


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REPORT ON THE USSR

Vol. 1, No. 21, 1989

ALL-UNION TOPICS

NATIONALISM

Two Noteworthy Russian Nationalist Initiatives

John B. Dunlop*

Russian nationalism has become a significant factor in the power struggle—some participants term it “a civil war”—that is at present taking place within the Soviet leadership and among the Soviet elites. Mikhail Gorbachev is “a Soviet patriot,” not a Russian nationalist, and he has sought to split the ranks of the nationalists by attempting to coopt such influential liberals as Academician Dmitrii Likhachev, chairman of the board of the Soviet Cultural Foundation, and Sergei Zalygin, the editor

of the journal *Novyi mir*.¹ He has also made conspicuous overtures to the Russian Orthodox Church, seeking to detach religious believers from the conservative nationalists.²

Despite these efforts on the part of the general secretary, a majority of Russian nationalists appear, at least temporarily, to have sided with Gorbachev’s political opponents. Gorbachev’s attempt to legitimize and reinvigorate Marxism by going back to the 1920s and to the Khrushchev

* John B. Dunlop is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford. His contribution here continues the debate begun in “Russian Nationalism Today,” *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, Special Edition, December 19, 1988. For a different view of this complex subject, see Julia Wishnevsky, “Ligachev, ‘Pamyat’, and Conservative Writers,” *Report on the USSR*, Vol. 1, No. 10, pp. 12-15.

¹ See John B. Dunlop: “Soviet Cultural Politics,” *Problems of Communism*, November-December, 1987, pp. 34-56; *idem*, “The Contemporary Russian Nationalist Spectrum,” *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, Special Edition, December 19, 1988, pp. 1-10.

² These overtures are discussed in detail in John B. Dunlop, “Politics of Religion (under Gorbachev),” which is to appear in a forthcoming issue of *Problems of Communism*.

period for a new "pool of ideas" has not proven popular with the nationalists, while they regard his opening of the doors to Western mass culture (rock music, beauty contests, cheesecake, nudity in films, etc.) with abhorrence.

Gorbachev's opponents in the top levels of the Party are themselves not Russian nationalists but, in fact, rather conservative Marxist-Leninists. In an attempt to stop the Gorbachev juggernaut, or at least slow it down, they have, however, consciously enlisted the support of Russian nationalism. Major newspapers like *Pravda*, whose editor, Viktor Afanas'ev, seems to be an opponent of Gorbachev, and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* are now energetically embracing such nationalist causes as protection of the Russian environment and the restoration of prerevolutionary Russian history.

In deciding to set loose the genie of Russian nationalism, Gorbachev's opponents have taken a political risk. Influential nationalists—for example, artist Ilya Glazunov and writer Vladimir Soloukhin—can be heard advocating that Marxism-Leninism be jettisoned as the ruling ideology of the state.³ As Walter Laqueur has noted in a recently published study of *glasnost'*, the tactical common front that has been formed between neo-Stalinists, who are frequently "atheists of the old school" completely lacking in sympathy for "old women in old villages," and the anti-Marxist Russophiles is a peculiar one.⁴

Since Gorbachev's lightning political coup in late September, 1988, the anti-Gorbachev coalition has apparently decided to pull out all the stops in promoting a revival of ethnic Russian nationalism. At a plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union, Sergei Vikulov, editor of the nationalist monthly *Nash sovremennik*, recalled that the Soviet Union was saved during the dark days of World War II when it turned to Russian patriotism as a mobilizing force.⁵ The same, he intimated, should be done today.

³ See the exposé of Glazunov's anti-Marxist views in "Eksportnaya glasnost'," *Izvestia*, October 26, 1988. Soloukhin's anti-Marxism finds expression in his short book *Smekh za levym plechom*, Frankfurt-on-Main, Possev, 1988. A lightly censored version of this same work appeared in *Moskva*, No. 1, 1989, pp. 3-75. In early 1989, Possev-Verlag announced that it was preparing for publication a new book by Soloukhin entitled *Poslednaya stupen'*. An excerpt from this book, "Chitaya Lenina" (Reading Lenin), has already been published by Possev.

⁴ Walter Laqueur, *The Long Road to Freedom: Russia and Glasnost*, New York, 1989, p. 115.

⁵ "Perestroika i publitsistika," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, December 23, 1988, p. 4.

The Association of Russian Artists

In November, 1988, a number of leading Russian nationalist writers, critics, and editors combined to form an Association of Russian Artists (*Tovari-shchestvo russkikh khudozhrnikov*) in Moscow. The founders of the new organization included the writers Valentin Rasputin, Vasilii Belov, Viktor Astafev, Yurii Bondarev, and Stanislav Kunyaev; the critics Yurii Loshchits, Mikhail Lobanov, and Vadim Kozhinov; Anatolii Ivanov, the editor of *Molodaya gvardiya*, and Sergei Vikulov.⁶ In their "Appeal to the Artists, Scholars, Cultural Figures, and Tilters of Russia," the organizers called on their compatriots to devote all their efforts to "awakening, illuminating, and strengthening the national self-awareness and spiritual powers of the Russian people."⁷

One of the primary aims of the new organization is to combat separatist minority nationalist tendencies that are seen as threatening the unity of the Soviet Union. "The once-powerful union of the peoples of Russia, joined together by the idea of steadfast unity," the appeal's authors warn, "is experiencing a difficult period, during which, under the guise of demagogic slogans, nationalist groups . . . are seeking to break up and destroy the unity of peoples."

The moral decline of the Russian people itself is also seen as threatening the future of the Soviet Union. Much of the blame for this decline is laid squarely at the feet of the Soviet regime. The appeal recalls "the devastation in people's souls brought about by the civil war, the years of terror and repression, and coerced depeasantization (*raskrest'yanivanie*)" that has led to such plagues as "mass drunkenness" and a growth in the numbers of broken families and orphaned children.

In the same way, the Soviet regime is charged with having badly mishandled the nationality problem:

The command methods used by the leadership in the sphere of nationality relations has led to a situation in which it has become common to identify the will of the administrative bureaucratic apparatus with the views of the Russian people, whereas it is precisely Russia that is in the most critical position, close to collapse. And the collapse of Russia will inevitably lead to the loss of the unity of the political and state system of the whole country.

⁶ "Sozdano Tovari-shchestvo russkikh khudozhrnikov," *Moskovsky literator*, Nos. 46-47, December 2, 1988, p. 8.

⁷ See *Moskovsky literator*, Nos. 49-50, December 16, 1988, p. 3.

This would be particularly unfortunate, the appeal claims, in light of "the achievements and exploits of our great (Russian) ancestors, who were able to unite in one state lands stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean."

The programmatic goals of the new organization include: the propagandizing of Russian folksongs and folklore; the preservation of Russian library and archival materials and the restoration of Russian historical and cultural monuments; the formation of "committees for the preservation of nature"; the formation of "economic societies" to oversee the development of the Russian economy; the fostering of good relations with the minority peoples of the RSFSR; the improvement of "military-patriotic education" of the youth; and "the education of the people in the spirit of respect for Russian history and the traditions of military duty."⁸

The program documents of the new association call for the creation of a national information bureau, to be called "The Voice of Russia," and the introduction of Russian national channels on Soviet radio and television. An expansion of Russian themes in newspapers, journals, and publishing houses is also advocated.

Since coming into existence, the new association has emerged as an influential sponsor of Russian nationalist events. In April of this year, for example, it hosted a "charitable evening encounter" for contributors to the journals *Nash sovremennik*, *Moskva*, and *Molodaya gvardiya*, and to the series of books "Lives of Remarkable People."⁹ Speakers have included Sergei Vikulov, Vladimir Soloukhin, Stanislav Kunyaev, Yuri Loshchits, and economics writer Anatolii Salutsky.

A New Slavic Cultural Foundation

A second major Russian nationalist initiative has been the launching in March, 1989, of a Foundation for Slavic Writing and Slavic Cultures (*Fond slavyanskoi pis'mennosti i slavyanskikh kul'tur*).¹⁰ The new organization is pan-Slavic in orientation, but some of its founders are conservative Russian nationalists. More than eighty Soviet organizations joined forces to support the founding of the new organization. They include: the Writers' Unions of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia; the Academies of Sciences of the Ukraine and Belorussia; the Scholarly Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences for Problems of Russian Culture; the

All-Russian Cultural Foundation; the Russian Orthodox Church; and the Old Believer Russian Orthodox Church.

The chairman of the new foundation is Academician N. N. Tolstoi, a direct descendant of Count Lev Tolstoi. The deputy chairmen are the Russian nationalist writer Valentin Rasputin, the Ukrainian writer Boris Oleinik, and the Belorussian writer Nil Gilevich. Among the members of the foundation's council are the Russian nationalist writers Yuri Bondarev, Vladimir Krupin, and Yuri Loshchits.

The de facto goal of the new organization appears to be to cement relations between Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. A secondary goal is to reach out to Slavic and Orthodox Christian peoples residing outside the borders of the Soviet Union. Since Marxism-Leninism is increasingly unable to serve as a bonding element, a new recipe—pan-Slavism and Orthodoxy—is apparently being tried out.

In a speech marking the formation of the new foundation, Academician Tolstoi noted that "our Slavic cultures—Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Russian—are, on the one hand, original national cultures and, on the other hand, united cultures."¹¹ In an interview with the Riga youth newspaper *Sovetskaya molodezh'*, he reported that major Slavic festivals sponsored by the foundation will be held in Kiev this year, in Polotsk in 1990, and in Ufa in 1991.¹²

In his comments welcoming the new organization, Metropolitan Pitirim of Volokolamsk and Yur'ev, the head of the publications department of the Moscow Patriarchate, asserted that "Slavic culture, as a historical phenomenon, was created in an atmosphere of Orthodoxy."¹³ The Slavic nations should, he said, be united by the spirit of catholicity (*sobornost'*).

The well-known Russian nationalist historical writer Dmitrii Balashov also hailed the formation of the new organization but warned that it might become bureaucratized, as happened with the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments. "Our basic efforts," Balashov urged, "should be directed towards spiritual rebirth. . . . We have in the last half-century destroyed 95 percent of our cultural treasures."¹⁴

The question of the day, according to Balashov, is whether the "supraethnic" state created by ethnic Russians can be preserved. It would be lamentable, he said, if the miracle of Russian statehood should

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ "S Rossiei v serdtse," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, April 9, 1989, p. 2.

¹⁰ See "Zadacha blagorodnaya i blagodatnaya," *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, March 17, 1989, pp. 4-5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹² "Sozdan fond slavyanskoi pis'mennosti i slavyanskikh kul'tur," *Sovetskaya molodezh'*, March 29, 1989, p. 1.

¹³ *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, March 17, 1989, p. 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

be consumed by "chaos." "The national self-awareness of all nations and peoples," he declared, "must be reborn. Because that is the pledge of true internationalism."

In a lengthy speech welcoming the new organization, critic Yuri Loshchits paid tribute to the nineteenth-century Russian Slavophiles and other perceived champions of pan-Slavism: Grigori Skovoroda, Aleksandr Pushkin, Adam Mickiewicz, Jan Kollar, Peter Negosh, Taras Shevchenko, and Fedor Tyutchev. "As it is said in the scriptures," he recalled, "all of us are in the hands of God. Similarly, we Slavs could say: we are all children in the house of Slavdom."¹⁵

Loshchits criticized the decline in the use of the Ukrainian and Belorussian languages. Knowledge of the history of the Slavs should, he said, be widely promoted: "We in Russia today have a poor knowledge not only of the history of the Slavs in general but of the history of the Eastern Slavs in particular." As he saw it, a "new Slavic Renaissance" was needed.

In an interview with the newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Eduard Volodin, a doctor of philosophical sciences who is executive secretary of the Scholarly Council for Problems of Russian Culture of the USSR Academy of Sciences (a body created in 1987), declared that the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian cultures had "emerged from one east-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

ern root."¹⁶ Turning to specifically Russian problems, he maintained that it was necessary to address "blank spots" in the knowledge of Russian history and culture. Much more should be known, for example, about the Slavophile and Russian nationalist opponents of the nineteenth-century revolutionary democrats. After all, they were not "ignoramuses." The "popular culture" of the Russian peasantry should also be studied; the peasantry, he noted, provided the social base of the Russian army.

Volodin welcomed the participation of Orthodox and Old Believer clergy in the new organization. Metropolitan Aleksii of Leningrad and Novgorod, was, he said, a supporter of the foundation. A basic aim of the organization, he affirmed, was "to introduce the spiritual inheritance of the past into contemporary life."

Conclusion

The formation of the two new organizations discussed above show that conservative Russian nationalists are concerned about the future political fragmentation of the Soviet empire. They are attempting to shore up the Eastern Slav nucleus of the USSR. It will be interesting to see what reaction there is to these initiatives in the Ukraine and Belorussia.

¹⁶ "Slavyanskaya kul'tura," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, April 14, 1989, p. 2.

RL 230/89, May 18, 1989

ECOLOGY

Anarchy Mirrored in Lake Baikal

Zeev Wolfson

Pollution of Lake Baikal continues to receive a great deal of attention in the Soviet press. The problem long ago outgrew its purely ecological framework and has taken on an economic and political character. According to commentaries published in Soviet newspapers, a significant section of the general public regards Baikal as a barometer of the success or failure of *perestroika*. As yet, no progress has been visible at Baikal.

In the autumn of 1988, both *Literaturnaya gazeta* and *Pravda* carried detailed articles about the first "All-Union Socioecological Expert Commis-

sion on Baikal."¹ Some 300 academics and specialists in a variety of fields took part in the work of the commission, the proceedings of which assumed the nature of a game. This "Court of History" lasted ten days, all Soviet laws were ignored, and the participants tried to be guided only by humanitarian precepts. For ten days, anarchy reigned at the Listvyanka tourist resort; all manner of opinions

¹ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, October 19, 1988, p. 1; I. Pestun, "Prisyazhnye zasedateli na Baikale," *Pravda*, November 25, 1988, p. 3.

were aired freely, and highly dramatic formulations were heard. It was even planned to feature the "Court of History" in a special program on Central Television.

During the sessions, it emerged that under the Soviet regime a total of thirteen resolutions have been adopted on nature conservation around Baikal. The most recent of these, dating from April, 1987, sharply criticized various ministries and departments for their failure to implement previous decrees and outlined a number of specific measures designed to reduce pollution of the lake in the next few years. The adoption of this decree was followed by the creation of a commission to monitor progress that included not only officials but also scientists, journalists, and the writer Valentin Rasputin. These members of the commission have certainly not been remiss in fulfilling their duties: not a month has passed without there being an article in the central press reporting that the state of Lake Baikal is continuing to deteriorate despite the measures that have been taken.²

Dr. A. Reteyum—a systems control specialist—stated at the hearing that the problem is not simply one of the deterioration of Lake Baikal. The trouble is that everything going on around Lake Baikal is out of control. The contribution of any given industrial plant to the pollution of the lake is not known, and therefore it is not clear what needs to be done to reduce it. The Baikal Pulp and Paper Combine was made to shut down its yeast section, but, although the quantity of organic pollutants in the waste discharged into the lake by the combine decreased, their overall toxicity increased. *Pravda* wrote:

Disputes over the degree of damage caused by the Baikal Combine are not based on any hard data. The figures for pollution produced by various scientific institutions are in a muddle. Accurate input-output figures for such pollutants as organic chemicals, heavy metals, and petroleum products just do not exist.³

Why is such essential information lacking? After all, it is not as though studies of pollution of Lake Baikal only started recently, following the last government resolution. Studies, and serious studies at that, have been going on for a long time. An article on Lake Baikal in a recent issue of the specialist journal *Geografiya i prirodnye resursy* revealed that, apart from the Institute of Limnol-

² See, for example, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, March 10, 1988, p. 3, and October 7, 1988, p. 2; *Literaturnaya gazeta*, January 20, 1988, p. 3, and August 27, 1988, p. 1.

