times that he wanted a thorough review of US policy with his administration team and that when he saw the right time to sit down with Mikhail Gorbachev he would make a proposal directly.

Police have started clamping down on poets who display and sell their politically charged verses on the Arbat, a Moscow pedestrian street that under Gorbachev has become a Soviet Hyde Park. Earlier this year, Lev Zaikov, the Moscow city Party boss, charged that on the Arbat, "under the flag of democracy, banalities have blossomed and sometimes overt anti-Soviet propaganda." The day after Zaikov's speech was published, police started to interfere with poets' displaying or selling their verse, according to AP, which interviewed several of them.

Some 20,000 people demonstrated in Tbilisi against a campaign in the autonomous republic of Abkhazia aimed at reducing Georgian control. AFP quoted Georgian sources as providing the information. (On March 18, it was reported that several thousand Abkhaz held a meeting in a small town in their republic to demand that Moscow give them the status of a Union republic.)

March 26 was the day of elections for 1,500 of the seats in the new Congress of People’s Deputies. Two or more candidates competed in about three quarters of the constituencies; in the rest, there was only one candidate. The new Soviet parliament will later choose the president and will elect a new Supreme Soviet from its own ranks. Mikhail Gorbachev was shown on Soviet television voting for delegates to the new parliament. Speaking to reporters after the voting, Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union must not overreach itself for that could put the people's future at risk. He said that his policies of pressing for more democracy and glasnost were "the key to opening the potential of our Socialist system." Asked about the prospects for a multiparty system, Gorbachev said that this would not be the solution. Gorbachev was also quoted by AP as saying that he was not satisfied with the results of perestroika. He said he would like it to be more energetic (Reuters, UPI, March 26). Reuters reported that human-rights activists in the Ukrainian city of Lvov boycotted the elections. Followers of the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church also said that they would stay away from the polls, while members of an independent cultural association called The Lion Society said they were voting against everyone on the ballot (Reuters, March 26).

As early as March 26, Reuters reported the first results of the elections, which showed Boris El’tsin’s sweeping victory in the campaign to become deputy for Moscow to the new Soviet parliament. On March 27, it became known that El’tsin had
won 89 percent of the vote in Moscow. This overwhelming victory—won in open contest—counts for more than the election of the top Soviet leaders who won by a margin of over 90 percent at an internal Party vote during the recent plenum of the Central Committee. In the uncontested Central Committee elections of Party deputies to the Congress of People’s Deputies, Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, and Chebrikov all received 98 percent—the biggest votes for Politburo members. These percentages were exceeded, however, by those obtained by a candidate member of the Politburo, Luk’yanov, and a Central Committee secretary, Baklanov, both of whom received 99 percent of the vote. The results of the Party elections were published in Pravda on March 19. Of the other Politburo members, Slyun’kov and Medvedev ranked second in popularity inside the Party, taking 97 percent of the votes. Zaikov and Nikonov won 96 percent, while Yakovlev seems to have enjoyed less support from the Central Committee, receiving only 91 percent. In a stunning display of dissatisfaction with his conservative views, the Central Committee gave Egor Ligachev only 88 percent of its votes at the plenum—less than his opponent El’tsin received in the “open” election.

**El’tsin on Housing Problem**

The Sunday Telegraph of March 26 published an interview with Boris El’tsin. Among other things, he voiced doubts about the CPSU’s promise to provide every Soviet family with a separate apartment or house of its own by the year 2000: “Here we’ve been following old habits—making a declaration and asking afterwards if it can be done. We have declared that by the year 2000 every Soviet family will have an apartment. Then we did our sums and it turned out that it is almost impossible. If we don’t fulfill the promise we will have betrayed the people again.” (The Third Party Program, adopted at the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in 1961, promised that every Soviet family would have its own apartment by 1980. That promise was not kept.) Today, some 14 million Soviet families and individuals are on the waiting list for better housing (Pravda, January 22, 1989, p. 3).

**Protest March in Erevan**

Protesters marched for about an hour in the Armenian capital of Erevan before being dispersed by the police. The number taking part in the demonstration was put variously at between 2,000 and 3,000. Armenian sources told AFP and AP that at least one person was detained. Mehat Gabrillian, an Armenian activist, was quoted by AP as saying some of the marchers carried posters referring to the elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies. The protest called for an independent Armenia and for the release of members of the Karabakh Committee detained last year.