³ *Pravda*, November 25, 1988, p. 3.

ogy, which was set up on the shore of the lake twenty years ago, there are fourteen other academic institutes, more than thirty institutions and organizations of various ministries, and a number of higher educational establishments tolling away on the "Resources of the Lake Baikal Basin" program.⁴ The unique natural environment of the lake certainly deserves the most meticulous study, but thousands of specialists have been receiving their salaries year after year for doing something and they have not yet managed to assemble the most basic facts about the sources of pollution of the lake. This really must require a very special form of disorganization.⁵

Comparison of newspaper articles about Lake Baikal with the far more detailed material to be found in the specialized press makes it clear that lack of coordination and confusion prevail not merely in the information sphere. The situation is just as bad regarding implementation of specific measures mapped out by the government.

The resolution of 1987 required the Baikal Pulp and Paper Combine to be converted to the production of innocuous furniture by 1993, when a replacement pulp and paper mill should have been built at Ust'-Ilimsk. But, as Valentin Rasputin has pointed out, they have not yet been able to find people to draw up plans for the replacement plant, let alone the building materials and the labor force. No one is interested in the millions of rubles being offered by the Ministry of the Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood Processing Industry, and it is clear that the Ust'-Ilimsk plant will, at best, not be ready for another ten years.⁶

Gosplan, Gosstroi, and the USSR Academy of Sciences joined forces to draw up an overall plan for exploitation of the resources of the Baikal area. It provides for the creation of three zones. In the first conservation zone, the construction of new industrial and agricultural enterprises and the use of fertilizers and pesticides are banned. Yet *Literaturnaya gazeta* reports that the taiga on the northern shore of the lake is being cleared for the cultivation of agricultural crops—with the use, of course, of fertilizers and pesticides.⁷ And this is within one kilometer of the lake shore.

Under the terms of the government resolution, funds were allocated for clearing the lake shore and the coastal taiga of waste dumps and other forms of pollution. At the end of last year, *Pravda*

⁴ *Geografiya i prirodnye resursy*, No. 3, 1988, p. 13.

⁵ Staff of environmental control services in Canada and the United States gather data on the sources of pollution of air and water in areas comparable to the Baikal basin every one or two years.

⁶ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, August 27, 1988, p. 1.

⁷ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, October 19, 1988, p. 1.

reported that the 20 million rubles employed to clear up the eastern shore had not made it any cleaner.⁸

The government resolution and various Gosplan directives obligate all factories in the Baikal basin to install filters to clean all emissions into the atmosphere, but the efficacy of this measure is dubious because, at the moment, the atmosphere is being much more heavily polluted by forest fires than by factory chimneys. Every year, several thousand square kilometers of taiga are burnt down. According to *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, the bodies responsible for preventing forest fires totally lack both the organization and the technical means. The number and scale of fires is growing, and this is having a major effect on the deterioration of Baikal.⁹

The "Court of History" did not issue a formal indictment, but the experts reserved their strongest condemnation for the country's existing economic system. One option they suggested was the creation of a *khozraschet* entity to cover the whole of the Baikal basin. If the local population were to feel themselves masters in their own home and the local soviets were—in line with Gorbachev's promises—to be invested with real power, then, it was said, it would be possible to have effective ecological control and judicious exploitation of the water, recreational, and other resources of the area.

Such views seem to be popular among the scientific intelligentsia. Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Valentin Koptuyug is known to share them.¹⁰ They are, however, far from realistic. The plan to build a new industrial center with 140,000 inhabitants—Severobaikal'sk—on the lake shore was commissioned by the local Buryat authorities.¹¹ Where is the patriotism, where is the common sense, of people who want to plant an industrial center in a zone that they have themselves declared a conservation area?

The mechanics of such a contradictory "love of one's own land" have been explained in an article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* that described the fate of another, "underground Baikal."¹² The town of Pervomaisk in Gorky Oblast stands on top of the largest reservoir of artesian water in Central Russia. The town authorities agreed to the construction of a biopesticide plant there knowing full well that it would ruin the underground lake. The reason they did so was that the entire budget for building

roads, schools, hospitals, telephone lines, etc. in the Pervomaisk Raion is only a few tens of thousands of rubles and will never be more. Thus the only possible way for the raion to obtain these roads, schools, and hospitals is as a gift from a rich industry. However much power the raion and village soviets had, they would still be paupers ready to sell their air and water in exchange for the blessings of civilization. Indeed, as long as the central authorities still have the ultimate say, it is easier to stop a project like Severobaikal'sk than it would be if republics and oblasts were fully independent.

The authorities never had any serious intention of carrying out the terms of the earlier twelve resolutions on Baikal. They were adopted for decency's sake as an adjunct to industrial projects that rapaciously exploited the area's natural resources. Progress reports on the fulfillment—or, more accurately, the nonfulfillment—of these decrees never appeared in the press.

Today, the authorities can hardly be criticized either for reluctance to act or for remaining silent about their failures. Gosplan and the relevant ministries are taking decisions and allocating funds, and the statistical yearbook *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR* contains a special section with data on protection of the Baikal environment. The data, which provide a far from rosy, albeit incomplete, picture of the state of Baikal, have even been reproduced in a United Nations reference book on the environment.¹³ There can be no doubt of the authorities' sincere desire to reduce pollution of the lake, if only for propaganda purposes, but Baikal is not the only case in which government directives are failing to work. Without moving from the ecological sphere, it is clear that the resolution on putting an end to pollution of Lake Ladoga is also not working.¹⁴

A government resolution and a special Gosplan program to reduce energy consumption have failed to produce the desired results. Academician Koptuyug has written about how it was planned to reduce energy consumption per unit of national income by 1.8 percent in 1987, instead of which it rose by 0.9 percent.¹⁵ This means an additional burden on the environment both in the course of extracting greater amounts of oil and coal and in the course of burning them. The Soviet economic "machine" is not moving in the direction its bosses wish. Directives seem to have lost much of their effect, the "machine" fails to respond to other

⁸ *Pravda*, November 25, 1988, p. 3.

⁹ *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, June 30, 1987, p. 4.

¹⁰ V. Koptuyug, "Ot ozabochennosti k effektivnoi ekologicheskoi politike," *Kommunist*, No. 7, 1988, pp. 24-33.

¹¹ *Literaturnaya gazeta*, August 27, 1988, p. 1.

¹² N. Kharitonova, "Pokushenie blagodetelei," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, September 23, 1988, p. 4.

¹³ *Environment Statistics in Europe and North America*, United Nations, New York, 1987.

¹⁴ *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, October 9, 1988, p. 2.

¹⁵ V. Koptuyug, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

stimuli, and individual parts of it are going their own sweet way. Whether this tendency is regarded as anarchy or a necessary stage in the transition to

a new economic system, its consequences for the conservation of natural resources are pitiful in the extreme.

(RL 231/89, May 23, 1989)

USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR Restructured

Vera Tolz

The USSR Academy of Sciences has been a target of criticism for some time now for its inaction and for hampering any kind of creative scientific work with its bureaucratic structure.¹ The lack of significant change in the academy has been well reflected in the principal periodical published by the body, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, which is a rare example of a journal that has hitherto failed to be influenced by Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost'*.

The absence of restructuring in the USSR Academy of Sciences was particularly visible during the nomination of candidates by that body for the Congress of People's Deputies. In January, 1989, the presidium of the academy rejected as candidates for election to the new parliament such leading reform-minded academicians as Andrei Sakharov, Roal'd Sagdeev, and Tat'yana Zaslavskaya. Only a storm of protest by thousands of employees of various academic institutions forced the presidium to allow a new selection of candidates.² In the course of the crisis within the academy over the election issue, some employees and even some members of the academy started to call openly in the Soviet media for the creation of alternative scientific associations to the Academy of Sciences. On April 20, for example, a corresponding member of the academy, Aleksei Yablokov, disclosed on Soviet television

plans to set up an association of scientists that would be independent of the Academy of Sciences.³

It is clear that the leadership—i.e., the presidium—of the Academy of Sciences is very much concerned about the criticism of the academy and, in particular, about open charges in the press that the present structure of the body hampers the development of Soviet science. As a result, the presidium has started taking steps, albeit rather cosmetic ones, to improve the academy's image. One of these steps has been to refurbish the journal *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, which has until now been a very poor advertisement for the academy.

Issue No. 4 for this year of the journal, which is published by the presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has announced a major restructuring of its work. The issue opens with the text of a resolution adopted by the presidium evaluating the journal's work and making proposals for its improvement. The resolution is very critical of the journal's performance, saying that it has failed in its duty to become a "discussion tribune" for questions of Soviet science and scholarship and that it has failed to keep the general public informed about important projects undertaken by the academy, let alone the achievements of science abroad. Even the poor quality of writing in the journal is singled out for criticism in the resolution.

Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR is indeed one of the few Soviet periodicals to have been influenced little, if at all, by the policy of *glasnost'* and has consequently failed to win any great respect even within the academy itself. In order to improve the performance of the journal, the resolution suggests, among other things, that it publish franker reports about the activities of the academy, introduce a special rubric in which to publish materials

¹ For one of the latest attacks on the academy, see the article by Academician Boris Raushenbakh in *Izvestia*, May 2, 1989, and the letter from Academicians Abel Aganbegyan and M. Kabachnik in *Izvestia*, March 20, 1989.

² For some details on the controversy surrounding the selection of candidates from the USSR Academy of Sciences for election to the Congress of People's Deputies, see *Sotstalistsicheskaya industriya*, January 24, 1989; *Pravda*, February 1, 1989; *Moscow News*, Nos. 5, 7, and 8, 1989; *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 17, 1989.

³ *Central Television*, "Vremya," April 20, 1989. Yablokov also gave a telephone interview on the subject to RFE/RL on April 25, 1989.

relating to the history of the academy, publicize the achievements of science in foreign countries, and introduce a special discussion section.

Towards this end, the presidium has made radical changes in the composition of the editorial board of the journal. Academician Ignatii Makarov, a mechanics specialist, remains as chief editor, but only three of the twenty-one members of the former editorial board have survived. Academician Georgii Skryabin, who was deputy chief editor of the journal, died in March of this year;⁴ the others have been dismissed.

Among those excluded are the conservative historian Academician Boris Rybakov, who has recently come under attack in Soviet historical journals,⁵ and Academician Yulii Bromlei, a specialist on nationality relations in the USSR whose ideas are now felt to be not sufficiently in tune with the times. Rybakov and Bromlei have lost their posts as directors of the Institute of Archeology of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Ethnography, respectively. Although accorded the position of "honorary directors" (Rybakov in 1988, and Bromlei in March of this year), they have ceased to wield any significant influence in their professional fields.⁶ Also excluded from the editorial board is Academician Moisei Markov, who voluntarily relinquished the post of academician secretary of one of the academy's departments in June, 1988, on grounds of advanced age.⁷ Academician Leonid Brekhovskikh, although continuing to be academician secretary of the academy's Department of Oceanography, Physics of the Atmosphere, and Geography, has also lost his seat on the editorial board. In Brekhovskikh's case, the reason for his departure seems to be connected with the fact that

he has been accused in several publications of promoting environmentally dangerous scientific projects.⁸

The three former members who remain on the editorial board are Academician Vitalii Gol'dansky, corresponding member of the academy Semen Mikulinsky, and Academician Vladimir Kirillin. It is understandable that Gol'dansky, a physicist, has been retained, since he is one of the most active reformists in the academy and has attempted to restrict its bureaucratic elements. He has discussed the current problems of the academy in articles in the most outspoken Soviet periodicals.⁹ Mikulinsky, a philosopher and scientific historian, and Kirillin, a technician whose career has been mainly connected with the Soviet government, belong, however, to the old guard. Both are rather elderly—Mikulinsky is seventy, and Kirillin is seventy-six—and both lost their positions in the past few years as a result of the campaign to rejuvenate the academy. The dismissal of Mikulinsky as director of the Institute of the History of Natural Sciences and Technology and as chief editor of the journal *Voprosy estestvoznaniya i tekhniki* was announced in January, 1987.¹⁰ Kirillin was relieved of the post of academician secretary of a department of the academy in June, 1988.¹¹ It is very probable that these two elderly members of the academy had to fight a hard battle to remain on the board of *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*.

The new editorial board, numbering thirty-one, includes such outspoken and reform-minded members of the academy as economist Leonid Abalkin, jurist Vladimir Kudryavtsev, and space scientist Roal'd Sagdeev. Not all members of the new editorial board are reformists, however, since they include such well-known reactionaries as Academician Evgenii Chelyshev, who is academician secretary of the Department of Literature and Language. One surprising inclusion is Academician Aleksandr Baev, who retired as a secretary of a department together with other elderly top-ranking academicians in June, 1988. It is not clear what significant contribution Baev can make to the work of the journal at the age of eighty-five.

⁸ For some bitter criticism of Brekhovskikh, see, for example, *Novyi mir*, No. 7, 1988, p. 166, where A. Monin accuses Brekhovskikh of being the only top official in the academy who continued to defend the northern rivers diversion project at a time when it had already been sharply criticized as ecologically dangerous in the Soviet press.

⁹ See, for example, *Sovetskaya kul'tura*, May 28, 1988.

¹⁰ *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 1, 1987, p. 140.

¹¹ TASS, June 11, 1988; *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 9, 1988, p. 138.

⁴ The obituary of Skryabin, who was also an academician secretary of the presidium of the academy, appeared in *Prauda*, March 29, 1989.

⁵ For criticism of Rybakov see, for instance, the round-table discussion on restructuring in Soviet historiography in *Voprosy istorii*, No. 3, 1988. See also Vera Tolz, RL 170/88, "A New Stage in Restructuring Soviet Historiography," April 18, 1988.

⁶ The replacement of Rybakov as director of the Institute of Archeology and his appointment as "honorary director" was announced in *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 2, 1988, p. 120. Bromlei was replaced as director of the Institute of Ethnography at the end of March, 1989. His replacement has not been reported yet in *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*. It was announced by the Soviet delegation at the conference "Pre-Modern and Modern National Identity in Russia/Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," held in London, May 30-April 3, 1989.

⁷ TASS, June 11, 1988.

Issue No. 4 of the *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* contains materials that it would have been unthinkable to find in the journal in the past. Under the rubric "Man and Society," there is an article by Gennadii Osipov of the Institute of Sociology of the USSR Academy of Sciences—a new member of the editorial board—analyzing the current debate in the USSR about whether the society that now exists in the country is a Socialist one. Osipov devotes considerable space to the views of Soviet philosopher Aleksandr Tsipko, who has attracted attention with contributions to the journal *Nauka i zhizn'* propagating the view that Stalinism was a logical development not only of Leninism but also of Marxist concepts of society that, he argues, have failed to stand the test of time.¹²

There is also an article by Candidate of Psychiatric Sciences Leonid Radzikhovskiy, who analyzes personality cults as "psychiatric phenomena." Radzikhovskiy stresses the similarities between the Stalin and Hitler cults. Although Stalinism is now one of the most popular topics of discussion in the Soviet press, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* has hitherto been a rare exception in almost completely ignoring the subject.

¹² *Nauka i zhizn'*, Nos. 11 and 12, 1988; Nos. 1 and 2, 1989.

Under the rubric "Time. Ideas. Destinies," Doctor of Physics and Mathematics Adolf Yushkevich presents some interesting material about the persecution in the 1930s of one of the most famous of Russian mathematicians, N. N. Luzin. In the course of his research into the history of the "Luzin affair," Yushkevich was permitted access to the archives of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which have been only minimally affected by the current trend towards opening up Soviet archives. Yushkevich includes the texts of several important documents from Luzin's personal archives in the academy that have hitherto not been made public.

Despite these visible improvements, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* still pales by comparison with such an outspoken journal as *Voprosy estestvoznaniya i tekhniki*, another monthly that is also published by the USSR Academy of Sciences. The latter journal has become a major source of interesting material about the persecution of scientists during the time of Stalin, and, by comparison, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* still has a long way to go to achieve the standard that has now been prescribed for it in the resolution of the presidium of the Academy of Sciences.

(RL 232/89, May 12, 1989)

SCIENCE

Soviet Science Policy in the *Perestroika* Period: An Overview*

Aleksei E. Levin

Since the new Soviet leadership came to power just over four years ago, a growing perception of the cardinal importance of modernizing the organization of science and higher education in the USSR has emerged. This has led to a more active science policy. In a number of Mikhail Gorbachev's recent speeches the notion emerges that democratization and scientific and technical progress are two central and equally vital tasks facing Soviet society at the current stage of *perestroika*. What follows is an overview of the main elements of Soviet science policy from 1985 to 1989.¹

* Translated from Russian.

¹ The Western literature on this subject includes a fair number of works devoted to the pre-*perestroika*

From the point of view of Soviet science policy, the four years since Gorbachev came to power can be divided into two distinct parts. Until March, 1987, no substantial reforms in science policy took

state of Soviet science. Several trends of recent years are examined, for example, in Harley D. Balzer, "Is Less More? Soviet Science in the Gorbachev Era," *Science and Technology*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1985, pp. 29-46; Gary Taubes and Glenn Garelik, "Soviet Science: How Good Is It?," *Discover*, Vol. 7, No. 8, 1986, pp. 36-59; George Avis, (ed.), *Soviet Higher and Vocational Education from Khrushchev to Gorbachev*, Bradford University, Occasional Papers, No. 8, 1987; and Peter Kneen, "Soviet Science Policy under Gorbachev," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1989, pp. 69-87.

place. Those measures that were taken were traditional in character (for example, several resolutions were adopted on increased development of individual scientific disciplines). In the hope of achieving greater flexibility and effectiveness in the face of the traditionally rigid organization of Soviet science, a decree was published in 1984² sanctioning the creation of temporary scientific collectives—a program that had been initiated three years earlier by the USSR Academy of Sciences. So slowly were the provisions of the decree put into effect, however, that three years after its adoption only fifty such collectives had been formed; moreover, all of them were created within the framework of academy science. Attempts made in the mid-1980s to find new ways to structure applied and industrial science, taking into account the interdisciplinary nature of modern developments in science and technology, led to the creation of a large number of “scientific-production” associations (more than 500 national production organizations and twenty-two interbranch scientific-technical complexes by the end of 1987). These, however, were burdened with all the old sins: departmentalism, extreme centralization, and administrative-command management. In sum, by the spring of 1987, Soviet science policy was still only on the threshold of genuine structural reforms.

Nevertheless, the period from March, 1985, to March, 1987, proved to be extremely important in another sense. During this time, criticism of the state of science and higher education increased markedly in the Soviet mass media. Although “the shock of Chernobyl” and the unprecedentedly open discussion of the Northern rivers diversion projects were the catalysts for the debate, it was in no way limited exclusively to questions of atomic energy, land reclamation, and ecology. In 1986 and 1987 especially, important groups of scientists voiced their dissatisfaction with the stagnation of Soviet science, the humiliating backwardness in most scientific disciplines, the bureaucracy of science management and the erosion of the scientific ethos, the undemocratic character of scientific institutions, the material poverty of science and its low priority (except for a few elite areas, primarily of a military nature) in allocation of resources, the dominant departmentalism in planning and organization of research in both applied and pure science, the inadequate preparation of young scientists, and the practical separation of higher education from front-line scientific research and development.

The unacceptability of the models for managing Soviet science that emerged between the 1930s and 1960s, in which “all relations between . . . the pro-

² *Sobranie postanovlenii pravitel'stva SSSR*, No. 6, 1984, pp. 88-90.

ducers of new knowledge and the rest of the economy . . . were regulated by a management mechanism of the administrative-command type”³ was readily evident to many participants in the debates. There is no doubt that these discussions not only gave rise to a demand for *perestroika* in science but also influenced preparations for the reforms of the spring and fall of 1987 that embraced the three main branches of Soviet science: academy science; university science; and “department” or “ministry” science, including the “specialized” academies, such as the V. I. Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences (VASKhNIL) and the Academy of Medical Sciences.

The general goals of the reforms were fairly clear even before publication of the corresponding documents, and they do not in themselves appear exceptionally revolutionary. Rather, they represent a continuation and development of many priorities of Soviet science policy enunciated earlier. They can be summarized along the following lines:

- Increasing the flexibility and effectiveness of the research and development system and its ability to react quickly to economic and social demands.
- Significantly improving higher education, especially in such key fields as training personnel for the machine building, chemical, electronic, and biotechnological industries, and in information science.
- Raising the level of pure science and modernizing its organization.
- Creating reliable noncommand mechanisms for information exchange and for cooperation between science and the economy that guarantee rapid and stable application of scientific innovations and their transformation into promising, competitive products and technologies.
- Overcoming the international isolation of Soviet science and integrating it into the world system of generating new knowledge.

Although, as already stated, these goals (with the possible exception of the last one, which is obviously tied to Soviet foreign policy) had emerged earlier, in the reforms of 1987 they were more clearly defined and were implemented in a fundamentally new political, social, economic, and ideological context. In particular, the realization that the Soviet economy was in a state of crisis necessitated taking much more radical measures than in

³ *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1988, p. 99.

the recent past, including a general decentralization and debureaucratization of Soviet science and even changes in the system of power relations in this area. Moreover, reforms in science policy began to be introduced at a time when the coordinates had already been drawn for the reform of industry but preparations had barely begun for political reforms and for the reform of the agroindustrial complex. Therefore, the direction taken by reforms in science policy mirrored a general desire to change the Soviet political and economic model and also reflected the fact that they were conceived and realized at an interim stage in the reform process.

The beginning of the 1987 reforms can be pinpointed to the general meeting of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in March of that year. The academy leadership was faced with two basic tasks: to reduce the degree of organizational centralization—or, specifically, to create more efficacious horizontal communication within the system of academy science; and to satisfy, at least in part, the calls of regular academy members for the immediate democratization of the institution. As it turned out, the academy leadership, in particular its president, Guriĭ Marchuk, wanted to make as few concessions as possible on the second point, preferring to limit itself to more traditional modernization in the area of administration. This tendency was clearly shown in the resolutions adopted at the session.⁴ Management of academy activities was entrusted to its eighteen disciplinary departments, which received the right to plan their own research, to allocate among the institutes resources assigned by the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, and to work out their own forms of cooperation. The departments were also given significant “levers” in the areas of personnel and publishing policy as well as international exchanges; decisions about scientific trips abroad by academy employees could now be made at this level (the number of such trips doubled in 1987). Relations with central state organs (the Council of Ministers, Gosplan, the State Committee for Science and Technology, etc.), however, were left completely to the presidium. At the same time, the academy rank and file failed to obtain the right to elect the leadership of academy institutes, and the rights of the scientific councils of institutes were not significantly broadened. It is not surprising, therefore, that the resolutions of March, 1987, evoked a new wave of criticism in the Soviet press.

To support their demands, academy members cited the newly adopted Law on the State Enterprise, which introduced the principle of elected leaders of production collectives, and it was proba-

⁴ *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 7, 1987, pp. 78-82.

bly this that forced the academy leadership to make concessions. In July, 1987, a commission of the academy's presidium was formed under the leadership of P. N. Fedoseev to find ways to amend regulations for the appointment of the leadership of the academy's institutes. The commission's recommendations were circulated (this in itself was an innovation) to all academy institutes, and after revision they were adopted at a general meeting of the academy in October, 1987.⁵ Henceforth candidacies for institute directorships were to be discussed at institute meetings (“meetings of work collectives,” to use the official terminology), and only after this preliminary screening were they to be forwarded to departmental general meetings or election. Thus, the institute staffs received only a consultative vote (which of course did not satisfy the aspirations of the more radical advocates of *perestroika* within the academy). Nevertheless, the new provision meant that members of scientific councils would in future not be appointed by the directors but would be elected by the members of the institute, who also obtained the right to propose candidates for heads of subdivisions within the institutes for later election by the scientific councils.

Reforms of academy science (extending to the republican academies as well) have also included a broadening of the institutes' rights to plan and finance scientific research as well as their own structures and staffs. (On this point, academy subunits lag behind industrial enterprises and scientific research institutes of “ministry” science.⁶) Beginning this year, the old principle of “bloc” financing, whereby resources were allocated essentially for the maintenance of scientific organizations, will be completely replaced by competitive financing (also previously unknown to Soviet science) of research projects only. These projects will have to fall within the framework of fundamental research programs⁷ at present being planned for the academy as a whole.⁸ Details of this new model of financing should be completed in 1989 and 1990. At the same time, cooperation between academy and university science is supposed to grow, towards which end a number of existing restrictions on holding more than one post will probably be

⁵ *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 2, 1988, pp. 3-7.

⁶ *Izvestia*, March 7, 1989, p. 3.

⁷ *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 7, 1988, pp. 9-21; and *Pravda*, March 7, 1989, p. 2.

⁸ See, for example, the draft concept for the program for biosphere and ecological research of the USSR Academy of Sciences for the period extending up to the year 2015, *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 11, 1988, pp. 6-16.

changed. In addition, there has been a significant reduction in the size of the central academy staff (30 percent), and the practice of using temporary research groups in academy institutes is growing. Institutes are also now permitted to earmark revenue from cost-accounting agreements to augment salary funds.⁹ Finally, in 1989 an additional 400 million rubles has been allocated to the academies for new equipment and another 100 million for other needs.¹⁰ Thus, overall allocations for academy science have increased by around one third.

Other points can be made briefly. In October, 1988, practically the entire top leadership of the USSR Academy of Sciences was changed. Moreover, in connection with elections to the Congress of People's Deputies in 1989, there was a virtual explosion of political activity among scientists at academy institutes that not only led to a thorough revision of the list of academy candidates approved by the presidium, but apparently cleared the way for reforms and precipitated the formation of new pressure groups within the academy.

The general program of reform of Soviet higher education, including the reform of "university" (*vuzovoi*) science, was also launched in March, 1987.¹¹ Plans were made to promote scientific activity in institutes of higher education, where until then personnel with scientific degrees had comprised a relatively insignificant proportion of the employees. Funding for the reform program was to come from a portion of the income institutions of higher education would receive under the reform from ministries and departments as "payment" for specialists sent to them. As the reforms progressed, it was decided to strengthen cooperation between higher education institutions and the economy on a cost-accounting basis, thereby emphasizing the development of pure science funded from the state budget in institutions of higher education, especially in the strongest universities. Allocations for these purposes were increased in 1988 by 80 million rubles—a 40-percent rise over the 1970 plan level.¹² Moreover, a construction and material equipment plan amounting to nearly 3.5 billion rubles to be paid by the branches involved was worked out for institutions of higher education for the 1988-95 period.¹³

Cooperation between university and academy science has been strengthened as well. By the end of 1988, nine joint scientific centers and six joint

research laboratories, as well as twenty-two branch laboratories, were in existence.¹⁴ Salary funds have also been increased for higher education. Independent scientific and technical associations with institutions of higher education in the role of lead organizations began to be created.¹⁵ In addition, there has been an upsurge in research, application, and service cooperatives with the participation of staff from higher education institutions, a trend that will probably gain further impetus from the USSR Supreme Soviet's "Decree on Leasing and Leasing Relations in the USSR."¹⁶

The spring of 1988 saw the beginning of a centralization of the national education system of the USSR, which is now concentrated exclusively in the hands of the USSR State Committee on Education. One of the tasks of this new "superministry" is the transformation of the university science sector into "an independent complex with broad rights and with responsibility for solving major scientific and technical tasks, with a developed infrastructure, a commercial basis, and multifaceted foreign economic activity."¹⁷ Specifically, this sector is supposed to establish its own banks and special foundations for the financing of exploratory scientific and technical projects and to set up special organizational structures on the model of those currently existing in Western universities. The international contacts of the higher education sector are supposed to intensify, particularly in scientific fields. With regard to the last point, changes are already noticeable.

The reform scheme for the third, "ministry" branch of Soviet science was published in late 1987¹⁸ and is a good deal more radical than in the other branches of Soviet science. For the first time in Soviet history, the results of applied research and development were awarded the official status of products and their sale was made the sole source of financing for a given branch's scientific enterprises. The reforms also stipulated that enterprises should switch over completely to a full cost-accounting basis and that the prices for its services should be determined on a competitive basis through negotiations with potential buyers of these services. Presumably, by switching to a cost-accounting basis, the Soviet economy (especially the technically best equipped and most competitive branches) will find a vested interest in using research and development to renovate production; and the institutes responsible for developing new products will, in

⁹ *Izvestia*, November 18, 1988, p. 3.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, March 7, 1989, p. 2.

¹¹ *Pravda*, March 21, 1987, pp. 1-3; and *Byulleten' Ministerstva vysshego i srednego spetsial'nogo obrazovaniya SSSR*, No. 6, 1987, pp. 7-25.

¹² *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 4, 1988, p. 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ See, for example, *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 42, 1988, p. 15.

¹⁶ *Pravda*, April 9, 1989, p. 2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Izvestia*, October 23, 1987, pp. 1-2.

turn, be stimulated by their dependence upon orders from industry and agriculture. Relations among the scientific research institutes themselves and even the smaller research subdivisions are also now to be conducted on a contract basis. Finally, contractual relations are now permitted between scientific and technical cooperatives and research institutions of "ministry" science.

The process of switching "ministry" science over to full cost-accounting began in 1988 and should be completed by the beginning of the next five-year plan. So far the course has not run entirely straight, particularly because the USSR has lacked a system of competitive bidding on research projects or, more specifically, a system of prior professional project review. The creation of such a system, like the formulation of the national scientific and technical development strategy, are among the functions of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the State

Committee on Science and Technology. To say that such a system exists in the USSR would be premature, although individual elements have already been worked out. The Soviet high-temperature super-conductor research program, for example, has been organized along these lines. It is obvious, however, that the fairly massive restructuring of Soviet science along the lines of the Western grants system that is being demanded by the more radical innovators is not to likely at present, especially in the area of "ministry" science. As for national scientific programs, fourteen complex projects currently grace the list, including, for example, the "Human Genome," "Promising Information Technologies," and "Ecologically Clean Energy."¹⁹

¹⁹ *Sotstatisticheskaya industriya*, January 1, 1989, p. 2.

(RL 233/89, May 19, 1989)

CMEA

The Economic Reintegration of Eastern Europe*

Vlad Sobell

An analysis of recent developments in Europe suggests that the eventual reintegration of Eastern Europe into the pan-European economic system has proceeded to its initial stages. Changes in the USSR, the acceleration of reforms in some CMEA member countries, and the expected strengthening of the European Community are the dominant factors behind this historical turnaround.