**Soviet Diplomat in Iraq during Saudi King’s Visit**

Vladimir Polyakov, who heads the Near East and North Africa Department at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, visited Iraq over the weekend where he was said to have held talks with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was in Baghdad for talks with Iraqi leaders at the same time as Polyakov. The Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia do not have
Easter Celebrations in USSR

TASS reported that Easter was celebrated by the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches in the Baltic republics and in the Lvov area of the Western Ukraine. TASS said that Roman Catholic Cardinal Julians Vaivods attended a mass in Riga. In Lithuania, masses were held in Vilnius and in Klaipeda. Easter was also observed in twenty-six Lutheran parishes in Lithuania. The Evangelical-Lutheran Church of Estonia also celebrated Easter with special services. TASS said that Catholics attended masses in Lvov and other parts of the Western Ukraine.

Moscow News Interviews Conquest

Moscow News (No. 13) published a lengthy interview with Robert Conquest conducted by an American journalist from the journal Nation. Conquest focused primarily on his books The Great Terror, which is to be serialized in the Soviet journal Neva, and Harvest of Sorrow. Conquest said that the current revelations about Stalinism in the Soviet press have confirmed the main conclusions he reached in his books. It was also disclosed that issue No. 3 of the journal Voprosy istorii, which has not yet reached the West, carries a letter by Conquest defending his estimates of the number of victims of the famine in the Ukraine in 1932-33. Last year, Voprosy istorii published a letter by a leading Soviet specialist on peasant history, V. Danilov, who criticized Conquest, saying he had overestimated the number of deaths from the famine. In the editorial introduction to the interview, The Great Terror is said to have reached the Soviet Union through samizdat channels soon after it was published in the West in 1968. The introduction mention that, on reading the book, the Soviet intelligentsia immediately came to regard it as “one of the most important Western research works on Soviet history.”

More Information on Drug Addicts in USSR

Novosti reported that the number of people with “a drug habit” in the Soviet Union stands at 120,000. This includes 46,000 registered drug addicts and 4,744 “sniffers of toxic substances.” Eighty percent of Soviet drug users are young people under twenty-five, and the main centers of teen-age drug abuse are in Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and some parts of the RSFSR. According to official figures, almost 90 percent of Soviet addicts use home-made preparations of poppy or hemp; “heroin, LSD, and marijuana practically do not exist in the USSR.” APN said that studies have shown that “the most important objective reasons for drug addiction among teen-agers are poor academic progress, overambitiousness in career goals, and constant conflicts and alcoholism in the family.”
Strong Attack on One-Party System Published

The literary monthly *Raduga* (No. 2, 1989) contains an article by Mikhail Shilov, who declares that the one-party system in the Soviet Union was "the chief precondition" for the creation of Stalin's personality cult. The author reminds readers that Lenin established the system but did not envisage the consequences. Shilov adds that the one-party system continues to create problems in the Soviet Union even in the period of *perestroika*, noting that the ruling Politburo makes mistakes like any normal group of working people, but there is no one to criticize the Politburo's performance. Shilov rejects as absurd the claim often made by Soviet officials that a one-party system has a strong historical tradition in the Soviet Union. Shilov says that party pluralism should be allowed in the USSR because a one-party system is incompatible with democracy.

Perestroika Influences Film Industry

Soviet filmmaker Leonid Gurevich said that about 90 percent of Soviet documentary films released now would not have been made before *perestroika*. Gurevich spoke at a Washington preview of a Soviet documentary film festival that is starting a tour of the United States. The twenty-two films in the festival tackle the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster, the Armenian protests, the war in Afghanistan, and the repressions of the Stalin era (USIS, March 28).

Philosopher Repeats His Criticism of Marxism

*Nedelya* (No. 11) carried an interview with Aleksandr Tsipko, the philosopher who became famous for a four-part article in *Nauka i zhizn* (Nos. 11 and 12, 1988; and Nos. 1 and 2, 1989) in which he attributed the Soviet Union's great failures and tragedies to flaws inherent in Marxism, on the basis of which the Bolsheviks tried to build a new society in Russia. In the *Nedelya* interview, Tsipko reiterated his criticism of some of the postulates of Marxism, such as Marx's ideas on "non-market socialism." The editorial introduction to the interview reported that as early as 1980 Tsipko had written a book, entitled *Sotsializm: zhizn' obschestva i cheloveka* (Socialism: The Life of Society and Man), in which he referred to the negative consequences of all revolutions, including the October Revolution of 1917. He complained that revolutions, especially those followed by civil wars, as was the case in Russia, accustom people to violence, murder, and general cruelty. The editorial introduction adds that Tsipko had trouble with the authorities on account of his 1980 book. It seems that Tsipko's criticism of Marx and Lenin has had a strong effect on some rank-and-file members of the Communist Party. For example, the bulletin of the Lithuanian Restructuring Movement, *Soglasie* (No. 3, 1989), published a statement by a Lithuanian, a member of the CPSU since February, 1974, which informed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania of his wish to leave a Party that had committed so many crimes. The disillusioned Lithuanian wrote that he used to think that Stalin had deviated from Lenin's line, and that this was the reason for Stalin's cruel policies. Current critiques of Marxism-Leninism, however, have shown that Stalin had only developed further the "anthuman" ideology of class struggle expounded by Lenin.
Gorbachev on Election of Politburo Members

On March 27, Pravda and Izvestia published a TASS interview with Gorbachev on the elections. Asked to comment on the 12 [out of 641 participants in the recent Central Committee Plenum] who voted against him, Gorbachev said: "Too few. I would have been disappointed if there had been no critical remarks at all," adding that he also regarded the pace of perestroika as too slow. Gorbachev declined to speculate why 12 percent of those voting voted against Ligachev and 9 percent against Yakovlev.

Tuesday, March 28

Election Results

According to Izvestia, voter turnout for the elections on March 26 was about 80-85 percent in most regions, a level that Izvestia considered "convincing enough by any international standards." There will be runoff elections in 76 districts where three or more candidates ran but none took 50 percent of the vote; there, the two candidates who received most votes on March 26 will be put on a fresh ballot. In 199 districts where one or two candidates were nominated and neither candidate cleared the 50-percent hurdle, repeat elections will have to be held. (On March 29, TASS, in English, reported that the 76 runoff elections for the congress will be held on April 2 and 9. The repeat elections will be held by May 14.) The Central Electoral Commission has ten days in which to count the results, in the meantime only partial returns are available.

In the Ukraine, Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who ran unopposed in Dnipropetrovsk, Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman Valentina Shevchenko, and Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers Vitalii Masol were elected—but their margins of victory have not been revealed yet. The first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, Gennadii Kolbin, received 97 percent of the vote. The first and second secretaries of the Moldavian Communist Party also won, together with the chairmen of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers. Vazgen I, the Armenian Catholicos, was elected, as was Vitalii Vorotnikov (who received 84.6 percent of the vote in Voronezh and who, it will be remembered, chose not to run against Boris El'tsin in Moscow).

In Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, and Kishinev—to name but a few cities—local Party officials were defeated, as were five regional Party secretaries in the Ukraine (TASS, March 27-29, and Central Television, March 28). According to Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov, about 20 percent of the Communist Party candidates who were nominated did not win (AP, Reuters, March 28).

On April 6 and 7, the USSR Academy of Sciences will officially nominate candidates for a repeat election to be held on April 19 and 20. There are twelve seats to be filled (TASS, March 27-29, 1989).

In the Baltic republics, the results of elections to the new parliament offered an impressive demonstration of public support for the popular movements there. The most striking results were scored in Lithuania, where Sajudis, the movement for restructuring, won 31 of the republic's 42 seats by
Save-the-Aral Contest Announced

TASS announced a contest organized by Central Television for the best project to save the Aral Sea. Chingiz Aitmatov commented in the course of a televised round-table discussion (March 28, 1745) that the Aral disaster is not a local, Central Asian, phenomenon, but attests to the monopolistic and self-interested actions of various organizations, particularly the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources. Environmentalists had cause for some rejoicing last week with the announcement of the retirement of Nikolai F. Vasil'ev as minister of land reclamation and water resources (Radio Moscow-1, 1900, March 25). Vasil'ev, who was one of the most vocal proponents of the Northern and Siberian river diversion schemes, has been heavily criticized by environmentally conscious intellectuals in terms similar to those used by Aitmatov against Vasil'ev's ministry.