The Turn towards European Normalization

Recent developments on the European scene can be fully understood only as being moves towards normalization away from the artificial division of the continent of Europe after the Second World War, normalization that is also "post-Communist." The division was primarily caused by Stalin's capture of the countries of Eastern Europe and installation in them of economic and political systems according to the Soviet model, but the division deepened as both sides began to build

separate military and economic alliances. Today, Soviet reforms are creating propitious conditions for a gradual reversal of this process and carry the prospect of eventually reintegrating Eastern Europe with the mainstream of European development.

There are two basic reasons why Soviet reforms have had this effect. First, the Kremlin under Mikhail Gorbachev has come to recognize that the USSR's stranglehold over Eastern Europe, far from assuring the USSR of greater security, has, paradoxically, brought it less. Eastern Europe is now economically almost bankrupt and politically an unstable region; the Kremlin is aware of its limited capacity to prop it up economically and police it militarily. Second, some CMEA countries' economies are in worse financial straits than others, so that the process of erosion of their Soviet-type systems, which is evident throughout the region, is more advanced in some than in others. The economically weaker governments grew more vulnerable to reformist pressures and have been pushed into genuine concessions. Thus, a serious split has developed within the alliance between the orthodox

* First published by *Radio Free Europe Research* as Background Report/84 (Economics), May 17, 1989.

GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and the reforming USSR, Hungary, and Poland, on the other.

Although the Soviet-led alliance has never been free from disagreements (concealed as they were behind the facade of fraternal unity), the present-day split is unprecedented in its nature and depth. It runs right through the alliance, dividing it into two groups of countries. The roots of this division are essentially systemic, whereas previously the CMEA governments would disagree about isolated nuances of policy, they now disagree about fundamental matters such as the nature of socialism. For the reforming group, market economics and political reforms amount to a "revival of socialism," while for the nonreforming regimes such ideas represent a turn towards capitalism. Since the alliance's purpose is ostensibly a joint commitment to "socialism," the CMEA is for all practical purposes disintegrating. As one leading Western observer has put it, the alliance of East European countries in the late 1980s is "but a shadow of its former self."¹

Who Is Drifting towards Whom?

It is still too early to claim that these major shifts are irreversible (a semblance of conditions before *perestroika* could be restored if there was a change of heart in Moscow), but they do, appear durable enough to encourage Western governments to follow more active policies towards Eastern Europe. The CMEA states' dire economic situation and the permissiveness evident in the posture of the Kremlin have created an opportunity for economic as well as diplomatic influence, which the West is moving cautiously to exploit. In a sense, Western influence has long been increasing: it grew in proportion to Eastern Europe's substantial hard-currency debt and need for imports of technology. As Soviet domestic reforms have progressed, however, and as the Soviet "new thinking" has reduced East-West tension, Western influence has become more direct and overt. Some East European officials now unashamedly claim that Western help is indispensable to the success of reforms,² and the US and West European governments, have now made it clear that they are willing to reward political liberalization and market-oriented reforms in the CMEA with measured economic support.³

¹ Charles Gati, "Eastern Europe on its Own," *Foreign Affairs*, Special Issue on "America and the World," Vol. 68, No. 1, 1988/89, p.102.

² For example, President of the National Bank of Hungary Ferenc Bartha (*Radio Budapest*, April 27, 1989).

³ Vlad Sobell, "Western Aid and Economic Recovery in Eastern Europe," Background Report/82 (East-West Relations), *Radio Free Europe Research*, May 16, 1989.

Many analysts have noted the emergence of the pivotal role of West Germany in this process.⁴ There are several factors at play that have contributed to this. The first is that, historically, industrialized Germany has influenced the countries of central and southeastern Europe, and recent developments can therefore be seen as a return to this traditional role. Second, West Germany built up its position as the leading Western trading partner of most CMEA members long before *perestroika*. Third, as the "frontline" state of the Western alliance, West Germany is perhaps more interested than other Western governments in ensuring that the post-Communist reintegration of the CMEA states proceeds as peacefully as possible. Fourth, the West German economy is fundamental to the European Community and therefore it is only natural that West Germany lead the way in any EC initiative on the CMEA.⁵

West Germany's economic preeminence in relations with members of the CMEA has fueled speculation among some analysts about a drift towards the East and, therefore, a weakening of Bonn's commitment to the Western alliance. This may be a kind of optical illusion. There is, indeed, movement in Europe, but it can hardly be interpreted as movement by the West (and, more explicitly, by West Germany) towards the East. It is the CMEA that is falling apart, and it is members of CMEA that are doing most of the shifting. As one West German analyst put it: "It is not necessarily West Germany that is drifting to the East, it could be that the East is drifting toward the West."⁶ Some analysts argue, moreover, that West Germany is merely further advanced in a process, that the Western alliance as a whole is increasingly coming to recognize as inevitable.⁷ Thus what appears to be West Germany's drift is in reality the other members of the Western alliance lagging behind, and, as

⁴ See, for example, Timothy Aepfel, "Behind Bonn's Opening to the East," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 9, 1989; William Echikson, "East Europeans Look to Bonn," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 9, 1989; William Drozdiak, "Soviets Encourage West German Role in East Europe," *The Washington Post*, March 18, 1989; Robert J. McCartney, "West Germany Seeking Leading Roles in East and West," *The Washington Post*, April 25, 1989; Amos Perlmutter, "West Germany: A Vital Link in Shifting European Balance," *Los Angeles Times*, April 27, 1989; and Reginald Dale, "EC Sees a Chance to Be a 'Magnet' to East," *International Herald Tribune*, March 23, 1989.

⁵ Philip Hanson and Vlad Sobell, "The Changing Relations Between the EC and the CMEA," Background Report/73 (East-West Relations), *Radio Free Europe Research*, May 3, 1989.

⁶ Cited in Dale, *op. cit.*

⁷ See Aepfel, *op. cit.*

they activate their economic links with the CMEA, the gap between West Germany and its allies will vanish.

European Integration and East European Reintegration

This "drift" must be seen in its proper perspective. Above all, account must be taken of the creation of a unified market within the EC during the 1990s. If the EC's plans become reality, then Western Europe will emerge as the world's largest integrated market as well as the largest exporter. Thus the West European economies (and this will benefit the West German economy—the key player—in particular) are moving closer towards each other than they are towards CMEA member countries. West Germany is poised to anchor itself ever more solidly in the West. Despite its growing trade with the USSR, West Germany's turnover with the USSR amounted in 1988 to a mere 1.6 percent of its total trade. Secondly, the de facto disintegration of the CMEA, the exhaustion of the economies of most of its members, and the fatigue in the Kremlin noted above have set the stage for a progressive reintegration of the CMEA into the world economy, which in practice means into the emerging "European economic space" (as the current chairman of the CMEA Executive Committee put it), the core of which will be formed by the EC.⁸ West European integration is acting as a catalyst in this process of East European reintegration, and the consequent Westward drift of the CMEA countries is part and parcel of a larger process of pan-European integration.

It is often overlooked that the CMEA is a thoroughly artificial creation. It could, in fact, be argued that, instead of integrating the members of the CMEA, the *raison d'être* of the CMEA is the artificial separation of the East European economies from the rest of the world. The foundation and early evolution of the CMEA was sustained not so much by fostering trade (as was the case in the EC) but by the sheer diversion of trade away from traditional Western partners. The CMEA is synonymous with trade diversion rather than net trade creation.⁹ The

⁸ Some analysts speak of a Europe made up of three concentric circles: the EC in the middle, the EFTA countries around it, and the CMEA countries forming the outer ring (see Dale, *op. cit.*). Andrei Lukanov, an alternate member of the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party and currently chairman of the CMEA Executive Committee, stated at a recent symposium in Madrid that "it is necessary to create a common European space within which the [CMEA] nations and those of the EC and EFTA can all interact" (*AP*, Madrid, April 14, 1989).

⁹ Franklin D. Holzman, "Comecon: A 'Trade-Destroying' Customs Union?" *Journal of Comparative Economics*, December, 1985, especially pp. 419-23.

much-vaunted intra-CMEA cooperation is therefore little other than an attempt to limit the economic damage caused by the politically motivated separation from the rest of the world.¹⁰

Despite the CMEA's artificial nature, however, it is difficult to agree with the statement by Reszo Nyers (the longstanding Hungarian reformer who is now a member of the Hungarian Politburo) that, in practice, the CMEA "does not exist."¹¹ Having been created and maintained for forty years, there is now a distinct economic entity called the CMEA that provides preferential markets for uncompetitive goods and through which the USSR supplies essential energy and materials to loss-making East European heavy industries, without which facility the East European economies would collapse. The point is rather that such a form of integration simply has no future. The future lies in a reintegration of the CMEA economies into the European economic system.

The Strains

The economic reintegration of Eastern Europe is bound to be a prolonged and painful process. The CMEA economies must undergo a massive restructuring: labor must be shifted away from the grossly loss-making heavy industries to more competitive branches or the underdeveloped service sector or both. The phasing out of subsidies, the search for real prices and real exchange rates for the East European currencies, will generate significant open inflation. The transition to a market-based system, which is a condition of reintegration, cannot be accomplished without further belt-tightening. The strains of this process will also be apparent in Western Europe. If the CMEA is truly to open up, the EC economies are likely to face an influx of East Europeans, many of whom will seek legal as well as illegal employment. The pressure is already being felt in West Germany. For example, some 1,250,000

¹⁰ V. Sobell, *The Red Market: Industrial Cooperation and Specialisation in Comecon*, Aldershot, Gower, 1984, Chapters 1 and 11.

¹¹ In a discussion on Hungarian television, Nyers said: "In my opinion, in God's truth, the CMEA does not exist. It resembles the Andersen tale about the emperor who proclaimed that he was dressed and everyone believed him because that was proper. . . . However, the emperor was naked. We only make ourselves believe [that the CMEA exists]. . . . The CMEA at present is nothing other than a system of bilateral relations. These bilateral relations [would function in the same manner] without the CMEA's enormous headquarters, without the CMEA's resolutions. The governments, the planning offices, and the foreign trade ministries would create the same thing [without the CMEA]" (*Hungarian Television*, May 2, 1989).

Polish citizens are expected to visit West Germany in 1989; as in the past, many will seek employment opportunities to earn enough German marks to set up businesses in Poland.¹² The EC economies will also face more competition from East European imports as the EC's import quotas are gradually reduced or phased out completely in the 1990s.¹³

Although painful in the short run, this process is healthy in the long term. The Westward movement of East European labor is a natural outcome of European economic normalization, from which both the West European and the East European economies can ultimately benefit. In the West, it can help keep down labor costs, while the East can benefit from the inflow of hard currency and flourishing private enterprise. Besides, the main agent

¹² Echikson, *op. cit.*

¹³ Hanson and Sobell, *op. cit.*

of European economic reintegration is likely to be an Eastward flow of Western capital seeking the advantage offered by relatively cheap labor in Eastern Europe.¹⁴ Moving capital to labor rather than labor to capital is a more efficient and less disruptive alternative.

¹⁴ A report on the future of the Czechoslovak economy, produced by the Institute of Forecasting of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, identifies low labor costs (in relation to the Western countries) as the "principal potential comparative advantage" of the Czechoslovak economy. According to this study, the average cost of labor in Czechoslovak industry is between 30 and 40 percent of the US average. The cost of labor in West Germany is estimated as slightly higher than in the US. The cost of labor in the poorer European countries, such as Spain and Greece, is still significantly above the Czechoslovak level (73 percent and 59 percent, respectively).

(RL 234/89, May 12, 1989)

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Afghan Veterans in Siberia

Valerii Konovalov

The central Soviet press writes very little about veterans of the war in Afghanistan who reside in Siberia and the Far East. Only a fragmentary picture of the urgent problems facing them in adapting to civilian life can be pieced together from the scraps of information that occasionally appear in newspapers and periodicals. There is also a dearth of official data about how many Siberians fought in Afghanistan and returned either as cripples or in zinc coffins on the "black tulips" (the name given to the AN-12 aircraft that flew the bodies of Soviet soldiers back to the Soviet Union). The Estonian Komsomol newspaper *Noorte Haal* has claimed that the number of Soviet citizens killed in the Afghan war came to 50,000 and that altogether more than a million served there.¹ It seems reasonable to assume that these figures include a significant number of Siberians.

Some statistics for Novosibirsk are available. Aleksei Manannikov, an independent journalist living in the city, told Radio Liberty special correspondent Savik Shuster that, according to official lists, 127 residents of Novosibirsk died in Afghani-

stan and two are still missing.² Some 440 of the city's Afghan veterans are reported to be in need of better housing.³ A further piece of information of particular interest attests to the effects of conscription in this unpopular war: all three sons of one Novosibirsk family served in Afghanistan; one died and the other two returned home suffering from physical injuries and psychological traumas.⁴

The postwar adjustment of Siberian veterans to civilian life seems to have become a serious social problem. It is no secret that many of them have found difficulty in coming to terms with their new position in society, only a minority having made the transition successfully. The majority have to engage in a running battle with various official instances that is often as vicious as the ones they fought with the "spooks" (*mujahidin*) during the war in order to obtain "the privileges for internationalist warriors" the press so often writes about. Sometimes, officials maliciously make of these

² Interview given by Aleksei Manannikov to Savik Shuster of Radio Liberty on February 27, 1989.

³ *Vechernii Novosibirsk*, January 14, 1989.

⁴ *Sovetskaya Sibir'*, January 11, 1989.

¹ *Noorte Haal*, January 24, 1989.

"privileges" a further humiliation by openly mocking the disabled and the families of those who were killed in Afghanistan.⁵ Siberian veterans in these categories are faced with the same problems as veterans all over the country—inadequate housing, a frequent lack of even basic medical care for invalids, and an absence of assistance for the relatives of those killed in Afghanistan, many of whom were their families' sole breadwinners. It is only in the sphere of military-patriotic education of young people, in setting up military-patriotic clubs and associations, that Afghan veterans have been given the green light.

In the campaign preceding the elections to the new Congress of People's Deputies, military-patriotic training and the role of the army in the education of young people was a key element in the platforms of candidates who had fought in Afghanistan. In Novosibirsk, the contender who proved to be most zealous in this respect was Colonel General Boris P'yankov, former commander of the Fortieth Army in Afghanistan and now in charge of the Siberian Military District.⁶ According to Manannikov, however, the Novosibirsk voters blackballed the militaristic candidate. The general's cause was not even helped by such contrivances as having an armored car parade through the city during the election campaign with a poster reading "Vote for P'yankov" attached to its machine gun.⁷ One of P'yankov's former colleagues in Afghanistan, Oleg Shenin, the first secretary of the Krasnoyarsk Krai Party Committee, was more successful. A former adviser to the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Shenin managed to get elected to the Congress of People's Deputies.⁸ In Krasnoyarsk Krai, he has launched a campaign to apply military experience gained in Afghanistan to civilian life: twenty-seven military sports camps have been set up; military-patriotic classes for young people run by Afghan veterans have been instituted in every town and kolkhoz; and many Afghan veterans are now employed in the police. Shenin has appointed an Afghan veteran to head the Party committee of the Internal Affairs Administration of the Krai Executive Committee.⁹

The picture in Novosibirsk is much the same. According to a report by Manannikov published in the Paris-based emigre journal *Russkaya mysl'*, military-patriotic clubs are springing up all over

⁵ *Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik*, No. 5, 1989; *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 12, 1988; *Argumenty i fakty*, No. 7, 1989.

⁶ *Krasnaya zvezda*, February 23, 1989.

⁷ Interview given by Aleksei Manannikov to Evgenii Kushev of Radio Liberty in March, 1989.