Soviet Germans Set Up Interest Group

DPA reported on a conference of Soviet Germans opening on March 29 in Moscow. The conference is to set up a society representing the interests of all Soviet Germans. More than 100 participants in the conference have gathered from all over the USSR. According to one participant, the new society hopes to press for "a correct solution" to the problem of the Soviet Germans before the CPSU Central Committee plenum on interethnic relations convenes this summer. The DPA informant insisted that "the correct solution" involves reestablishment of a republic for ethnic Germans on the Volga. On March 29, TASS reported on the conference's opening and, the same day, the "Vremya" news program reported that the possibility of setting up a German autonomous republic on the Volga river was indeed on the agenda of the conference.

USSR Loses Contact with Second Mars Probe

TASS said Soviet controllers have lost contact with Phobos-2, the unmanned craft which has been circling Mars for the past two months. TASS said the radio link to the spacecraft was lost on March 27 after it was maneuvered to take pictures of the Martian moon Phobos. It said Soviet controllers were trying to find out why the link was lost and how to reestablish it. The Soviet Mars program started with two Phobos spacecraft, but controllers lost contact with Phobos-1 last September when they sent an incorrect computer command. On
March 29, TASS and Izvestia quoted the director of the Soviet space agency, Aleksandr Dunaev, as saying experts have a week to decide what can be done about the loss of contact with Phobos-2.

**Moscow Reports Unpublished Food Import Figures**

Radio Moscow-1 (1900) reported figures for last year’s Soviet food imports, which, it said, had never been published before. The radio listed large imports of grain, sugar, meat, butter, potatoes, fresh fruit, and eggs amounting to more than 10,000 million rubles in all last year and asked how much-needed machines that would have paid for. Radio Moscow quoted the Soviet trade journal Vneshnyaya torgovlya as the source for the figures.

**USSR Buys More US Grain**

The US Agriculture Department said that the Soviet Union had bought more US grain. The department said that the latest purchase of 550,000 tons of corn is for delivery by September 30. The deal brings the total corn sold to the USSR for 1988-89 to more than 10 million tons (AP, UPI, March 28).

**Dumas and Shevardnadze Discuss Gorbachev’s Visit to France**

TASS reported that the French and Soviet foreign ministers, Roland Dumas and Eduard Shevardnadze, discussed Mikhail Gorbachev’s forthcoming visit to France during a meeting in Moscow. They expressed the hope that the summit would strengthen recent positive trends in bilateral relations. Gorbachev is due in Paris between July 4 and 6. Dumas arrived in Moscow on March 28 to open a French art exhibition and left later that evening.

**Wednesday, March 29**

**Gorbachev Meets Media Executives**

TASS reported that Mikhail Gorbachev met representatives of the Soviet media to discuss the results of the elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies. TASS said other top officials at the meeting included Politburo members Egor Ligachev and Vadim Medvedev. Gorbachev also talked about the results of this month’s Central Committee plenum on agriculture. After the meeting, the chief editor of Ogonek Vitali Korotich gave Western reporters some information on the meeting. He said that Gorbachev described the defeat of some Communist Party candidates at the elections as a natural part of the democratic process and not cause for alarm (Reuters, March 30). Gorbachev was quoted elsewhere as saying that the election results proved the Soviet Union did not need a multiparty system (AP, UPI, March 30). The full text of Gorbachev’s speech was released by TASS on March 30.

**Thatcher Interviewed by Izvestia**

In an interview with the chief editor of Izvestia, Ivan Laptev, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that having the right leaders in the right place at the right time had helped ease world tensions. She told Laptev that she thought that together with Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan she had
helped create conditions for improved East-West relations. She praised Gorbachev as a leader of vision with ideas on how to carry out programs and to motivate people to exercise their talents and their responsibilities (*Izvestia*, March 29). A lengthy interview with Thatcher was also published in *Ogonok*, No. 11.

**USSR Renews Criticism of Pakistan over Afghanistan**

The Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, Aleksandr Belonogov, repeated allegations that forces from Pakistan are fighting in Afghanistan. During a news conference at the United Nations, Belonogov said Pakistani tribal militia were fighting alongside the resistance. He also blamed the United Nations in part for the situation in Afghanistan and said it should arrange "a true dialogue" between the government and the resistance (*AFP*, March 29).

**Soviet Chess Player and His Father Defect to US**

A leading USSR junior chess player defected to the United States. US chess officials said fourteen-year-old Gata Kamsky and his father, Rustam, went into hiding in the New York area last week. They had come to the United States the previous week as part of a Soviet chess delegation attending an international tournament in New York. An official of the American Chess Foundation, Allen Kaufman, said the Kamskys approached him during the tournament and asked for help in seeking political asylum (*Reuters*, AP, March 29).