⁸ *Izvestia*, April 5, 1989.

⁹ *Krasnaya zvezda*, April 15, 1988.

the place, especially ones that give airborne assault training. The clubs that are considered to be the best in the city are "Saturn" and "Patriot." One of the leaders of "Saturn," Yuri Kapishnikov, a well-known figure in Novosibirsk, declared at a recent meeting in the town: "If we had waged a total war, we would have turned the whole of Afghanistan upside down." He has, however, come close to turning his native town upside down. The unofficial "Assault Troops' Day" held on August 2, 1988, caused a furor in the city. Kapishnikov has even extended military-patriotic education into institutions for the detention of juvenile offenders. Afghan veterans are teaching young thieves, murderers, and other violent offenders karate and professional use of firearms. No doubt, this experience will prove useful to them in the future.¹⁰

Military-patriotic education is also well developed in Kemerovo Oblast. Today, there are about twenty military sports clubs, and an oblast council of internationalist warriors has been set up, with Aleksandr Zheltukhin, an Afghan veteran who is a warrant officer at one of the oblast's military schools, as its chairman. In Novokuznetsk, Afghan veterans who work at the Novokuznetsk Metallurgical Combine are giving evening classes in close combat to students of vocational-technical schools at the "Yunyi desantnik" club.¹¹

The war in Afghanistan altered the mental outlook of hundreds of thousands of young fellows who took part in it. Many of them returned from the war with a desire to take an active part in the reorganization of society and to prove themselves useful in one sphere or another, but they very soon came up against a wall of alienation. Their disappointment with civilian life has often led to outbursts of the aggressive feelings that had built up in them during the years of the war. Hence the "Afghan syndrome" and "the lost generation of veterans." The enlistment of Afghan veterans for military-patriotic education has not helped to heal the mental scars, compelling them to continue to live and think in martial categories.

Afghan veterans have been allowed little time or opportunity to deal with their own urgent problems, the most important of which is the need to organize real help for those of their number who returned from the war disabled. Captain Aleksandr Kolodeznikov, a Yakut who served in Afghanistan and has now been elected by the Komsomol to the Congress of People's Deputies, has nevertheless had the courage to raise these issues in print, entering into a dispute with those of his former colleagues who argue for the employment of Afghan

¹⁰ *Russkaya mysl'*, August 12, 1988.

¹¹ *Partiinaya zhizn'*, No. 15, 1988; *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 19, 1988.

veterans in the military-patriotic education of young people. Captain Kolodeznikov says that the authorities have simply washed their hands of the Afghan veterans and their problems; it is as if they had been told: "Play around with the lads, there is nothing else for you, you are not fit for anything else."¹²

In fact, there are many causes in Siberia that could derive great benefit from the energy and unusual experiences of these veterans. They include, for example, the fight against pollution in Siberia and for the rational use of its natural resources, and the campaign to obtain a special economic status for the region. Captain Kolodeznikov is also concerned about the "Afghan syndrome." In his opinion, to lessen the psychological and social consequences of the Afghan war, veterans should first concentrate on their

¹² *Krasnaya zvezda*, March 14, 1989.

own problems rather than pass on their dangerous war experience to immature youngsters. Otherwise, there is a danger that Siberian veterans will end up blowing themselves up with grenades, as one veteran did in Kazan',¹³ or chopping off their hands with axes, as an Afghan veteran in Konotop did in order to become entitled to disability benefits.¹⁴

It is to be hoped that the efforts of Captain Kolodeznikov to secure real rights for the Afghan veterans in civilian life will not be in vain and will win out over the aspirations of General P'yankov and his like, who deliberately seek to arouse the as yet unabated martial ardor of the "Afghan brotherhood." It is time to be finished with the war in Afghanistan both in Siberia and in other areas of the country.

¹³ *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, March 17, 1989.

¹⁴ *Komsomol'skoe znamya*, March 31, 1989.

(RL 235/89, May 24, 1989)

Publication of Preliminary Findings on the Tragedy of April 9

Elizabeth Fuller

The Georgian press has published accounts of the second session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet commission charged with investigating the events in Tbilisi on April 9, when peaceful demonstrators were violently dispersed by troops and nineteen people were fatally injured. It is noteworthy that the report that appears in the Georgian-language Party and government newspaper *Komunisti*, written by the young journalist Manana Kartozia (who in recent years has made a name for herself with articles on controversial topics in the Komsomol newspaper *Akhal-gazrda komunisti*), is considerably more informative than the GruzINFORM dispatch in *Komunisti*'s Russian-language counterpart, *Zarya Vostoka*.¹ While the findings of the commission give the lie to several statements published earlier in the Soviet media, the most important questions remain unanswered: Who gave the order to send in the troops? And was Moscow informed in advance?

The heads of the Georgian administrative organs who gave evidence to the commission are cited as stating unanimously that the circumstances of the demonstrations in Tbilisi, which began on April 4, and the slogans and banners displayed by the demonstrators did not warrant the deployment of troops in the city. Nor, they said, was there any justification for the imposition of the curfew, announced on Georgian television only minutes before it was due to take effect on April 9. Both these decisions, according to the heads of the administrative organs, were taken without their knowledge or prior consultation. Furthermore, Public Prosecutor of the Georgian SSR Vakhtang Razmadze provided a list of objects subsequently

¹ The Georgian-language account appeared in *Komunisti* on May 6, 1989, and GruzINFORM's Russian dispatch was printed in *Zarya Vostoka* on May 7, 1989.

retrieved from the scene of the violence—900 shoes, 250 handbags, articles of women's clothing, school textbooks, mattresses, gas masks—which, the commission concluded, "provide grounds for deducing that the meeting was predominantly peaceful" in intent. Razmadze's list and the commission's comment on it were omitted from the Russian-language account in the press, as was the statement that "the minister of justice of the Georgian SSR was unable to cite a single legal document specifying what a curfew entails and what rights and responsibilities it bestows on the military."

Reiterating the findings of Georgia's chief toxicologist, Mikhail Vashakidze, as published in the Georgian press on April 27, two members of the commission reported that laboratory tests had determined the chemical composition of the toxic gas used to disperse the demonstrators, which is known as "C-S." (Vashakidze had given the full name of the gas as chloroacetophenone, or phenyl chloride, which he said causes serious damage to internal tissues as well as eye irritation and headaches.)

Perhaps the most disturbing disclosure in the report on the session concerns the role of the military in the events of April 9. Academician Irakli Dzhordzhadze, a retired lieutenant general who is on the commission, reported that he had twice asked the commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, Colonel General Igor' Rodionov, to answer questions. Not only did Rodionov flatly deny Dzhordzhadze's request, but he also refused to meet with Andrei Sakharov, who attended the session. The commission subsequently published an open letter addressed by the commission to Rodionov reminding him that, as a deputy to the Georgian Supreme Soviet, he was bound under the terms of the republican constitution to comply with "the elementary constitutional demands" of the Supreme Soviet commission and supply

the documentation and information necessary to the inquiry.² The commission further decided that, if Rodionov did not change his attitude to its requests, it would consider stripping him of his seat in the republican Supreme Soviet.

There is surely a connection between Rodionov's refusal to give evidence and the question of who made the decision to deploy troops armed with sharpened shovels and toxic gas against innocent demonstrators and thus bears responsibility for the deaths and injuries that ensued. At a plenum of the Georgian Party Central Committee on April 14, USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated that the decision to use force, to deploy military subunits, and to impose a curfew in Tbilisi had been made by the leadership of the republic headed by the then Party first secretary, Dzhumbar Patiasvili, and had been insisted upon by many prominent people in the republic—who subsequently criticized Patiasvili's role. Shevardnadze went on to specify that the decision had been made "virtually unanimously by the members of the republican leadership, with a few exceptions." The only individual Shevardnadze mentioned by name as opposing the decision was Rodionov, whom Shevardnadze quoted as arguing that the functions of the Soviet armed forces did not include such acts.³ In an interview given to Moscow television on April 29, Rodionov reiterated that he had been opposed to the participation of Soviet Army troops in the attack on the demonstrators. He further stated that it was the Interior Ministry troops, not the military, that used chemical gas against civilians.

A somewhat different version was provided by Patiasvili's successor as Georgian Party first secretary, Givi Gumbaridze, at a meeting at the Tbilisi City Party Committee on April 22. On that occasion, Gumbaridze stated:

You are aware that, in connection with the situation that had arisen in the capital, the Bureau of the Georgian Party Central Committee adopted a political decision on restoring order. The opinion was expressed that if necessary—I emphasize, if necessary—martial law (*osoboe polozenie*) should be imposed. The meeting of the Party *aktiv* on April 8 was informed of this. But I cannot refrain from stating that the majority of Bureau members, including myself, were unaware of the plan, the form, the means, and the timing of the concrete implementation of this measure.⁴

² *Zarya Vostoka*, May 7, 1989.

³ *Zarya Vostoka*, April 15, 1989.

⁴ *Zarya Vostoka*, April 25, 1989.

At a news conference for foreign journalists two days later (no account of which appeared in the Georgian press), Gumbaridze insisted that he had not known of the decision to send troops onto the square occupied by the demonstrators until minutes before the assault took place, at which point it was already too late to countermand the orders that had been given.⁵ Gumbaridze's claim that the decision on the imposition of martial law had been announced to the Georgian Party *aktiv* on April 8—the day before the troop attack—is not entirely convincing. The published account of that meeting does include the statement that the participants "approved a program, which was endorsed by the Bureau of the Georgian Party Central Committee, of urgent political and organizational measures to normalize the situation in the republic," but the meeting also emphasized the need to protect young people, who, as it turned out, constituted the majority of the demonstrators.⁶ It is difficult to reconcile this solicitude with the use of sharpened shovels and toxic gas. The need to restore "calm and reason" was likewise underscored in an appeal by the Georgian leadership that appeared in the republican press on April 9.

Gumbaridze's insistence that the decision to use force against the demonstrators was made by an unnamed minority within the Georgian leadership was echoed by statements made to Western reporters in Moscow following the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on April 25: both Kremlin ideologist Vadim Medvedev and candidate member of the Politburo Georgii Razumovsky (who had accompanied Shevardnadze to Tbilisi in the wake of the events of April 9) insisted that the Kremlin leadership had learned of the violence only after it had taken place.⁷ Most Georgians, however, including film director Eldar Shengelaya, are convinced that Georgian officials would not have been able to send in the troops without permission from Moscow.⁸

The two key questions—who, specifically, made the decision to send in the troops, and did the order emanate from Tbilisi or from Moscow?—inevitably suggest a third: What was the significance of the presence, at the meeting of the Georgian Party *aktiv* on April 8, of the two participants from Moscow—USSR First Deputy Minister of Defense K. A. Kochetov, who presumably would have been able to overrule Rodionov, and CPSU Central Committee function-

⁵ *The Los Angeles Times*, April 25, 1989.

⁶ *Zarya Vostoka*, April 9, 1989.

⁷ *The Baltimore Sun* and *The New York Times*, April 26, 1989.

⁸ *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 22, 1989.

ary V. N. Lobko?⁹ It is to be hoped that the role played by these two men in the events of April 9 figures prominently on the list of questions to

be addressed at subsequent sessions of the Georgian Supreme Soviet's investigative commission.

⁹ *Zarya Vostoka*, April 9, 1989.

(RL 236/89, May 17, 1989)

UKRAINE

Party and Writers at Loggerheads over Ukrainian Popular Front

Roman Solchanyk

The proceedings of the April 18 report and election meeting of the Kiev writers' organization, published in two recent issues of the literary weekly *Literaturna Ukraina*,¹ point to continued tensions between the Party and Ukrainian writers over *Narodnyi rukh Ukrainy za perebudovu* (Popular Movement of Ukraine for *Perestroika*, referred to in short as "*Rukh*" and as "the Movement" here).² The writers appear to have been surprised by the unusually harsh press campaign against the Movement's organizers, which included political accusations reminiscent of the 1960s and 1970s. Among other things, they were charged with agitating for "an independent Ukraine," provoking "civil war," and attempting to set up a competing political party, in what was clearly a Party-inspired move to discredit the Movement.

Although the organized press campaign against the Movement has subsided, the issue figured prominently in the meeting of the Kiev writers' organization, the Party members of which played a key role in the Action Group that organized the Movement along with their counterparts in the Institute of Literature of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.³ The writers are obviously concerned about the implications of the politically-loaded smear campaign, and several of the speakers called on the Ukrainian Party leadership to "review" its attitude towards the writers. The over-

all impression is that the Movement's organizers, although far from ready to abandon their stand, have been placed on the defensive.

The well-known poet Dmytro Pavlychko appeared to be summoning the support of no less a figure than Mikhail Gorbachev by suggesting that more of his colleagues be told of the meeting between a group of writers and Gorbachev during the Party leader's visit to Ukraine in February:

Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev asked if it was true, as he had been told, that we want to form a new party? No, I said, we don't need a new party. And today I am telling you in the name of those who put together the draft program of the Popular Movement of Ukraine for *Perestroika*: We do not need a new party, we need *perestroika*.

Pavlychko also noted that Gorbachev meets with writers to discuss important issues and engage in dialogue, but "for some reason we do not have this kind of a tradition in our republic."

This line—i.e., that the current problems in Ukraine, specifically the opposition to *perestroika* and democratization, are linked wholly or directly to Ukrainian Party leader Volodymyr Shcherbitsky and have little or nothing to do with Moscow—appears to be fairly widespread among Ukrainian cultural figures. The critic Anatolii Pohribnyi told the Kiev writers' meeting that the Party and Gorbachev are grateful to the writers for their civic activities, but Pohribnyi said, "We do not notice this with regard to the administrative-bureaucratic apparatus, whose positions in the republic are rather strong." Following directives from Kiev, Pohribnyi asserted, the republican press opened fire on the writers, characterizing them as "anti-*perestroika*, nationalists, and money-grubbers."

¹ *Literaturna Ukraina*, April 27 and May 4, 1989.

² See Bohdan Nahaylo, "Confrontation over Creation of Ukrainian Popular Front," and "Draft Program of Ukrainian Baltic-Type Popular Movement under Strong Attack," *Report on the USSR*, No. 9, 1989, pp. 13-17 and 27-8.

³ See the interview with the chairman of the Action Group, Ivan Drach, in *Vechirni Kyiv*, March 6, 1989, on how the Movement was organized.

I feel that we have the right not only to demand that this be halted but also to demand that an apology be made to the literary community of the republic.

The novelist and publicist Stepan Kolesnyk maintained that the organized and tendentious appraisal of the Movement in the republic's press was the work of "only some bureaucratized officials who have usurped the right to speak in the name of the people." The novelist Oleksandr Syzonenko, arguing that Ukrainian writers "never came out as opponents of their Party, remaining Communists, the CPSU's first helpers," pleaded for a solution to "this needless confrontation." He addressed Kostyantyn Masyk, the first secretary of the Kiev City Party Committee, who participated in the writers' meeting, requesting that he intervene with the Party leadership:

We ask you, comrade K. I. Masyk, to tell the comrades in the Central Committee that our tasks are the same: accelerating *perestroika*; enriching spiritual life; striving as hard as we can for the realization of the Party's historic objectives. But we ask certain influential leaders to review their positions with regard to the republic's writers.