**Georgia Gets New President, Prime Minister**

Radio Moscow-1 (1400) reported the replacement of Pavel Gilashvili as chairman of the Presidium of the Georgian Supreme Soviet. The report said that he had retired; he is seventy years old. Gilashvili was replaced by Prime Minister Otar Cherkezia, who has been elected a deputy to the new Soviet parliament. Zurab Chkheidze, who had been first deputy prime minister, was appointed prime minister.

**Pravda Warns of Continued Protests in Moldavia**

*Pravda* warned of the possible consequences of "nationalist" activities in Moldavia, saying that a tragedy might occur if such activities continue. Recent protests in the Moldavian republic have called for the Latin alphabet to replace the Cyrillic, and for Moldavian to replace Russian as the official language of the republic. *Pravda* said that demonstrators who gathered in Kishinev on March 19 carried signs reading "Down with the Government." On March 31, Radio Kishinev, in Moldavian, reported that a law had been drafted that would make Moldavian the state language of the republic.

**Gorbachev on Protection of Socialist Countries**

Mikhail Gorbachev said that every safeguard should be taken to protect Communist countries from outside interference. Hungary's MTI news agency quoted Hungarian Party General Secretary Karoly Grosz as saying that Gorbachev made the statement during last week's talks with Grosz with reference to the events of 1956 and 1968 when the Hungarian revolution and the Prague Spring were suppressed by Soviet troops (*MTI*, in English, *Reuters*, AP, March 29)

April 7, 1989

37
Antihomosexual Law Said to Be Excluded from New Criminal Codes

In an interview with Literaturnaya gazeta (No. 13), the prominent sexologist Igor' Kon revealed that homosexual relations between consenting adults would no longer be a criminal offense in the Soviet Union. According to the Criminal Codes now in force in the USSR, a homosexual act between consenting males is punishable with up to five years imprisonment. For approximately the past two years there has been heated discussion in the media about the need to abolish the laws against homosexuality. As Kon points out in his contribution to Literaturnaya gazeta, representatives of the medical profession have been in favor of abolishing the law, while legal experts have tended to oppose them. The law was introduced in 1934 under Stalin.

Thursday, March 30

Soviet Journalists Irked over Choice of Japanese as Cosmonaut

Two Soviet space journalists complained about the choice of a Japanese to be the first journalist in space. (The Soviet space agency said on March 27 that the Tokyo Broadcasting System would pay the USSR to let a Japanese journalist fly to the Mir space station in 1991.) Aleksandr Tarasov said he understood why a Japanese had been chosen—because Soviet journalists are paid in rubles and could not afford the hard currency that the Soviet space agency will get from Japan. Tarasov covers space events for Pravda. Yaroslav Golovanov, a veteran space writer for Komsomol'skaya pravda, wanted the Soviet government to cancel the plan or, failing that, to send a Soviet journalist on a short space trip first (AP, UPI, March 30). On March 31, the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry said it was willing to finance putting a Soviet journalist in space ahead of the Japanese journalist already scheduled for the trip (Komsomol'skaya pravda, March 31).

First Session of Congress of People's Deputies Postponed

The postponement of the first session of the Congress of People’s Deputies was officially announced. The Soviet Union’s new parliament was originally set to meet in mid- or late April, but the need for a substantial number of new and runoff elections makes it unlikely that it will convene until after Gorbachev’s return from his trip to China (May 15-18). The first of the runoffs will be held on April 2 but the last is not scheduled until May 14.

Landslides in Chechen-Ingush Republic

More than 30,000 people are now reported homeless as a result of recent landslides in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic. TASS said the landslides had been set in motion by melting snow in mountain areas of the republic. It said no casualties had been reported.

Yazov Meets with Assad, Heads for Home

Soviet Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov met in Damascus with President Hafez Assad after a two-day tour of Syrian military installations. TASS said that they discussed the situation in the Middle East and “the growing dynamism” of relations
between Syria and the Soviet Union. Yazov arrived in Syria on March 27 and spent March 28 and 29 at a Syrian naval base and visiting Syrian ground forces. The Soviet Union supplies most of Syria's weapons (AP, TASS, March 30).