Not all of the speakers who raised the issue of the Movement were so conciliatory. Stanislav Tel'nyuk was forthright in drawing a direct comparison between the current campaign and those of the Stalinist years, demanding that the accusations against the authors of the Movement's draft program and the Writers' Action Group be rescinded and that this be announced in the press. Similarly, Raisa Ivanchenko—who revealed that a letter-writing campaign is under way to force her out of Kiev State University—referred to "the slander against the entire writers' organization" and "the methods of the 1930s," and called on the Party representatives at the meeting to organize an investigation of the press campaign. Both Tel'nyuk and Ivanchenko suffered in the early 1970s because of their literary publications. The critic Vyacheslav Bryukovets'kyl went further, demanding legal action against slanderers.

The well-known poet Ivan Drach, who is head of the Kiev writers' organization and the main figure in the Movement controversy, did not address the issue in his keynote presentation to the meeting.

From the speech delivered by Masyk, the Kiev City Party leader, it seems fairly clear that the Party leadership is not prepared to make an about face in its attitude towards the Movement. Masyk was diplomatic, assuring the writers that their work is greatly valued in high places and reminding them

that he supported the idea of a group within the Ukrainian Writers' Union that would "promote *perestroika*, that would take upon itself its *spiritual aspects* (emphasis supplied)." But, he maintained, it was one thing to organize groups such as the Movement and another to organize practical work. This, he was suggesting, was the Party's job:

That's why the question comes up of whether we need some new kinds of organizational structure, ones moreover that have pretensions to encompass everything; that take on the task of solving all economic, social, political, spiritual, and ecological questions; and that lead to the replacement of the existing network of the political system of our society?

His response is quite obviously "no." What the Party is interested in is the cooperation of Ukrainian writers and of other elements, including informal groups, on initiatives developed by the Party itself. This was the essence of the message delivered by A. A. Sazonov, Moscow's representative to an all-Union regional scientific conference on nationality relations convened in the West Ukrainian city of Ternopol' on April 6 and 7. Sazonov, who is deputy head of an unidentified subdepartment of the State and Legal Policy Department of the CPSU Central Committee,⁴ told the conference:

In our interconnected society, there can be no separate Uzbek or Georgian, Ukrainian or Russian *perestroika*—there can be no purely national *perestroika*, as some would have. *Perestroika* is international, although, naturally, it should also consider the national factor.⁵

Interestingly, Masyk reminded the writers that the first steps had already been taken to launch just such "a consolidated platform" for *perestroika*—i.e., the March 24 round table with prominent representatives of all the Ukrainian creative unions and societies organized by the Ideological Department of the Ukrainian Party Central Committee.

This meeting witnessed Leonid Kravchuk, the head of the Ideological Department, proposing that the Ukrainian intelligentsia submit its recommendations for the formulation of "a complex program

⁴ Sazonov is probably a deputy to Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Mikhailov, head of the Subdepartment for Interethnic Relations. See Alexander Rahr, "Who Is in Charge of the Party Apparatus?" *Report on the USSR*, No. 15, 1989, p. 23. Cf. Sazonov's participation last year in a round table in Minsk published as "Ne prosto formula bratstva," *Politychesky sobesednik*, 1988, No. 8, pp. 3-6.

⁵ *Radians'ka Ukraina*, April 9, 1989.

for the development of Ukrainian national culture for the period to the year 2000"—a scheme in the tradition of grandiose Soviet projects. Maintaining that the Movement had failed to win the support of the masses, Kravchuk invited the intelligentsia to do what they do best—i.e., to "show [their concern] precisely in the sphere of culture and precisely with their professional means," in short, to stay out of politics. To judge from the transcript of the round table,⁶ this attempt to preempt the Movement was largely successful. It appears that the only participant who, although supporting the idea of such a program, categorically refused to compromise on the Movement was Drach. According to the report, Drach

took a different position from the other participants, which, unfortunately, was not marked by a constructive approach. "The formation of the Popular Movement," he said, "is moving ahead." Rejecting any kind of critical remarks with regard to the draft program of the Popular Movement of Ukraine, he at the same time questioned whether there were nationalist manifestations in our or any other republic. The opponents of the Popular Movement, according to the speaker, are defending the command and administrative system by whatever means. . . .

Those present were said to be "astonished" by Drach's position. The meeting concluded with an agreement that representatives of state organs, creative unions, scholarly institutions, and mass public organizations would work together to establish "an authoritative commission" to develop the kind of program suggested by the Party.

⁶ See *Pravda Ukrainy*, March 30, 1989, and *Literaturna Ukraina*, April 6, 1989.

The Movement appears to be headed for difficult times. It has been rejected by the Party, which at its recent Central Committee plenum roundly criticized the group for its aspirations to mass appeal and the alleged desire "to stand above the organs of Soviet power and basically in opposition to the CPSU."⁷ The republic's academic establishment has disavowed the Movement, and rank-and-file scholars and scientists have been warned to stay away.⁸ Earlier on, prominent writers like Yuri Shcherbak and Borys Oliinyk expressed their reservations about the process by which the draft program had been adopted.⁹ And now the Movement is in danger of being overshadowed by an alternative Party-sponsored program that the Ukrainian intelligentsia simply cannot reject out of hand. On the face of it, the Kiev writers appear to have been outmaneuvered by the Party, the same Party that reigns in Kiev and in Moscow, which should be reason enough to reevaluate some of the optimistic judgments about how the CPSU leadership views *perestroika* in Ukraine.¹⁰

At the risk of sounding trite, it must be stated that the deciding factor will be the position taken by the Ukrainian masses, but that, however, is not readily obvious.

⁷ *Pravda*, May 21, 1989.

⁸ See the report on the March 31 general assembly of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, April 2, 1989.

⁹ See *Robitnycha hazeta*, February 8, 1989, and *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, March 8, 1989.

¹⁰ Some sober thinking along these lines might also clarify Boris El'tsin's puzzlement, which he expressed in his interview with *The Washington Post* (May 25, 1989), about why Shcherbitsky is still the first secretary of the Ukrainian Party.

(RL 237/89, May 22, 1989)

NUCLEAR POWER

Third Anniversary of Chernobyl' Disaster

David Marples

Amid the inevitable publicity that greeted the third anniversary, on April 26, of the Chernobyl' tragedy—official and unofficial gatherings of people in Minsk and Kiev, a press conference, and long interviews with the officials responsible for the cleanup work and the operation

of the power station—one of the most startling series of articles to appear to date about the effects of the disaster was published in the Ukrainian youth newspaper *Molod' Ukrainy*.¹ This two-part

¹ *Molod' Ukrainy*, April 19 and 20, 1989.

series—a bitterly cynical commentary by Viktor Kosarchuk and Ivan Petrenko—is datelined Narodichi, a village in Zhitomir Oblast, which, over the past three months, has become a center of controversy over radioactive fallout.

The two authors state that the oblast was visited twice in February of this year by members of the Institute for Nuclear Research of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The visitors reported their findings to a meeting of the institute on February 22, which concluded that there are large areas in the villages of Klishchi, Khrystynivka, and Nozdryshchi unsuitable for human habitation. The lack of attention to the dangerous situation in Narodichi is blamed by the authors partly on Professor I. Likhtarev of the Center for Radiation Medicine of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, which is based in Kiev. They indicate, through questions asked of a senior scientific worker at the Institute for Nuclear Research, Evgenii Karbetsky, that the information Likhtarev provided about the radiation situation was erroneous.²

In Nozdryshchi, the authors discovered, a woman with three children has been tending a garden bordered on two sides by the barbed wire demarcating "the zone of alienation"—the most seriously contaminated zone. In another village, they found residents cultivating land only two to three kilometers from the wire. In Khrystynivka, which had hitherto been considered "clean," a dosimeter revealed that radiation at one end of a street was tens of times as high as it was at the other, yet people walking in the street were unaware of the situation. The contamination seems to be worst of all in the local forests, where there are now radioactive hotspots in accumulations of fallen leaves.³

Following the revelations about Narodichi published in February in *Moscow News*,⁴ the two journalists relate, a Japanese reporter visited the settlement. He was informed by the chief veterinary surgeon of the raion that some thirty mutant farm animals had been born in 1988, whereas there had previously been no known deformities. On several kolkhozes in the area, he learned, it is forbidden to drink milk and to eat eggs or meat. A local postal worker begged Kosarchuk and Petrenko to ensure that the children are removed from the zone. On local farms, the cows are not tested for radiation but are being milked, and children are taken by

² For more about Likhtarev's statements, see David Marples, "Growing Controversy over Effects of Chernobyl' Disaster," *Report on the USSR*, No. 17, 1989, pp. 17-20.

³ Further information about radioactive contamination of forests is provided in *Lesnaya promyshlennost'*, April 8, 1989, p. 3.

⁴ *Moscow News*, No. 8, 1989, p. 12.

their mothers into fields in which there are high levels of radioactivity. (The authors apparently took these latter examples from the raion newspaper, *Zhovtnevi zori*.)

Possibly because of the situation in Narodichi, the feasibility of providing the population with individual dosimeters to measure radiation levels was discussed at a press conference held in Kiev on April 20. A demand for the provision of such instruments has also been issued by Andrei Pralnikov, writing in *Moscow News*. After commenting on the relatively poor quality of the dosimeters in use at Chernobyl', Pralnikov observed:

But even the instrument used at Chernobyl' was thought highly of. On several occasions I saw people beg workers to sell or exchange their "peepers"—in the zone it has become a kind of hard currency, as valuable as a field set of fatigues worn by our men in Afghanistan.⁵

According to First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers E. V. Kachalovsky, a Kiev factory has now begun to produce dosimeters to designs of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, but the price of one is a prohibitive 450 rubles—just under three months' salary for the average rural worker.⁶

Key questions being asked by the public today concern the radioactive fallout; the complex situation that has resulted in some villages being reinhabited and others being depopulated almost simultaneously; and the continuing operation of the Chernobyl' power plant. Several newspapers published responses to readers' questions in their anniversary issues. Among the most frequent respondents were M. Sedov, the director of the Kombinat production association (which is carrying out the cleanup operations at Chernobyl'), and Mikhail Umanets, the director of the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant. Sedov informed readers that the current radiation levels at Pripyat', where workers at the plant used to live, vary from 0.2 to 2 milliroentgens per hour (or up to 400 times the normal background radiation), while those in the city of Chernobyl' range from 0.1 to 1 milliroentgen per hour. The conclusion is that, while Chernobyl' may be uninhabitable for "tens of decades," Prip'yat', which is being preserved, may never be fit for residence again.⁷

To the question why employees of the Kombinat production association are permitted to live in such towns, Sedov replied that they work there only on a shift basis. The goal is to transfer these cleanup

⁵ *Moscow News*, No. 18, 1989, pp. 8-9.

⁶ *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, April 23, 1989.

⁷ *Ibid.*; *Robitnycha hazeta*, April 26, 1989.

crews to Zelenyi Mys, the settlement for shift workers constructed on the shore of the Kiev reservoir in 1986–87, which is evidently now being expanded. "Believe me," he stated, "people do not live here because they want to." In short, the Kombinat workers are risking their lives by remaining in contaminated zones.

The continuing operation of the nuclear plant itself continues to puzzle and anger many. In Kiev on April 26, when a reported 12,000 people gathered in the Dynamo stadium to commemorate the third anniversary of the nuclear accident, a secretary of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, Dmytro Pavlychko, declared that not all the lessons of Chernobyl' had yet been learned. Henceforth, he maintained, anyone who is sent to work at Chernobyl' should go there for one of two reasons—either to dismantle the station or to assist in sanitizing the zone. Nuclear power operation must be guided by the wisdom of the people, he stated. The meeting was led by Borys V. Kachura, secretary of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and was attended by Party and government leaders who may not have agreed with the sentiments expressed by Pavlychko, but it is made clear in the press reports that his was among the most warmly received of all the speeches.⁸

In an interview published in *Izvestia* on the anniversary of the accident, plant director Umanets acknowledged the clamor for the shutdown of Chernobyl' but said that he preferred to look at the question from the scientific viewpoint. The power station may last out its thirty-year life span, he said, which would mean that the No. 1 reactor would be decommissioned in the year 2007. He admitted, however, that problems with graphite reactors (which have now been removed from the future building program) are necessitating detailed reconstruction work every fifteen years. Work now being carried out on the Leningrad RBMK, which has the oldest graphite reactors in the Soviet Union, is being studied for its cost effectiveness. If it turns out that such reconstruction is not viable economically, Umanets stated, then Chernobyl', along with other power stations with graphite reactors, will be shut down over the next three years.⁹

⁸ *Radyans'ka Ukraina*, April 28, 1989; *Robitnycha hazeta*, April 28, 1989.

⁹ *Izvestia*, April 26, 1989. Umanets' comment pertains to only one problem with the graphite reactor. The ostensible reason for the cessation of building work on others is an inbuilt technical flaw: graphite reactors are unstable at less than 700 megawatts of thermal power. The "weakness" of the reactor was recently acknowledged; see *Strottel'naya gazeta*, April 21, 1989.

This response, as well as others in the interview, fails to address the concerns expressed by the two authors of the article in *Molod' Ukrainy* and by many readers who have written to the Kiev newspaper *Robitnycha hazeta*. By keeping the Chernobyl' plant in operation, the authorities are prolonging the insecurity not only of the 3,500 workers who have to make the daily journey to the plant from Slavutych but also of the Kombinat employees who have to continue decontaminating the zone yet still have nowhere safe to live. Several experts cited in the press acknowledge, moreover, that the psychosomatic illnesses associated with "radiophobia" continue to elicit concern. There is perhaps no greater cause of such anxieties in Ukraine and Belorussia today than the unexpected longevity of the station itself.

One of the biggest obstacles to obtaining information about the situation in the area, as critics have often pointed out, is the inconsistency and lack of candidness in reporting. The editors of *Izvestia*, for example, denounced the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification for introducing a new law to prevent the press from publicizing accidents at nuclear power plants even if they result in nonfatal environmental contamination, while in the same newspaper Boris Paton, the president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, informed readers that the chances that radioactive substances would spread beyond the boundaries of the thirty-kilometer zone were slim—and this statement appeared in the very article that mentioned the future evacuation of a further twelve contaminated villages outside the zone, partly because of wind-borne radioactive dust.¹⁰ Such inconsistencies, as Kosarchuk and Petrenko note, are the main reasons for the persistence of "radiophobia."

While several reporters noted that Chernobyl' remains a source of concern three years after the accident, and while Umanets stated that the process of "liquidating the consequences of the accident" would not be completed for at least a century, in some quarters the anniversary date was greeted with relative indifference. In Minsk, for example—the capital of the republic most affected by radioactive fallout—no government or Party functionaries attended the commemorative meeting.

On April 25, an international conference attended by representatives of seventeen countries, including the United States and Canada, took place in Kiev. That the conference was linked with Chernobyl' is manifest from its title—"EuroChernobyl'." One of the factors taken into consideration by the

¹⁰ *Izvestia*, April 26, 1989. For a discussion of the biological effects of the accident today, see the interview with botanist Dmytro Grodzinsky in *Kul'tura i zhyttya*, April 23, 1989.

participants, who were studying the probable effects of a conventional war in Europe, was the distribution of nuclear power plants.¹¹ Yet such a conference can have the effect of diverting attention from more pressing issues. When the accident at Chernobyl' occurred, the authorities commented that the disaster illustrated the wisdom of Mikhail

¹¹ See the reports in *Radians'ka Ukraina*, April 26 and 27, 1989. On the anniversary date, no other article on a topic related to the Chernobyl' accident appeared in this newspaper.

Gorbachev's call for the removal of all nuclear weapons from the face of the earth by the year 2000. Today, three years after the accident, the theme of "a common European home" and debates about conventional war that point to Chernobyl' as evidence of what might happen in a war almost overshadow the increasingly formidable problems being caused by the nuclear fallout. In short, in some official circles at least, there appears to be more concern with an imagined future scenario than with the results of an actual disaster.

(RL238/89, May 22, 1989)

The USSR This Week

Vera Tolz & Melanie Newton

Saturday, May 13

Shevardnadze Concludes Visit to Bonn

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher held talks in Bonn. They signed a protocol on West German aid for the area affected by the Armenian earthquake last December. Officials said West Germany would provide 2,000 breeding cattle worth 4 million deutschmarks to restock herds lost in the quake. They said it would also build an orthopedic center in the region to help those who lost limbs (*RFE/RL Special*, May 13). Speaking to reporters after the talks with Genscher, Shevardnadze said that, if NATO modernizes its short-range nuclear missiles, the Soviet Union will have to reconsider whether to destroy its SS-23 missiles as it has pledged to do under the INF treaty. Genscher told journalists that Shevardnadze's visit to Bonn had been useful and had produced some good results. Genscher said some problems concerning the status of West Berlin had been solved during the talks (*DPA*, May 13). The same day, Shevardnadze left Bonn for Moscow.

Leningraders Create Informal Group Campaigning for Solov'ev's Ouster

AP reported the creation of an informal group in Leningrad whose aim is to oust the city's Party first secretary, Yuri Solov'ev. It quoted Petr Filipov, a Communist Party member and the leader of the new group, as saying that he and several other reform-minded Communists were working to bring about Solov'ev's replacement. Solov'ev was defeated at the elections in March to the Congress of People's Deputies.

Investigator Says Ligachev Figures in Corruption Probe

The Soviet Union's top corruption investigator Nikolai Ivanov, who is a candidate in repeat elections to the Congress of People's Deputies, indicated during debates on Leningrad television on May 12 that the name of conservative Politburo member Egor Ligachev figures in materials concerning corruption among top government and Party officials. Ivanov was answering questions about the progress of the fight against the Soviet mafia. He said the names of former Leningrad leader Grigorii Romanov, former Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev, and former head of the USSR Supreme Court Vladimir Terebilov were also to be found in the investigation materials. Ivanov gave no details of the investigation and stressed that he was not saying that any of the top Party officials he mentioned was guilty.

On May 13, *Pravda* carried a statement by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet saying that Ivanov and Tel'man Gdlyan, another prominent investigator, had been making "provocative statements" on radio and television about alleged law-breaking by Soviet political leaders. Earlier this month Gdlyan accused senior Party officials and the KGB of trying to stop his probe of corruption among top Soviet officials. On April 25, the USSR Supreme Court issued a resolution proposing that Gdlyan be removed from his position as an investigator of especially important cases. The reason given was that in 1982-83 Gdlyan became a leading figure in the fabrication of charges against a well-known Estonian scientist, I. Hint, who was arrested on trumped-up charges of embezzlement. *Pravda* of May 13 also quoted the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet as saying a special commission had been set up to investigate violations of legality that Ivanov and Gdlyan are alleged to have perpetrated while conducting various investigations.

On May 16, Ligachev denied allegations that he was involved in a corruption case under investigation by Ivanov. Novosti press agency said Ligachev made his denial in a message to the special commission investigating Ivanov and Gdlyan's methods. Ligachev called Ivanov's statement slanderous and said it was made for political purposes. Ligachev demanded a full investigation and a public report (*AP, UPI, May 16*). On May 18, Solomentsev also denied allegations of his involvement in corrupt circles. He said he had been discredited by Ivanov and Gdlyan and called for the matter to be investigated.

On May 19, more than 3,000 people were reported to have demonstrated in Moscow in support of Ivanov and Gdlyan (*TASS, in English, May 19 and 20*). The demonstration took place after Soviet television (May 19) quoted the special commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet as saying Ivanov and Gdlyan had seriously violated the law. The commission said they had used illegal methods to obtain evidence in the Uzbekistan corruption affair that involved Yuri Churbanov, the late Leonid Brezhnev's son-in-law.

Baker Comments on His Visit to Moscow

US Secretary of State James Baker said the United States and the Soviet Union were interested in moving from confrontation to cooperation in resolving regional conflicts. He said this was one of the aspects that emerged from his two days of talks with Soviet leaders in Moscow last week. Baker also said the Soviet offer to withdraw 500 short-range nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe was a good but "very modest" step, given the Soviet numerical advantage in that field (*Reuters, UPI, May 13*).

Representatives of Baltic Movements Meet in Tallinn

Representatives of the independent reform movements in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia met in Tallinn to discuss efforts to gain greater political and economic autonomy from Moscow for their republics. Reuters said that speakers at the "Baltic Assembly" called for the Baltic republics to be given control of their own economies. The assembly is sponsored by the Popular Fronts of Estonia and Latvia and the Lithuanian

reform movement, Sajudis (*AP, Radio Stockholm, May 13*). The assembly continued on May 14. Western agencies reported that participants in the assembly criticized the annexation of the Baltic states by the USSR in 1940. They called on the international community to consider the legal status of the region (*Reuters, AP, Radio Stockholm, May 14*). The participants also called for a conference with the Moscow authorities over the future development of the Baltic republics. The call came in the form of a draft resolution issued by the assembly (*RFE Lithuanian Service, May 14*).

Soviet Troop Withdrawal from Czechoslovakia Begins

The first of about 80,000 Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia began to withdraw as part of a partial pull-out of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe announced by Mikhail Gorbachev last December. Withdrawals have also begun from Hungary and East Germany. Czechoslovak Chief of Staff Colonel General Miroslav Vacek said about 1,500 Soviet troops will leave his country this year and more than 5,000 next year (*TASS, Radio Prague, May 13*).

Renewed Clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh

TASS and *Krasnaya zvezda* reported more ethnic clashes and protests in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The reports said 700 people had violated the curfew on the night of May 11 and had assembled in the oblast capital of Stepanakert. The reports said people shouted and threw bottles at soldiers before dispersing. Arkadii Vol'sky, head of the special administration in the region, was quoted as saying a military unit broke up a clash on May 8 between 300 Armenians and Azerbaijanis. He said three Azerbaijanis were shot and wounded and two Armenians were injured when a truck drove into a crowd.

Criminal Action over Building Standards after Quake

The Soviet authorities plan to initiate criminal proceedings over poor building standards that contributed to the death toll in last year's earthquake in Armenia. TASS said a Party commission coordinating relief work had met on May 12. Members of the commission said poor construction and deviation from planning norms were responsible for the high casualty figure. The commission decided to send its conclusions to the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office "to bring the guilty parties to justice."

Sunday, May 14

Gorbachev's Visit to China

On May 14, Gorbachev left Moscow for China to attend the first Sino-Soviet summit for thirty years. He made a stopover in the Siberian city of Irkutsk. Speaking to a crowd in the city, Gorbachev said production of consumer goods was improving and there were more goods gradually reaching the market. He said, however, that some "hotheads" want to speed up economic reforms and let the market balance supply and demand. But Gorbachev said this would cause price fluctuations. He said he favors gradual price reforms.

During his speech, Gorbachev also said the Soviet military budget will be published soon, although he gave no date (*Central Television*, May 14).

On May 15, Gorbachev arrived in Beijing. He was accompanied by senior Soviet Party and government officials. In an arrival statement Gorbachev said he hoped his visit would mark a watershed in relations between the two countries. In a last-minute change, formal welcoming ceremonies for Gorbachev were switched to the airport from Tiananmen Square because of continuing demonstrations there by tens of thousands of Chinese students (*Reuters*, AP, May 15). Speaking the same day at a banquet in Beijing, Gorbachev said he believed China and the USSR can jointly help solve global problems and strengthen peace and security in Asia (*TASS*, *Reuters*, May 15). Soviet television devoted a thirty-minute report to Gorbachev's arrival in Beijing. It reported the formal greetings and also included film of the mass student demonstrations on Tiananmen Square. The report did not explain, however, that the students were demonstrating for a more democratic society in China.

On May 16, Gorbachev began talks with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing's Great Hall of the People. A wreath laying ceremony in Tiananmen Square was canceled because of continuing student demonstrations there. During the talks, which lasted two and a half hours, Deng said relations between China and the Soviet Union had been normalized. Deng said the crucial issue in the world today is relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. He said he thought US-Soviet ties were changing from confrontation to dialogue. Later the same day, Gorbachev had talks with Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng. Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov said they discussed the issue of border troops. Chinese television quoted Li as saying Gorbachev also expressed willingness to discuss an eventual total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia. Gorbachev also met with Chinese Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (*Xinhua*, in English, Western agencies, May 16).

On May 17, Gorbachev gave a major televised address to representatives of the Chinese public in the Great Hall of the People. He called for the demilitarization of the Chinese-Soviet border and said it should be turned into a frontier of peace. He also gave fuller details of deep cuts Moscow plans to make in its Far East forces. He said twelve army divisions would be slashed, eleven air regiments disbanded, and sixteen warships removed from the Pacific fleet. He said that, by 1990, Soviet troop levels along the Soviet-Chinese border will be cut by 120,000 men. He called the summit a milestone in Sino-Soviet ties and said he believed both sides had learned from past mistakes and wanted never to repeat them. He also said the international community should take a more vigorous stand on the Afghan conflict and that a settlement on Cambodia was "gradually taking on a realistic shape." (*TASS*, in English, *Xinhua*, in English, *Reuters*, AP, AFP, May 16 and 17).

Following his speech, Gorbachev told a news conference that a very important stage had begun in Sino-Soviet ties. He called the Beijing summit a watershed event. As he spoke, more than a million prodemocracy marchers surged through

central Beijing. Gorbachev told the news conference, which was delayed because of the demonstrations, that he would not judge the protests. But he said he would use political methods if such events occurred in Moscow. Gorbachev defended Socialist countries experiencing unrest as they try to reform. He said such problems only prove that the changes under way are profound. He said anyone who thinks this road will lead socialism "to the ash heap of history" will be disappointed (TASS, in English, AP, Reuters, UPI, May 17).

In a live interview on Chinese television the same day, Gorbachev said he had received a letter from Chinese students expressing support for reform. He said "this is something that brings our two peoples even closer" (Reuters, May 17).

Soviet media coverage of the summit stressed the normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union. They carried only brief reports, however, on the student demonstrations and *Pravda* suggested that many Chinese disapproved of them. All the major newspapers said the students welcomed Gorbachev and hailed his policy of *perestroika*. On May 18, the Soviet television news program "Vremya" carried film of the student protests, also showing those on hunger strike.

On May 18, Gorbachev ended his visit to China in Shanghai. As Gorbachev arrived in Shanghai, students stepped up prodemocracy demonstrations there. Tens of thousands of students were said to be taking part. TASS said the Chinese authorities had "practically lost control" over the demonstrations in Beijing and it reported the demonstrators' demands for the resignation of several Chinese leaders. A joint communiqué issued at the end of Gorbachev's visit called for a further improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and said "neither side would seek hegemony of any form" in any part of the world. The document also called for an international conference on the Cambodian war as soon as possible. It urged that arms shipments to Cambodia's warring factions be reduced and eventually end when Vietnamese troops withdraw (TASS, in English, *Xinhua*, in English, Reuters, May 18).

Repeat Elections to Congress of People's Deputies

Repeat elections to the Congress of People's Deputies took place in the Soviet Union today. Among the winners were *Ogonek* editor Vitalii Korotich, who received 84 percent of the vote in a race against nine other candidates, and criminal investigator Nikolai Ivanov, who defeated twenty-seven other contestants to win 60 percent of the vote. Both men were opposed by local Party officials. Other victors included the recently appointed head of the Muslim Religious Board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Mukhammadsadyk Mama-yusupov. According to officials of the People's Front of Latvia, its candidates won five of six contested seats. In Estonia's single runoff election, Klara Hallik, who was endorsed by the People's Front of Estonia, won over 50 percent of the vote. The conservative editor of *Molodaya gvardiya*, Anatolii Ivanov, was defeated, as was reform-minded playwright Mikhail Shatrov. As expected, many of the 199 seats contested on May 14 remain to be decided in runoff elections scheduled for

May 21. Five of eight contests were decided on May 14 in Moscow, but in three districts—Proletarsky, Kuntsevsky, and Lyublinsky—runoff elections are still to be held. Runoffs will also be held in six districts in Belorussia, three in Uzbekistan, one in Kiev, and three in Leningrad. (TASS, *Radio Moscow-1*, AP, May 15). It was reported on May 16 that the poet Evgenii Evtushenko had won a seat in the congress from a constituency in Kharkov. Reuters quoted Evtushenko's wife as saying that he had won the seat against eight other candidates, including the city's mayor. Evtushenko is a vocal supporter of *perestroika* but earlier failed to gain nomination to the congress as a Writers' Union candidate.

Sakharov Says Soviet Economic Reforms Going Too Slowly

Speaking to a congress of the Italian Socialist Party in Milan, Academician Andrei Sakharov said the Soviet reform process was moving too slowly. He said the USSR was "on the brink of economic catastrophe." Sakharov said that, although Gorbachev's reforms were a move in the right direction, their slow pace was causing "profound distress." Sakharov said there had been a need to dismantle the old centralized system. But he said people were demoralized because the old system "is not being replaced by anything else" (Reuters, May 14).

Large Number of AIDS Carriers Reported in Ukraine

Ukrainian Deputy Health Minister Yuri Spizhenko said 142 carriers of the AIDS virus had been recorded in the Ukraine. He described this fact as alarming. Spizhenko, who heads a Ukrainian AIDS commission, was quoted by TASS as saying that twenty-seven of the identified AIDS carriers were Soviet citizens, while 115 were foreigners.

Monday, May 15

***Pravda* Defends Kadar against Hungarian Opposition**

Pravda defended Hungary's former Party head, Janos Kadar, against criticism from the Hungarian opposition. The newspaper called Kadar "a prominent and influential leader." *Pravda* said the Hungarian opposition was acting against Hungarian interests by making "insulting and unfair remarks" about Kadar and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. (Kadar led the Hungarian Party for thirty-two years after the Soviet invasion in 1956.)

Victory for Ecologists in Cheboksary

Radio Moscow said residents of the city of Cheboksary on the Volga River had won a victory over the authorities by blocking plans to increase the water level of the city's reservoir. The radio said the USSR State Planning Committee had decided to stop the project after scientists and experts advised against it. It said Cheboksary citizens gathered tens of thousands of signatures for a petition opposing the plan on the grounds it would endanger the ecological situation and the fish reserves and lead to flooding. The radio said the foundations of many buildings in the city were below the present water level of the reservoir.

International Association of Nuclear Operators Formed

Nuclear power plant operators from around the world gathered in Moscow to launch a new association designed to share safety information and prevent a repetition of accidents like the Chernobyl' disaster in 1986. Representatives of more than 300 power generating stations in thirty countries, including the United States, the USSR, France, and Britain, signed a charter inaugurating the World Association of Nuclear Operators. AP said the organization's charter stated that its mission "is to maximize the safety and reliability of the operation of nuclear power plants by exchanging information and encouraging comparison, emulation, and communication among its members."

International Human-Rights Conference Opens in Moscow

TASS said jurists from East and West opened an international conference on human rights in Moscow. The four-day conference is organized by the Soviet Jurists Association and the International Commission of Jurists. TASS said participants will debate such topics as *perestroika*, human rights, the independence of judges and lawyers, the reform of criminal legislation, and the correlation between international agreements and domestic law on human rights. TASS said foreign participants will visit a corrective labor camp and meet officials of the RSFSR Ministry of Justice.