**Nekrasov's Membership in Ukrainian Writers' Union Restored**

The Ukrainian Writers' Union has posthumously readmitted Soviet writer Viktor Nekrasov, who was stripped of his citizenship after emigrating to the West (TASS, March 30). Nekrasov came under official criticism in the 1960s for his writings about travels to the West and for his human-rights activities. He emigrated to the West in 1974 after being expelled from the Party and from the Writers' Union. He died in Paris in 1967. Just before Nekrasov's death, *Moscow News* published an article that praised his work. Since then, several Soviet periodicals have written positively about Nekrasov, including his broadcasts for Radio Liberty.

**US and Soviet Firms Sign Agreement on Joint Ventures**

A number of Soviet and US companies have signed an agreement defining financial and administrative rules for future joint ventures in the Soviet Union. TASS said that the agreement, signed in Moscow, involves a trade consortium of six major US companies and a group of about thirty Soviet foreign trade enterprises. The American side includes companies dealing in oil, pharmaceutical and health care products, and consumer goods. There are plans to set up twenty-five joint enterprises in the USSR over the coming months in agriculture, the oil industry, medicine, and other areas.

**Students to Be Freed from Military Duty during Study**

A Soviet official said rules were being changed to exempt university students from military service during their period of study. The deputy chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Public Education, Gennadii Kutsev, said in *Komsomol'skaya pravda* that the change in the rules would take effect this fall with the start of the new academic year. Kutsev said compulsory military education courses would continue at all universities except those teaching medicine; the courses would, however, be updated and shortened.

**Soviet Spokesman Raps Baker's Ideas on Eastern Europe**

Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfil'ev said a proposal on Eastern Europe by US Secretary of State James Baker was an attempt to interfere in the internal development of East European countries. Baker proposes an agreement by which the Soviet Union would relax its controls in Eastern Europe in return for a NATO pledge not to use this to endanger the USSR. Perfil'ev told reporters in Moscow that such proposals were an attempt to exploit other countries' difficulties and "are devoid of prospects" (AFP, TASS, March 30).

**Hijack Attempt in Baku**

An attempt to hijack a Soviet airliner to Pakistan was foiled by KGB commandos who stormed the plane after it landed at Baku airport in Azerbaijan and overpowered the would-be hijacker. A Foreign Ministry spokesman, Vadim Perfil'ev,
said the man had threatened to blow up the plane unless he was given half a million pounds sterling and flown to Pakistan. Perfil'ev said none of the passengers or crew was hurt when the plane was stormed (TASS, March 31).

Iran’s Foreign Minister in Moscow

Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati arrived in Moscow amid what Western correspondents describe as improving relations between Iran and the Soviet Union. TASS said Velayati was making a brief working visit at the invitation of Eduard Shevardnadze. Velayati told reporters before leaving Teheran that Iran had always favored the expansion of ties with the USSR (AP, Reuters, March 30). On March 31, Velayati met with Gorbachev. Reporting on the talks, TASS said the situation in Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the Iran-Iraq war were discussed. The agency also quoted Gorbachev as saying the USSR regards Iran as “a desirable partner” for economic and cultural ties and political dialogue. The same day, Velayati had talks with Shevardnadze (TASS, March 31).

Friday, March 31

On Psychiatric Abuses in USSR

Amnesty International said that the Soviet Union still commits sane dissidents to psychiatric clinics but that the numbers of such cases have fallen following Western criticism of the practice. The human rights group said that the reforms of Soviet psychiatry appear not to have been implemented effectively. In Spain, the Executive Committee of the World Psychiatric Association recommended readmitting the official Soviet Psychiatric Society into the WPA. Reuters and AP reported that this move has drawn criticism from some members of the WPA who say that the Soviet society does not yet deserve readmission. The official readmission of the Soviet Union to the WPA requires the approval of the full membership in a vote scheduled for October.

Ligachev Comments on Agricultural Issues

Egor Ligachev said all restrictions should be removed on private family farms and gardens because they produce so much of the country’s food. He said on Soviet television that private farmers should be given all the land and resources they need. Ligachev also said the country’s food problem must be alleviated quickly and solved by 1995.

Foreign Ministry Official on South Africa

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatolii Adamishin said South Africa’s system of apartheid could be dismantled peacefully. But he said the South African government and the African National Congress must be ready to compromise. Speaking in Zimbabwe at the end of a tour of southern Africa, Adamishin said South Africa should stop what he called state violence and show its readiness for talks (AP, Reuters, March 31).