Baltic Deputies Form Bloc, Adopt Resolution

Deputies from the three Baltic republics plan to jointly advocate three pieces of legislation when the USSR Congress of People's Deputies convenes. They say they will press for full economic autonomy for all Union republics. They also want the congress to disband the special military forces that have been used against demonstrators. In addition, the Baltic deputies want the congress to refuse to ratify a draft law issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet making it a crime to criticize government officials (AP, May 15).

USSR Begins Withdrawal of Troops from Mongolia

The USSR began a planned partial withdrawal of its military forces from Mongolia. It is to withdraw 75 percent of its troops from Mongolia by the end of next year. Moscow says that will mean a pull-out of 50,000 troops plus a large number of tanks, combat vehicles, and aircraft. The withdrawal coincided with Gorbachev's arrival in China, which has long demanded a cut in Soviet forces in Mongolia. A Soviet official said in Moscow, however, that the coincidence was unintentional (TASS, RFE/RL Special, May 15).

National Center for Soviet Germans Created

TASS reported that a national center to represent the interests of Soviet Germans had been created in Orenburg. At the center's opening session, emphasis was laid on finding a solution to the more pressing problems besetting the Soviet German population, such as the deterioration of the role and status of the German language and the loss of national customs and traditions. (In 1979, only 57 percent of the 1,963,000 Soviet Germans considered German their mother tongue.) It was noted at the session that it is these problems that have prompted mass emigration to West Germany.

**USSR Allows Japanese to Visit
Vladivostok for First Time**

Some 240 Japanese tourists from the city of Niigata left by ship for Vladivostok today after the Soviet Union agreed to allow Japanese to tour the Far East port city for the first time since World War II. The mayor of Niigata, Genki Wakasugi, who was among the group, said that during the visit he would discuss with Soviet officials the possibility of establishing sister city relations and economic and cultural exchanges between Niigata and Vladivostok (AP, May 15).

Tuesday, May 16

**Jewish Activist Says Many Jews
Still Waiting to Emigrate**

Soviet Jewish activist Yulii Kosharovskiy said that despite great increases in Jewish emigration from the USSR there are still many Soviet Jews "stuck in refusal." He told reporters in Washington that thousands of Soviet Jews are "still fighting for freedom." Kosharovskiy arrived in the West in March after waiting seventeen years for an exit visa. Kosharovskiy said he supports President Bush's call to the Soviet Union to codify its emigration practices in accordance with international law and the Helsinki accords (*RFE/RL Special*, May 16).

New Gosteleradio Chief Appointed

Radio Moscow (2000) reported that Mikhail Nenashev had been appointed head of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. He replaces Aleksandr Aksenov who is retiring. The move was made by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Nenashev was previously chairman of the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade. No new chief for that committee was reported. It seems that the last straw that led to the replacement of Aksenov was a statement made on Leningrad television on May 12 by corruption investigator Nikolai Ivanov about the involvement of Egor Ligachev and other officials in corruption.

**Rumors of Food Rationing
in Moscow Denied**

Soviet newspapers denied rumors about rationing of some basic foodstuffs in Moscow. They said salt is in short supply, causing long queues at Moscow shops. They say this has created rumors about imminent rationing of meat, cheese, sausages, and other basic foodstuffs. The reports said the rumors were unfounded and there would be no rationing of meat, milk, or bakery products "in the foreseeable future" (*Radio Moscow*, May 16, 0700, quoting *Trud* and *Stroitel'naya gazeta*).

**USSR Said to Have Stopped
Arms Supplies to Nicaragua**

Reports quoting unidentified government officials in Washington said Gorbachev had informed President Bush in a letter this month that all Soviet weapons deliveries to Nicaragua were halted at the end of last year. The officials said the letter was received shortly before US Secretary of State James Baker visited Moscow, where he is said to have been given reconfirmation of the halt in weapons deliveries. They stressed that Gorbachev's assurances did not cover delivery of other forms of military assistance, such as vehicles and supplies.

The United States has been seeking to persuade the Soviet Union to cease its arms supplies to Nicaragua for some time (AP, AFP, May 16).

**Schifter Cites Increase
in Emigration Permits**

Richard Schifter, US assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, said there has been a big increase in the number of emigration permits issued in the Soviet Union so far this year. Schifter said 57,000 emigration permits were issued during the first four months. He said 27,000 permits were for ethnic Germans and 21,000 for Jews and Pentecostals (USIS, May 16).

**No Soviet Shuttle
Flight This Year**

The head of the Soviet space center, Aleksandr Dunaev, said there will be no flight of the space shuttle "Buran" this year. Dunaev told a press conference in Moscow that the decision is in no way connected with any technical deficiencies. He said "Buran" is ready to fly and the next flight will be made when there is a payload to pay at least part of the cost (TASS, May 16). Shuttle pilot Igor Volk said in New York two weeks ago that there are technical problems with the shuttle's flight control system and it may not fly again until 1992. "Buran" made its only flight, unmanned, last November 15. It flew two earth orbits before landing near the launch site at Baikonur.

Wednesday, May 17

**Soviet Space Expert Criticizes
"Mir" Space Station**

A leading Soviet space expert said half the equipment aboard the orbiting "Mir" space station does not work. Former cosmonaut Vladimir Shatalov said crews have "wasted a great deal of time" on technical repair work. Shatalov, who is chief of cosmonaut training, was quoted in *Izvestia*. He said the Soviet Union should create a special agency that would "put space to use for the economy." He said the lack of such a controlling body has led to decisions made without regard for cost.

**Writer Asks If Chernobyl' Clouds
Were Seeded to Avoid Moscow**

In an open letter to *Komsomol'skaya pravda*, Ales Adamovich, a prominent author and a member of the Congress of People's Deputies, asked whether clouds loaded with radiation from the Chernobyl' nuclear accident were seeded to make them rain before they could reach Moscow. In a letter addressed to Deputy Prime Minister Boris Shcherbina, head of the commission in charge of the Chernobyl' cleanup, Adamovich spoke of fears expressed by people in the Mogilev and Bryansk regions that they were sacrificed in order to spare Moscow from radiation. He said serious scientists also believed the clouds had been seeded, but he offered no evidence and did not name the scientists. TASS reported today that eleven villages near Bryansk are to be evacuated because of persistently high levels of radiation. On May 18, the British science magazine *Nature* quoted Vitalii Starodumov, director of the Kompleks group that is working on the cleanup around Chernobyl', as saying that decontamination

of the most radioactive land around the power plant is almost complete. Starodumov told *Nature* that there was virtually no radioactive dust being spread by the wind, because contaminated top soil had been removed and the land recultivated and treated with chemicals (*Reuters*, May 17).

Thursday, May 18

**Lithuania and Estonia Adopt
Legislation on Sovereignty**

The Supreme Soviets of Lithuania and Estonia passed legislation giving their republics more autonomy. The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration of sovereignty for the republic and approved amendments to the republic's constitution. One amendment said Soviet laws are valid in Lithuania only if approved by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. In Estonia, the Supreme Soviet approved a plan for economic self-management that includes limited ownership of private property (*AP*, *RFE Estonian Service*, *RFE Lithuanian Service*, May 18). The same day, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet issued a resolution calling on the new USSR Supreme Soviet to condemn and abrogate the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. The Estonian Supreme Soviet also passed a resolution condemning the use of troops and poison gas to suppress a demonstration in Tbilisi last month (*RFE Estonian Service*, *TASS*, May 19).

**Vorontsov in Teheran
to Discuss Afghanistan**

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yulii Vorontsov arrived in Teheran for talks on the situation in Afghanistan. Vorontsov is also Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan. The Iranian news agency IRNA said Vorontsov would also discuss bilateral relations with Iran. A Soviet economic delegation ended a visit to Teheran today after preparing trade and economic cooperation agreements. Radio Teheran said Iranian parliamentary speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani will sign the agreements when he visits Moscow next month.

**Heads of Warsaw Pact and NATO
Meet for First Time**

The commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, Soviet General Petr Lushev, met and shook hands with the supreme commander of allied forces in Europe, US General John Galvin. *Reuters* said this was the first such encounter between the top military men of the two alliances. It took place at a conference in London on defense matters. In a speech to the conference, Lushev reiterated Soviet opposition to modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear missiles. Later Lushev told reporters he hoped the informal encounter with Galvin would be followed by official meetings.

**Arens Said He Expects Majority
of Soviet Jews to Emigrate**

Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens said he expects a majority of the more than 1.5 million Soviet Jews to emigrate in the next few years. Arens said his belief stems from assurances made by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to US Secretary of State James Baker in Moscow last week that all barriers to Jewish emigration will be lifted (*The New York Times*, May 18). The same day the World Jewish

Congress announced that it will hold its executive meeting in Moscow next fall for the first time. A WJC spokesman said the meeting would probably take place in October (*Reuters*, May 19).

**USSR Makes Formal Proposals
at Conventional Arms Talks**

The Soviet Union formally offered proposals for reducing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to equal ceilings by the end of the century. The proposals were made by Soviet delegate Oleg Grinevsky at today's session of the twenty-three nation Vienna conference on cutting conventional forces. The figures are not new. Mikhail Gorbachev described them to James Baker in Moscow last week. NATO diplomats welcomed the move as a help to negotiations but said some of the Warsaw Pact figures are too high (*RFE/RL Special*, May 18).

**Gorbachev Interview
Focuses on Private Life**

In an interview to be published soon in the journal *Izvestiya TsK KPSS*, Mikhail Gorbachev says he works virtually around the clock and relaxes by taking walks in the forest. TASS said that in the interview Gorbachev reminisces about his childhood and youth in Stavropol. He also says his 1,200-ruble salary is no higher than that of any other Politburo member. He says he has the use of a private country house but has never owned one himself (*TASS*, May 18).

**Commission Recommends Fewer
Nuclear Tests at Semipalatinsk**

Radio Moscow (2100) said a Soviet commission had recommended reducing the number and size of underground nuclear tests conducted at the Semipalatinsk site in Kazakhstan. The report said the state commission acted after investigating a leak of radioactive gases from the site after an underground test on February 12. It said the gases spread to a small town but were not a danger to inhabitants.

**Soviet Television Shows
Film of Polish Protesters**

Soviet television showed short scenes from demonstrations in the Polish city of Cracow this week held to protest against the presence of Soviet troops. The "Vremya" news program showed demonstrators marching in front of the Soviet consulate carrying a poster and chanting "Soviets go home." It also showed them raising barricades and throwing stones at police armored cars.

**Ukrainian Clergymen
Stage Hunger Strike
to Press Demands**

Three bishops and three priests of the Ukrainian Catholic Church were reported to be staging a hunger strike in Moscow to press demands for the legalization of their Church. The Ukrainian Catholic Church has been banned since 1946 when Stalin ordered it absorbed by the Russian Orthodox Church. The six clergymen traveled to Moscow from the Ukraine on May 16 to seek talks with Soviet officials. Reports said the delegation began the hunger strike while waiting at the Kremlin to meet a member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (*RFE/RL Special*, May 18). It was reported on May 19 that Ukrainian Catholics in Lvov had joined the hunger strikers in Moscow (*RFE/RL Special*, May 19). Later the same day, the press office of the Ukrainian Catholic

Synod in Rome said the hunger strike by the Ukrainian Catholics had ended after six churchmen met a member of the Supreme Soviet. The press office said the meeting produced no immediate results, but another meeting was promised and the Supreme Soviet official said he would try to intervene with the local authorities to ease persecution of the Church.

**Lithuanians and Latvians
Hold Rallies in Support
of Crimean Tatars**

Solidarity rallies were held in the capitals of Riga and Vilnius to mark the forty-fifth anniversary of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars. Radio Riga said Crimean Tatars and representatives of the Popular Front of Latvia spoke at the Riga rally and expressed the hope that the next USSR Supreme Soviet would allow the Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland. The radio said the rally in Vilnius was organized by the "Rebirth of Culture" society of Crimean Tatars living in Lithuania (*Radio Riga*, 2200, May 18).

**El'tsin Interviewed by *Paris Match*
and *Washington Post***

Interviews with Boris El'tsin were published in *Paris Match* and *The Washington Post* on May 18 and 19 respectively. In *Paris Match* El'tsin warned that the Soviet people would not wait much longer for better living standards. He also said that, to be successful, *perestroika* requires the election of a new Party Central Committee. He proposed that a special Party congress be called to do this. El'tsin said he and Gorbachev share a joint strategy but have differences over tactics. Asked in the interview whether he would run for the office of president against Gorbachev, El'tsin replied, "Why not?" In his interview with *The Washington Post* El'tsin expressed concern that officials are trying to "neutralize" evidence of high-level corruption and are putting pressure on witnesses to retract statements given to prosecutors. Referring to the mention of Ligachev's name in connection with the corruption scandal, El'tsin said that the investigator Nikolai Ivanov must have evidence linking Ligachev and others to corruption cases, otherwise he would not have dared to say anything.

Friday, May 19

**Frunze Bus Drivers Get Wage
Increase after Strike**

A four-hour strike by more than 200 bus drivers in Frunze resulted in a promise from the Kirgiz government of more pay and better social conditions. TASS said the strike took place on May 16. It said the drivers had long demanded a change of the labor organization and pay system. It said the Kirgiz government decided to increase the drivers' wages, modernize the buses, allot land for the construction of apartments, and introduce breaks for the bus drivers along their routes. TASS said the measures go into effect on June 2.

Hijack Attempt on Soviet Plane

It was reported that an unsuccessful attempt had been made to hijack a Soviet airliner in Africa. Reports from Tanzania said two people were injured in the attempt, which ended on

May 18 at Dar es Salaam airport. The hijackers are in custody. It is not clear if the injured were hijackers or passengers. The airliner was on a flight from Luanda, the capital of Angola, when the hijackers tried to seize control. The reports said they were overpowered by security guards aboard the plane (*Xinhua, AP, May 19*).

Ryzhkov Criticized as Ecologically "Illiterate"

Soviet biologist Aleksei Yablokov, who is a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, criticized Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov's record on protecting the environment. At a news conference in Moscow, Yablokov called Ryzhkov "an illiterate" on ecological issues. He said the Congress of People's Deputies should consider whether Ryzhkov should be replaced, but he stopped short of actually calling for Ryzhkov's ouster. Yablokov has been elected to the congress. He specifically criticized Ryzhkov's support for a plan for developing the chemical industry in Western Siberia (*Reuters, AFP, May 19*).

Number of AIDS-Carriers in Elista and Volgograd Rises

More children and adults have contracted AIDS at two places in the RSFSR where the disease was spread earlier this year through the use of unsterilized syringes in hospitals. Soviet television said in the news program "Vremya" that fifty-eight children and nine adults were infected in Elista in the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic and that twenty-three children and one adult had contracted the virus in Volgograd. The same day, Deputy Prime Minister of the RSFSR Nikolai Trublín told Soviet television that a wide network of laboratories would be set up in the RSFSR to diagnose AIDS cases. He said that an RSFSR AIDS center would open in Moscow within one and a half months.

Demonstration in Tbilisi

Thousands of people took part in a march in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi to mourn the victims of last month's clashes between demonstrators and security forces. Soviet television said people from all over Georgia, including some Armenians, participated.

(RL 239/89, May 19, 1989)

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For information, please contact John Tedstrom, RFE/RL, Inc., Oettingenstrasse 67, am Englischen Garten, D-8000 Munich 22, FRG. Telephone (049-89) 2102-2043; Telex 523 228/523 904, Telefax (049-89) 228 5188.



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